

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON “THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD’S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA’S SECURITY” WITH FRANK MILLER, PRINCIPAL, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP

MR. ROBERT FEIDLER: Well good morning, and welcome to the home of the Reserve Officers Association. My name is Bob Feidler and I’m the director of our strategic education program. And it has been my pleasure to work with Peter Huessy and the amazing program he has developed over the last decade, and with NDIA, of course, in being major sponsors of this program today.

Peter has conducted the Congressional Breakfast Seminar series on strategic nuclear deterrence and missile defense for a long, long time. Many of you have been frequent attendees of those programs, and they’re some of the best programs in Washington. I will note that today’s program is being broadcast live over the Internet, and it will be available on YouTube if you would like to either notify colleagues back in the office or if you would like to revisit it later to see what any of the speakers may have said.

You can locate it at YouTube.com/roavideos, or if you go to the ROA web site, we’ll have it posted on there as well at [www.ROA.org](http://www.ROA.org). Just look under – there will probably be a big icon there for videos and that’s where it’s at. So you can find it at either of those two locations.

It’s been a very great pleasure to work with Task Force 21 of Minot, North Dakota on this program today. Minot is famous for a number of things. Maybe some of you have heard of North Hostfest? It’s the biggest Scandinavian festival in America. It occurs in late September. It’s also boom town USA. You’re all familiar with the oil, gas, coal and other energy in western North Dakota and the boom in the (oil sands ?) in Minot.

It’s also the home of the 5<sup>th</sup> bomber wing and the 91<sup>st</sup> missile wing. It’s a real pleasure to introduce the chairman of Task Force 21, Mark Jantzer, who is a councilman in Minot. He’s the chairman of their Chamber of Commerce, and is doing a tremendous job for over a dozen years on issues relating to national security and Minot Air Force Base.

Mark.

(Applause).

MR. MARK JANTZER: That’s awfully polite applause for this early in the morning. I thank you all for being here. Welcome.

It’s our pleasure to sponsor this event this morning. And for those of you in the audience, we’ve had overflow capacity. So I’m glad to see that and I apologize for the tight quarters, but we’re glad that you’re here.

I see many friends in the audience of longtime work on work on policy issues. And I guess we live in interesting times. There are many challenges and choices before us. It seems that the Pentagon is ready to make decisions about nuclear force structure, and the administration is eager to start a new round of nuclear weapons talks with Russia.

There are many voices trying to influence the outcome of these actions by calling for precipitous reductions in our nuclear force structure and changes to our alert status; plus, perhaps eliminating one leg of the triad or maybe even two. Some of us think that those policies seem a little bit – are based on bad information and analysis that if applied would undermine our national security. And so that's why we're here this morning.

We hope that this session will help to clarify that today's nuclear triad and alert posture should not be abandoned and that we are on the right track for the foreseeable future. Please enjoy the speakers and engage this group with questions. Again, welcome. We're glad that you're here.

Thank you.

(Applause).

MR. PETER HUESSY: I want to thank you all for being here. I'm Peter Huessy. On behalf of Task Force 21 at Minot, I want to thank our friends from North Dakota for making this possible, and to all the speakers that have agreed to come here. And I want to express my appreciation to Mark for his help on this.

I also want to welcome our friends from the embassies of Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia, Great Britain and Canada. I also want to say hello and a welcome to General Davis, who is the executive director of the Reserve Officers Association of America, and our host. And also, my friends General Hebert (ph) and General Alston (ph) and General Depey, who are here today.

Those of you who have questions, if you could please write them on your index cards and pass them forward to me and I will ask them from the podium. The reason is we want to get them recorded because we're going to transcribe this event. It's also going to be available, as we said, on YouTube.

I also want to remind you to please turn your cell phones off, if you would please? And if you do need to use them, if you would step out into the lobby.

I also wanted to – for those of you at the head table, you will see a coin from Cyber Patriot and the Air Force Association, which is the competition we have where 800 and some odd high schools in America compete on real live war games on video and the prize is a scholarship to college. And the top three or four teams win, and many of you corporate sponsors of the seminar series are also sponsors of that event. But I have some sheets that I'll have available downstairs as you leave.

Finally, let me say that Frank has asked me to have available to you when you leave, downstairs, a white paper that he did on the strategic nuclear triad. Our speaker this morning, our keynote speaker, is Frank Miller, who is a principal at the Scowcroft Group and a longtime friend and probably the one

person in town that knows more about strategic nuclear deterrence than anybody. His boss spoke as the national security adviser to the president at my breakfast over at the Capitol Hill Club, and we had 187 people that morning. And today, we have 192 people. So, Frank, you can tell him that you one-upped him.

(Laughter).

He can come back and speak and we'll get 200. But many of you know Frank was at the White House and OSD and the Department of Defense. And I chose him as our keynote speaker because he promised he was going to throw out some red meat this morning, which coming from such a calm, dispassionate man, makes it all the more worth listening to.

Would you please welcome our dear friend, Frank Miller?

(Applause).

MR. FRANK MILLER: Thank you, Peter, very much. Rarely do I not recognize myself in the introduction, but I think you just did it. It's an honor to be here and it's an honor to speak to this distinguished audience. And I am particularly glad this morning to be able to give the keynote address.

This is an important time to discuss our nuclear deterrent. Our modernization programs are lagging, and the very need for an effective U.S. nuclear deterrent is being questioned in some quarters in this city. So before I turn to the issue at hand, the preservation of our strategic nuclear triad, let me begin by discussing why we need a deterrent in the first place.

Let me assert my firm belief that nuclear weapons will continue to influence global affairs for the foreseeable future. And as a result, the United States – so it affects our vital interests and those of our allies -- to moderate great power behavior, will continue to need an effective and viable strategic nuclear deterrent capability. It has recently been in vogue in some circles in this city to assert, quote, "The risk of a nuclear confrontation with either Russia or China belongs to the past, not future," close quote. Or, by the same people, "A large-scale conflict with Russia or China is simply implausible," close quote. It seems increasingly improbable that U.S. relations with China or Russia would deteriorate so severely in the next ten years that the nuclear balance would become a fading factor.

Well those are pretty bold predictions, and pretty bold predictions are dangerous. I think we can sum that up by pointing out that after the Munich conference Neville Chamberlain came back and said, "Herr Hitler has assured me he has no further territorial ambitions in Europe." The trouble with pronouncements like that is they reflect our aspirations and our hopes, not what other capitols are saying and doing. And those capitols have been fairly clear that they believe nuclear weapons are important tools in their diplomatic and military arsenals.

No other nuclear weapon state has embraced the American and British desire to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. In fact, quite the opposite has occurred. In Russia, the role played by nuclear weapons has been dramatically increased.

Nuclear weapons are now at the very heart of Russian security doctrine. The pundit statements of the most senior Russian officials: the president, the prime minister, the defense minister, the chief of the general staff, routinely threaten nuclear weapons use against Russia's neighbors. And just a month ago or so, the chief of the general staff, General Makarov, asserted that Russia might use nuclear weapons pre-emptively against NATO BMD defense sites.

Russian policy states officially that NATO is an enemy. Russian exercises feature simulated nuclear strikes against NATO countries bordering on Russia. And Russian strategic bombers are routinely violating U.S., U.K., Norwegian and Japanese airspace.

The Russians are now deploying two new types of sea-launched ballistic missiles, a new class of SSBNs, a new type of ICBM. They're working on a new bomber and a new long-range cruise missile. The Russian government is even contemplating building a second new type of ICBM, a giant Cold War throwback to the heavy ICBM class.

Now, I'm not suggesting that a new Cold War has begun. Am I suggesting that the Russian government uses its nuclear arsenal to intimidate its neighbors? Yes. And do I think that Moscow has accepted the notion that nuclear weapons should have a reduced role? Hardly.

The Chinese government refuses to engage in any discussions of its nuclear policy, maintaining a total opacity, except for making the operationally empty statement that it has a no first use policy. The operators and professionals in this room understand that such a policy can be changed literally in an instant by the central committees. And it's worth recalling in this context that the U.S.S.R. had a no first use declaratory policy and a first-use operational policy.

China is deploying two new types of ICBMs. It's building a new class of SSBNs and a new type of SLBM, and it refuses any limits on the growth of its nuclear forces. Reduced role? I don't think so.

This leads to the point, and I think it's a very important point, that it is an enormous conceit and the height of intellectual arrogance to believe that because some Americans may believe some policy goals are desirable, other country's leaders with extremely different values and their own interpretations of their national interests, will also believe the same thing. In this case, it should be obvious they do not. And as a result, the United States must maintain a strong, viable and effective nuclear deterrent to prevent the other great powers from believing that they can threaten us or our allies with nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail.

Is our nuclear deterrent an all purpose deterrent? Of course not. nuclear weapons are not and never have been and never will be an all purpose deterrent. They are not useful for deterring terrorism, even WMD terrorism by stateless entities, or piracy or cross-border drug trafficking, or even low-level insurgencies. They won't be useful in helping the Free Syrian forces overthrow Assad. They are arguably of marginal value in deterring all but the most catastrophic cyber-attacks or attacks against our space assets. And it's a cheap rhetorical trick to suggest that nuclear weapons have outlived their usefulness by pointing to the attacks it failed to deter, when they were not intended or deployed to prevent such attacks in the first place.

So when you read recently published statements like no sensible argument has been put forward for using nuclear weapons to solve any of the major 21<sup>st</sup> century problems we face; or, quote, “9/11 exposed the irrelevance of nuclear forces when dealing with 21<sup>st</sup> century threats,” close quote, I urge you to recognize them and reject them for what they are, cheap rhetorical tricks. To meet the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which are very real and which must be deterred, or defeated and destroyed, the United States must continue to rely on and to modernize its conventional forces, its ballistic missile defenses, its special operations forces and its space and cyber capabilities. And I urge you to remember that nuclear weapons were not designed to serve this role, and cannot do so.

They can, however, prevent the big war and allow us to use our other tailored capabilities to deal with more proximate and daily threats, threats which are more proximate and more daily precisely because nuclear deterrence has made the threat of great power conflict less proximate. And while I’m on policy topic, there are two other myths currently in vogue, which I’d like to destroy.

The first concerns our allies. You will have heard it said or you will have read that, quote, “Non-nuclear forces are also far more credible instruments for providing 21<sup>st</sup> century reassurance to allies whose comfort zone in the 20<sup>th</sup> century resided under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.” Well, clearly some American philosophes believe that that’s correct, but our allies don’t. And try as the philosophes may, and they have done so mightily, our allies still make clear that they want the reassurance provided by our nuclear umbrella. This is still the case in Asia, and it is still the case in NATO where twice in the last three years the leaders of the alliance – that is the elected heads of government of all the allied states – have reaffirmed this in writing.

And speaking of NATO, consider this remarkable set of statements made recently. The military utility of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is practically nil. They remain deployed only for political reasons within the NATO alliance. Well, imagine that. It’s now a bad thing for our nuclear weapons to reassure our allies to persuade them that they don’t need to develop their own nuclear weapons and to understand that Moscow comprehends that an attack on NATO could trigger a nuclear response. Well, I don’t think that’s a bad thing. nuclear weapons have always been political weapons, weapons of war prevention. And that, ladies and gentlemen, remains a very good thing.

And speaking of proliferation, we are also told ad nauseam that our nuclear weapons are contributing to the threat of nuclear proliferation. I’ve already noted how our nuclear arsenal is, in fact, an anti-proliferant, because we prevent allies who otherwise might and could, build their own nuclear weapons. But it is important to recognize that the oft-discussed linkage between the continued existence of the arsenals of the nuclear weapons states and (further ?) proliferation simply does not exist.

Over the history of the last 20 years, the U.S., British, French and Russian nuclear arsenals have declined dramatically, while in that same time period the Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and North Korean arsenals have grown. North Korea has not pursued a nuclear weapons program because of our nuclear arsenal. It has pursued one because it seeks to intimidate its neighbors and deter U.S. conventional military action. And the same holds for Iran.

And while the continued existence of the nuclear weapons states' arsenals makes for convenient talking points at international and domestic nonproliferation circles, it is factually false. And it's intellectually patronizing, to believe that proliferant governments are mindlessly aping P-5 policies.

So nuclear weapons are going to be around for a long time and continue to play a significant role in war prevention and deter major conventional aggression and moderating great power interaction. The question before us now is how to structure our nuclear forces in the future to continue to carry on this vital task. The U.S. nuclear triad of land-based ICBMs, submarine-based SLBMs and heavy bombers is a deterrent force which for five decades has provided a survivable and manifestly capable deterrent. While its birth as a coordinated and combined deterrent force was unintentional -- as simply the product of inter-service rivalry -- the triad has shown in its combination of alert status, basing modes, delivery systems and warhead types, to provide an overall capability which ensures that no enemy attack can prevent effective U.S. retaliation.

The forces' multiple basing modes ensure that an enemy attack could not destroy our retaliatory capability. The multiplicity of warheads and delivery systems ensure that no single technical failure, however serious, could negate our capability to respond. The combination of different ICBM and SLBM attack azimuths, complicate and defeat a potential enemy's attempts to defend against our fast flying deterrent. And our bombers have provided every president since Harry Truman an ability to signal resolve and determination in a crisis.

But what of the future force? In essence, the triad has been modernized twice, in the early 1960s by the Kennedy administration and in the 1980s by the Reagan administration. That was a long time ago. All of the triad systems will require significant modernization or replacement in the next few decades, or they will be lost.

I'll leave it to Admiral Benedict and General Kowalski and other distinguished panelists to drive this point home and to explain why this is so. But suffice it for me to say that absent modernization, we will not have a nuclear deterrent in a few decades. Has the policy and strategic requirements for having a triad changed?

Well, some would certainly have you think so. Again, it is in vogue in some circles in this town to suggest that we should limit the ICBM force and remove the SSBNs from alert status, indeed to make them incapable of responding for up to 72 hours. Well, what's wrong with that picture?

First, under the current force structure, any Russian leadership in a future crisis -- and remember we are not talking about a bolt from the blue posture today but a hugely dangerous crisis in the future in which the use of military force is being contemplated in the Kremlin, including the use of pre-emptive nuclear strikes as Russian doctrine suggests -- that Russian leadership would have to consider launching a large nuclear attack in order to neutralize our ICBM force as well as the other triad legs and our national command and control. Eliminate the ICBM force and the problem becomes dramatically easier. To succeed, you only have to destroy two SSBN bases, two bomber bases and Washington, and then demand a ceasefire. Even a smaller nuclear power can figure this out. So do we really need to discuss why this is a terrible and dangerous idea?

Second, removing forces from alert status has been a quest for some people in this town for decades. But they can't tell you why they are doing so, except in the words of a recent study, they believe, and here I quote, "Our ICBM's rapid reaction posture runs a real risk of accidental or mistaken launch." Well that, of course, is just not true. General Kowalski can tell you more authoritatively that it is just not true, but take it from me, it's just not true.

Then they will tell you that they are worried about the safety and security of Russian ICBMs. But from all the Russians do and say, the Russians aren't worried about that. Moreover, de-alerting measures are inherently unverifiable. If you want to discuss this at length, we can do so in the Q&A session or you can just read the piece I wrote for the Perry-Schlesinger Commission in 2008.

And finally, tying the president's hands and making it impossible for the U.S. to respond for 24 to 72 hours is a perfect formula for a nuclear blackmail scenario, which all of you could conjure up in just a few seconds. So keeping a strategic triad, elements of which are always on alert, will always remain vital. Additionally, as you will have discerned from my comments about NATO, not only do I believe a strategic triad remains necessary, I believe we must maintain forward deployed weapons in Europe until our allies tell us they no longer believe those weapons have important deterrent value.

Finally, there is the question of how many warheads we need to maintain in the active force. A few short years ago General "Chilly" Chilton, at the time commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testifying on the New START Treaty, stated to Congress that he was, quote, "comfortable with the force structure that we have," close quote, provided by the New START Treaty, because it was, quote, "adequate for the mission that we've been given and is consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review," close quote. That meant a force of about 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons, which translates into 2,200 to 2,500 actual weapons due to the treaty's counting rules. While some additional reductions may and can be justified depending upon future positive international developments, it should also be clear that deep, radical reductions to only a few hundreds of weapons would be wholly inadequate.

Such a small force would fail almost all of the requirements of a capable, secure and credible deterrent because first, you would not be able to deter direct attack on the United States, let alone threats to and blackmail of U.S. allies, because it would be too small to threaten retaliation against the most valued assets of a Russia or a China gone bad. Second, the force would likely be too small to be base survivable, and most likely would have to be deployed only in a single basing mode rather than in the triad; and put another way, would therefore be susceptible to an enemy pre-emptive attack. Finally, in thinking about nuclear deterrence, it's absolutely critical that we remember that the task at hand is to deter a potentially hostile foreign leadership which possesses nuclear weapons.

Our task is not to deter these states today. It is to deter them in a future crisis when they are contemplating the use of military force, including nuclear weapons, against our or our ally's vital interests. In such a perilous situation, U.S. policy must – must reflect the fact that we deter hostile leaderships by threatening what they value most, not what we value most.

We value our people. Hostile, authoritarian leaderships value their ability to remain in power, the security apparatus which allows them to do so, their military forces and the industrial capacity to

sustain war. And so it is a strategic mistake of enormous proportions to believe an effective deterrent in a future crisis can be based on a few hundred weapons which threaten a potential enemy's cities.

That strategy would be both immoral and self defeating. Mirror imaging is a dangerous and fundamentally flawed approach to deterrence and we must never fall into that trap. With that point made, let me thank you for your time and attentiveness and turn to your questions.

(Applause).

MR. WILLIAM CURTIS: I'm Doctor Curtis from the Naval Academy. General Cartwright recommended the elimination of land-based ICBMs. He also recommended we replace them with conventional warheads. What is your position on this issue and what are some of the complications for our arms control efforts?

MR. MILLER: Well, I hope I made clear in my remarks why I think we need to keep the nuclear ICBM element of our triad. I do believe that a small number of long-range conventional ballistic missiles is important and will be important in the future to deal with threats that occur in distant places where there are no U.S. forces present. And I've believed that for quite some time. But there is no way that those small numbers – and we're talking about a handful, I'm talking about, pick a number, two dozen of those – can substitute for a nuclear deterrent.

A conventional weapon is a warfighting weapon. It is designed to be used. A nuclear weapon is a war prevention weapon. It is not designed to be used.

Confusing those two missions is fundamental. Anybody who tells you that we can reduce the U.S. nuclear force by substituting long-range conventional ballistic missiles is talking, in fact, about fighting a conventional war with a great power. And I am not interested in fighting a conventional war with a great power. I'm interested in preventing such wars.

MR. PAUL INGRAM: Paul Ingram from the British American Security Information Council based in London. I wanted to ask, given the extent of the U.S. triad and its (capability ?) and its credibility, what is the particular contribution that the British and the French nuclear deterrents contribute to that capability?

MR. MILLER: There are a number of different ways to answer that question, and I'll try to hit all of them. From a purely American perspective, Paul, it would not be useful for the United States to provide the West's only nuclear deterrent. It would lead to the isolation of the United States in international circles. It would lead to isolation in our thinking because we would have no one to discuss concepts of deterrence with. And it would provide, I think, over time a germ which could grow into a larger disease in the United States asking why is it, if our allies are not prepared to help put themselves at risk, are we putting the homeland of the United States at risk to deter enemy attack on our allies?

But that's a very unique American perspective, which should not carry weight overseas. What is important overseas is what my dear late friend Sir Michael Quinlan use to call "dual centers of deterrence," "dual centers of decision-making." It is not implausible that in a future crisis a Russian

leadership bent on aggression against NATO could come to doubt the will of the United States to go to nuclear war, or to threaten nuclear war, to protect all of our allies.

It is not likely, however, I would say it is impossible, that such a leadership – and again, I talk not of today or not of tomorrow or not of Mr. Putin, but of some problem in the future at some point – that such a leadership could lead itself to believe that our European allies would not respond in their own behalf. And while I believe that our treaty commitments are firm and we mean what we say, in a crisis you would not want an enemy leadership, a potential enemy leadership, to miscalculate. And so I think that the British deterrent is absolutely vital to the preservation of British freedom of independence -- Britain as a global power -- so that there is no miscalculation in the minds of any potential aggressor that threats against Britain's vital interests will result in a huge and immediate response. So I think that's a great question, but I think there are very, very good answers to that.

And as for the French, French nuclear policy has always been interesting. I think it's 1967 and the Ottawa NATO Summit – someone will correct me on the date – and the French nuclear force was recognized as contributing to the overall security of the alliance. But the French do not participate in any alliance nuclear coordination. And so, whether all of NATO or the United Kingdom could rely on a French deterrent in a crisis is a little difficult, because what the French policy is – and I do not fault them for this – is that they will define France's national vital interests at the time when those vital interests are threatened. One can't craft an alliance policy based on that. So I hope that answers the question.

MR. PETER PRY: When we speak of modernizing the triad, does that also include the warheads? As you know, in our nuclear weapons laboratories today we're not even looking at nuclear weapons with a potential new design, a future generation of warheads. Shouldn't we be doing that if only to be aware of what future foreign potential adversaries may be up to in terms of advanced nuclear weapons designs?

MR. MILLER: That's a two part question. The first question is, do we need to maintain the nuclear stockpile and do our nuclear warheads need to be reliable and effective and safe? And the answer to that, of course, is yes.

The second part of that question is whether or not those warheads need to be of new design or whether we can extend the life of existing designs to a point where we are comfortable that they provide that safe, secure, reliable and effective deterrent? On the first point, yes. On the second, I'm not going to make a decision. I don't have a view. If we can extend the life of existing warheads at an affordable price, please, then I think that would suffice. But I no longer am in a position to make a judgment whether that requires a new design.

MR. BRUCE MACDONALD: Thank you, Frank. And first let me also congratulate you once again for the great service that you did in supporting the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Review Commission. Frank did yeoman's service in supporting that work.

MR. MILLER: Yeah, but I didn't kill the argument on de-alerting, so I think I failed.

(Laughter).

MR. MACDONALD: Your batting average is still awfully good. I wanted to ask you, some people have made the point that if you look at the triad today versus where it was maybe 30 even 40 years ago, we don't have quite so much as a triad as sort of a dyad plus. We still have a strategic bomber wing, but our strategic bombers are more and more being used for conventional purposes. And the number that are sort of specifically assigned for the strategic mission has declined.

In fact, I remember a few years ago in the work that I did in supporting the posture commission, there was even the one defense study by a defense contractor that sort of openly said you know what, what we really ought to do is go to a dyad. And I'm sure there's different variations of that, but I wanted to ask you what you thought of the state of the bomber leg today? And do we, in fact, have sort of a dyad plus and what are the implications of that from your perspective?

MR. MILLER: That's an interesting question, Bruce. Yes, I think we need a triad and yes I think we have a triad. Let me take it back to the beginnings of the triad, a period of time, let me emphasize, that I was not actively involved in working these issues. I'm not as old as some people think I am.

But in the 1960s, if you looked at the force, it was largely a bomber force. And the warhead numbers in the bomber force were disproportionate with respect to the ICBMs and the SLBMs, each of which were single warhead systems as they entered the force. So, I mean, counting warheads per leg I think is not a useful way to look at it.

I think what's important is what I've said in my prepared remarks. What you're talking about is a multiplicity of basing systems, a multiplicity of delivery systems, a multiplicity of warheads. And in combination – in combination – it provides a reassurance against technical failure, against an enemy breakthrough, an enemy attack on a particular leg of the triad.

And in the case of the bomber force, which we need anyway for conventional missions, as you point out, it provides the president an important signaling tool which is not available with the land-based force, which arguably can be done to some degree, but not as completely, with the submarine force. And during the early years of the triad, we were flying hundreds of B-52 strikes in Southeast Asia. So I think we still have a triad and I think we should judge it on the various capabilities and technical assets that it has rather than on the warhead numbers associated with any particular leg.

MR. : Frank, when talking about arms control and cuts, it seems as we go to lower warhead numbers, my view is that the number of delivery vehicles and the number of platforms become ever more important because once you get rid of a squadron of missiles you don't get them back. But your comments about the value of platforms and delivery vehicles as we go to lower numbers?

MR. MILLER: You're not going to get me into the particular numbers.

MR. : I wasn't asking you to pick a number, but –

MR. MILLER: Obviously, I think that a triad requires a mix of forces that is a real mix, not a symbolic mix. And so, as I said, I think that a combination of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers is necessary. I do believe that we can reduce weapons numbers as the international situation dictates and as our deterrent requirements allow.

I don't think the idea of pulling a nice multiple of ten out of thin air and saying there's my deterrent number, that's all I need, is a good way to do strategy or arms control. And there is this complex interaction of direct deterrence, extended deterrence and stability that needs to be taken into effect. Because I think you're right, cuts once made are pretty much irreversible.

MR. CARL OSGOOD: My name is Carl Osgood and I write for Executive Intelligence Review. You painted a certain picture of the Russians as well as other countries in your remarks, but you didn't talk about the importance of actually dialoguing with them, particularly with the Russian military, because they're sort of eager to do that with us. And if you ask General Cartwright or General Kehler about the importance of dialogue with the Russian military, they'll say it's very necessary. In fact, I have asked them that question and that's basically what they say. I'd like to hear your view on actually talking to them and dialoguing with them about addressing American concerns and addressing our concerns mutually that might actually reduce the chance of confrontation between us.

MR. MILLER: Nothing in my remarks would have indicated that I don't believe in that kind of a dialogue. That kind of a dialogue is essential. That kind of a dialogue must happen. It must happen on the basis of openness and transparency. Both sides need to bring to the table what they are really thinking and they need to base those discussions on facts.

What I described is not hypothesis, science fiction or right-wing raving. What I've described is the policy of the Russian government, which you can find in various official publications, and the actions of Russian forces which are well documented in the public press, but not over here. Is dialogue important? Yes. Are the Russian military leaders able to influence the Russian politicians? That's questionable.

If they are, and I personally tried having these kinds of dialogues in the '90s with Russian generals and defense ministry officials, they have yet to explain in any satisfactory manner why, well after the Wall came down, well after the Soviet Union fell apart, they maintain an arsenal of over 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons in the active force? And the answer, I think, is obvious. They try to use that to intimidate their near neighbors.

It's certainly not based on our tactical nuclear posture, which is a tenth of that or less. Lead by example, certainly hasn't worked. All of the discussions and public speeches by American officials and allied officials about those tactical nuclear weapons haven't made any difference. The Russians haven't said anything. We do have the apologists who say it's because their conventional forces are weak.

Somehow it stretches my credulity to think that anybody believes that the NATO alliance of 28 nations is going to decide to go to war, that the two U.S. brigade combat teams in Europe are going to

turn east and drive through Poland, drive through Belarus and threaten Moscow. So that's not a reason. And then you sometimes hear people say it's really about the Chinese, but don't tell anybody.

Who in the name of God believes, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, that if war were to break out between Russia and China, that Russia could use more than a couple, a handful of tactical nuclear weapons, before the war would go intercontinental? Twenty-five hundred tactical nuclear weapons. I would love to have the Russians be honest and open and dialogue on why the hell they have that many nuclear weapons.

So yes, I think dialogue is a good thing. And I think it would be useful if the Russians brought their physicists in and understood that the missile defenses we've proposed to put in Europe are not a threat to their ICBMs either, despite what they continue to maintain. So yes, dialogue, but dialogue based on honesty and transparency is absolutely vital. And I think we ought to have that with the Chinese as well. We're taking baby steps in that direction and I would love to see that dialogue increase.

MR. JOSEPH WALTZHEIMER (ph): Good morning, Joseph Waltzheimer. This week several (articles ?) in Germany suggested that the DDPN was a U.S. – the NATO defense posture review (wasn't ?) negotiated in good faith. And in fact, the head of research at NATO defense policy both before and after the DDPN suggested that it's a product of, quote, "NATO's nuclear wonks." I know you're not in government office, but I think you followed the DDPN process carefully. Did you have any sense in the buildup to it or since then that any of these accusations hold any water?

MR. MILLER: No, of course they don't. This is the kind of nonsensical garbage that we hear from those that continue to drive policy positions which are rejected not only by their own governments, but by the governments of the NATO alliance. In November 2010 the heads of the alliance, the elected heads, the presidents and prime ministers of the alliance, agreed to a strategic concept which says NATO needs some nuclear forces forward deployed. At the Chicago summit, the same elected heads of government made the same commitment.

These are not nuclear wonks. These are elected officials who are responsible to their parliaments and their congresses and their bodies politik. And just because some people continue to press a point, which is continually rejected by their governments, they then turn to the United States and say we are directing or dictating these kinds of things.

And what they don't understand -- and as the chairman of NATO's nuclear policy committee from 1997 to 2001, I have lots of experience in this area -- you don't tell our allies what to do. And we don't tell our allies what to think. That was the Warsaw Pact. That is gone.

The NATO alliance is an alliance built on the consensus of 28 nations. And if you get 28 nations to sign up to a strategic concept statement at the Chicago summit, that's a pretty good feat, not some U.S. diktat. So thanks for allowing me to hit that one out of the park.

(Laughter).

How many more, Peter?

MR. HUESSY: About two.

MR. MILLER: Two more questions. Yes, sir? No, not a question. No more questions? Yes, sir?

MR. : You talked about the warheads and the platforms in the triad. How about the infrastructure? The administration has made a request to delay the CMRR facility at Los Alamos by at least five years, thereby preventing the production of pits needed for U.S. defense needs. I'd like your comment on that.

MR. MILLER: I think I've spent enough time in this town to avoid being dragged into the details on that argument. We must have a responsive nuclear infrastructure which supports the nuclear warheads in the field. One of the enlightening and encouraging things is if you go to the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston, U.K., it's made very clear that AWE's mission is to support the warheads in the field. And that is what we should be doing.

And whether it's CMRR or not, I'm not going to get into. But we must have an establishment in NNSA and the laboratories which remembers that its purpose in life, primarily, is to support the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Work for others is nice. Work for others provides money for the laboratories. But it is secondary to the needs of our national defense.

And if we have to restructure NNSA, and if we have to modify the role of the laboratories to get them to understand that, then I think we have to do so over the next four years. Because without a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure to at least perform the service life extensions that are planned, and to do so in an affordable manner so that we can keep the deterrent we have, as opposed to paying exorbitant prices for exotic fixes for weapons systems we don't -- we don't need exotic fixes. We need some basic modifications -- then again, the deterrent is in very serious trouble. So thank you for that.

Last question? I've talked enough, Peter.

MR. HUESSY: You've done well.

(Applause).

I want to thank Frank for an extraordinary set of remarks. And again, we are transcribing these events. We will have them available on the AFA and ROA web site; the full transcript, but we are going to allow our speakers to, as they say in the wonderful institution called the United States Senate, advise and extend your remarks.

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S SECURITY" WITH SENATOR KENT CONRAD (D-ND), CHAIRMAN OF THE ICBM SENATE COALITION

MR. HUESSY: I want to welcome now the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, who over the last two decades, at least, has had the role as chairman or senior leader of the ICBM Senate Caucus, and which I have had the privilege of working with. As General Lord once said, I have ICBM's in my DNA. That's absolutely true.

As many of you know, this breakfast series started in 1983 during the Scowcroft Commission report, and we have done over 1,750 nuclear deterrent breakfasts. And we started in 1985, a missile defense breakfast series. And this is a culmination of this year's series.

I do want to mention that BASIC, our friends the British American Security Information Council, will be doing an event that I'm hosting on the 18<sup>th</sup> of September with Jan Nolan and Chris Ford, to debate the issue of the future of the nuclear posture. And you're all welcome. It's at the Capitol Hill Club. But please see our friend at BASIC if you would like to attend.

I have a deep, abiding love for the U.S. Senate. I was 19 years old when I went to work for Senator Gaylord Nelson, and then Bill Proxmire, and then Mike Ravel. And one of the last things I did for Mike Ravel was he said, do you know anything about the Alaskan pipeline? The vote at that time was, we had about 13 votes in favor. It ended up about 95 approving it. And then I went to work for Senator McGovern, and also for my dear friend from Idaho, Frank Church, who then sent me over to the Department of the Interior during the administration of Jimmy Carter, for which I now apologize, as Jim Woolsey would say.

But Kent Conrad has been a dear friend. And yes, he has an ICBM and a bomber base in his state. And some of my friends say that's just colloquial, that's just parochial.

Well, as Frank Miller has just told you, it is a lot more than just a North Dakota issue. Those folks in North Dakota protect our country and our western alliance and NATO. And there's very few Senators that I know who've done more to keep the ICBM and nuclear triad together in spirit and whole than Kent Conrad. And that's why we have invited him this morning to come speak to us about the role of the triad in our nuclear deterrent.

And so would you all welcome the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, the senior Senator from North Dakota, Kent Conrad?

(Applause).

SEN. KENT CONRAD: Wow. You're up early. Congratulations. I'm delighted that you're here. Look, I think that this is an important discussion and I'm delighted to be here to share some observations with you.

First of all, I've got to report on my attire. These are my running shoes because I sprained my ankle. And finally after four weeks of hobbling around I went and got x-rayed. And the doctor comes over to me after the x-ray and says, "You know, you've got a break in here." And I thought, this has gone on for four weeks. It's kind of unusual just with a sprained ankle.

And he said, "Did you ever play high school sports or college sports?" Well, I played high school basketball, and maybe it's from that. And he said, "Well, perhaps it is." But he said, "You've got to get off your feet." I said, you know, the United States Senate, get off your feet, that's not going to happen. So I got these running shoes and it makes it much better. So I hope it doesn't take away from the formality of this occasion.

(Laughter).

We face what we like to call in politics a defining moment, because we are at the cusp of another debate on the nuclear forces of the United States. And so I very much thank all of you who have gathered to be a part of this important discussion. First of all, I want to thank Task Force 21 from Minot, North Dakota, a community support group that really is a community support group. I deeply appreciate the commitment they have made to maintaining the relationship between Minot, the state of North Dakota and the Air Force base at Minot. I also want to thank the Air Force Association and the National Defense Industrial Association for their support, and of course the Reserve Officers for hosting us here today. Let's thank the Reserve Officers once again.

(Applause).

I think the size of this crowd speaks to how important this issue is. Today, we are at a pivotal moment. The Pentagon is looking to implement the New START Treaty and the mini-NPR reportedly is awaiting presidential approval.

In North Dakota, one of our top concerns is the ICBM force. And yes, it is a parochial issue. But it is much more than that because we believe deeply that the triad has served America well, not just North Dakota, but America.

And the proof is in the putting. Here we are. We have been conflict free at a major power level since World War II.

That is truly a remarkable achievement if you look over world history. And part of the reason, I believe, is the stability of our deterrent force. And obviously, the nuclear part of our deterrent is key.

Press reports suggest the Air Force supports cutting to 400 ICBMs while keeping all 450 silos online. The coalition has repeatedly said we believe we ought to keep 450 in both categories. And

obviously, we've got to keep 450 silos. We also think we ought to keep 450 ICBMs. But we understand that we're going to have to move.

What's more troubling is a recent report from the State Department International Security Advisory Board saying that the United States and Russia should pursue mutual unilateral reductions to just 1,000 warheads and 500 delivery vehicles. I believe that would be a profound mistake. Look, we just negotiated START. We were deeply involved – deeply involved, both publicly and behind the scenes with the negotiations on New START. We think we got a reasonable conclusion. But we should not go further at this point. The world is simply too uncertain for us to take additional steps.

And the talk of unilateral action, even if it's unilateral by Russia and by us, I think is out of step with the reality of the times that we confront. I hope very much, and I understand the people are well intentioned who lead this movement and they keep knocking at the door and we've had to debate them and defeat them in the debates on the START Treaty, because they were pushing this same agenda then. But if one looks at what is happening in the world: China on the move; the growing threat from Iran; taking additional steps at this point could be easily misinterpreted for American weakness. That is not the signal that we should send at this important time.

I supported New START, but it's time to take a breather. We should wait and see how those developments unravel before we take any further steps to limit our nuclear arms. We've enjoyed nuclear stability for generations because of the triad. It has worked. We have to make certain that stability is preserved under New START before taking further steps.

We also need to modernize warheads and delivery vehicles to ensure our nuclear deterrent remains effective and our bargaining position remains strong. You know, in my role in the Senate I spend a lot of my time negotiating. Negotiating from strength is a winner. Negotiating from weakness is always a loser. You know, one would think we'd learned this lesson through history.

These are big issues, and you have some big speakers here today to address them. I think it's very important that our voice is heard in this debate. I am very proud of the way we conducted ourselves during the debate on START.

I thought we were effective. I thought we were on the same page. I thought we delivered a compelling and convincing message. And we can't be afraid to repeat it in the context of this new debate.

These issues are simply too important to ignore, and I'm delighted that you're not ignoring them. I'm delighted that you're discussing them. And I'm delighted that we send a message that is unified from this meeting and others that will come in the days ahead.

Let me just close by saying that I've served now 26 years in the United States Senate. It's been my honor to do. I graduated from high school from Wellis (ph) Air Force Base High School in Tripoli, Libya. So the events of recent days have been deeply saddening to me and I think every American to lose our ambassador and to lose three other very talented, very dedicated Americans is a tragedy. We

don't yet know the full dimensions of what was involved. We have rumors of a film setting this off. It may well prove to be there was much more than that.

I just want to conclude by saying how proud I am to have represented the state of North Dakota, how proud I am of the association I've had with the United States Air Force. One thing that I've learned is the quality of our leadership and the membership in the United States Air Force is truly outstanding, as it is of each of our military services. We can be incredibly proud of the people who serve us and sacrifice for us, and we should never forget that service and that sacrifice.

Thank you very much for how you've treated me these 26 years in the United States Senate. I will always remember this time fondly and with deep respect for the people in this room. Thank you very much.

(Applause).

MR. HUESSY: Senator Conrad, thank you for those remarks, and we are going to miss you. And we wish you God's speed in all that you are going to do after leaving the Senate, which I believe there is life after.

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S SECURITY" WITH SENATOR JON TESTER (D-MT), MEMBER OF THE ICBM SENATE COALITION

We're honored now to have Senator Tester from Montana. I have two brothers in Montana. One is a rancher and one is a Harley dealer. They're pretty far right. But if you say the right things today, Senator, I'll send them a note to vote for you in the upcoming election.

(Laughter).

Would you welcome Senator Tester?

SEN. JON TESTER: Well that's motivation. I will also tell you that if you send the right note to the Harley dealer I might get a good deal on a bike. Thank you very much.

Kent Conrad, I just want to tell you, not from a North Dakota perspective but from a Montana perspective – and we've had a lot of fun over the last six years – Kent and I most of the time, him harassing me. But I can tell you North Dakota is proud of you, because that's the old country for me. That's where my grandparents came from. But the Senate will be severely diminished with your absence. The fact is you have done an incredible job over your tenure, and I say that as a farmer living west of Big Sandy watching you on TV and having the honor and privilege to be able to serve with you these last six years. You have been great, somebody who is very thoughtful. And I was disappointed you didn't have some charts up here today.

(Laughter).

But thank you very, very much for your service. Thank you for your service, Kent. I will keep my remarks brief.

Kent had said there's some big speakers up. I may be a big speaker but I'm not an expert in the field, and you do have some experts coming up to talk here. I want to thank everyone for being here: two of my fellow members of the ICBM Coalition, Senators Conrad and Hoeven. I'm proud to be a member of that bipartisan coalition and I look forward to continue advocating on behalf of the valuable role our nuclear triad plays in providing stability and security for our nation.

And thanks also to the community representatives here, from Montana in particular, Warren Wens (ph). David Weisman (ph), where are you? David Weisman is here.

They have been tremendous advocates for the nuclear force that we have, particularly as it relates to Montana. Over the years, David and Warren have fought hard to ensure the community's voices are heard when decisions impacting Malstrom Air Force Base are considered by those of us in

Congress and the Pentagon. The voice of our military community is certainly one that needs to be heard here in Washington. And I want to thank all of you for staying actively involved, and I encourage you to keep up that good work.

Since the last world war, our nuclear triad has served a critical role in keeping our nation safe, ensuring global stability and deterring the threat of nuclear war. Our nation continues to confront a number of strategic threats, whether it's the adversaries pursuing new nuclear capabilities, or rogue nations seeking nuclear programs of their very own. These threats are very real and they underscore the need for a nuclear triad that provides the deterrence that we seek and operational flexibility that we need.

I'm particularly mindful of the role played by the airmen and missileers of Malstrom Air Force Base. They are top-notch men and women, truly the salt of the earth, and they represent the very best of our military and of our nation. They also maintain and operate the most cost-effective leg of our nuclear triad, that is our ICBMS.

National security experts have agreed that land-based ICBMs are the most stabilizing component of our triad, as the structure of these forces makes a pre-emptive or disarming attack realistically impossible. That's why I fought to make sure that the New START Treaty protects the ICBM force, ensuring those missile wings. And hopefully, we can keep them at 450, but at a minimum, 400 to 420.

We continue to hear reports of further cuts to our ICBM force. Kent talked about it in his talk. And we've seen some of those proposals by outside groups to scale back or do away with our triad altogether. Such cuts to our nuclear forces could reduce their resilience. And unwarranted proposals to do away with the triad would leave us with fewer weapons types and weapons delivery systems, thereby reducing the flexibility the president needs to keep us safe.

That is precisely why it's important for you to continue advocating and educating, and to continue sharing your first-hand knowledge of the long-term reliability and effectiveness of this nuclear triad. You are doing great work. I know this event is going to be very valuable to those that are involved. And please know that you have a number of allies in Congress, and we'll certainly continue to do what we can to highlight the critical role of our nuclear triad in this 21<sup>st</sup> century.

So I want to just thank you all very, very much. I think this is a great opportunity to sit down and talk about opportunities and needs out there. And I just want to say from a Montana perspective, thank you all for the work that you do.

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S SECURITY" WITH SENATOR JOHN HOEVEN (R-ND), MEMBER OF THE ICBM SENATE COALITION

MR. HUESSY: Senator Hoeven is coming. He'll be here in a few minutes. I want to just say a few things about our colleagues over in the Navy. They recently – the command down in Kings Bay received one of the top awards of the U.S. Navy for extraordinary service. I believe the number of flight tests that the D-5 has had consecutively successful, is somewhere north of 200.

The NRDC has proposed that we eliminate the SLBM force. The Global Zero folks have said take the submarines down to 10. And I've seen proposals to take them down to seven.

In a study done back in 2009, it was interesting, the cost per survivable warhead put the D-5 at number one, ICBMs number three and bombers somewhere in the middle. On a deployed warhead basis, ICBMs were one, bombers two and SLBMs three. But if you combine various measures: deployed, on alert or survivable, each of the legs of the triad is either number one or number two or number three, depending on how you want to figure it. But neither of them works without the other.

And though this is a conference sponsored by our dear friends in North Dakota, it is a conference on the triad and its enduring value to the United States. And that also includes our bombers and our ICBMs and our SLBMs. And I think I want to make that clear, that this is supporting all three legs and how they have worked together.

As General Welsh says, very few things work perfectly. And very few things work perfectly over half a century. And I remember sitting down with a certain general with four stars up here and him saying, we don't use these anymore. And I said, we use them every day, sir.

Now I stole that from General Welsh, of course. And we do, the nuclear deterrent is there every day. And it is extraordinary -- in all my visits to Cheyenne and FE Warren, to Malstrom, to Minot -- I think I have visited every Air Force base in America. That was because of General Dougherty (ph) who would take me on his VIP trips.

He asked me once, you keep coming on these trips. I can't do that according to the rules. I said, I work for you.

And I must say I'm extraordinarily impressed by the work that is done, whether in Cheyenne or Minot or Queens Bay or Wrightman (ph) Air Force Base. I don't think Americans realize – or most people realize – just the extraordinary work every day, 24/7, that our soldiers and our sailors and our airmen and our marines do to protect this country, as well as our diplomats, which we sometimes we forget about. As we've seen in Egypt and in Libya, they are in harm's way as well.

And this series is designed to provide a forum of instead of what you see on TV of two people screaming at each other, trying to have people discuss things in a complementary way. And one of the two speakers I had, I think 20 times, was General Scowcroft and Jim Woolsey always spoke together. And they spoke at different aspects of this issue.

But one thing that I've been interested in is since 1983 when Al Gore was my first speaker. And the Senator at the time, had a podium and he put upside down walnut shells. And he pulled out a hammer.

I had no idea. I talked to Leon Feurth, I said, what is he going to do? And he said the value of the triad is that the Russians can't do the following. Now this was a breakfast just for members. It was closed to the press. And Senator Gore pulled out a hammer and proceeded to smash every one of the walnuts and said if we don't have a triad that's what the Russians can do.

That's what we're talking about today, how to have a survivable force. And in my view, I want to thank our friends from Minot 21 for putting this on. And I hope people will go to the web site where my breakfast series are on AFA and see the transcripts of all 32 breakfasts this year.

And related to that, Jim Miller is going to postpone his 21<sup>st</sup> of September remarks to us until some later date when he can get out of the office. And we have the 18<sup>th</sup> of September with BASIC. And we are going to have Tom Schieber of NIPP who is going to talk about long-range prompt conventional strike. And I promised General Kowalski and Admiral Benedict to do a seminar on commonalities between the SLBM and ICBM force, which we will try to do. And John Harvey wants to speak sometime later in the year when we can arrange that as well.

I'm waiting for Senator Hoeven to come to speak with us. He's en route and I'm just going to stop here and – but I do want to say a couple of things as well. My friend Brian Moran (ph), Brian use to work for Senator Bumpers and then Senator Dorgan, and has been enormously helpful with me and the Minot 21 group.

I also want to thank Brandon Keychop (ph), who works on the Budget Committee for Senator Conrad, for his extraordinary help. And we are losing one of the finest military legislative assistants on the Hill, Wendy is leaving Senator Enzi's office and she's going back to Wyoming to open a restaurant, which we're going to miss you, Wendy. That's quite a switch, but good luck on that.

So I'm going to take a break here. If you just sit for a minute, we'll let Senator Hoeven arrive and he'll address us. And then we'll hear from Terry Benedict, head of SSP, and then we'll hear from General Kowalski, and we'll hear from Mr. Greg Hulcher on our next panel. So enjoy your coffee and talk, and we'll wait for Senator Hoeven and we'll be ready to resume in a few minutes.

(Conference break).

MR. HUESSY: I'd like to introduce our last speaker on our Senate panel. That is Senator Hoeven of North Dakota, who was elected, as you know, in 2010. He serves on the Appropriations and the Energy Committee.

And Senator, on behalf of Task Force 21 Minot and the Reserve Officers Association of America and the sponsors also of my seminar series NDIA, the Air Force Association and ROA as well, I want to thank you for being here in this first triad conference that we've had beyond just the breakfast series. And I want to thank your staffer, Josh, for his help on this. And, Senator, I want to thank you for coming over here and speaking with us for a few minutes about your views of the enduring value of the triad to our deterrent.

So, would you all welcome the junior Senator from North Dakota, Senator Hoeven?

(Applause).

SEN. JOHN HOEVEN (R-ND): Thanks, Peter, for the nice introduction. It's great to be here and good to see all of you. I want to start out by thanking the Minot crew. I see we've got the mayor here, Mayor Zimmerman. And the head of Task Force 21, in support of our great Minot Air Force Base up there, Mark Jantzler and so many friends from Minot. And Peter Heckel (ph), who use to be Task Force 21 commander. There's a lot of people that have really done a lot supporting the Air Force, for as long as I remember.

I actually hail from Minot, North Dakota. How long do I have, by the way? One of the hazards you have around here is you get up speaking. And five minutes in the Senate can be anywhere from five minutes to about an hour and five minutes.

(Laughter).

Legitimately five? I'll have to tighten this up a little bit. I actually hail from Minot, so I spent a lot of time during my working career working with John McBarton (ph) and all these great folks from Minot in support of the Minot Air Force Base. And I've got to tell you, it was a labor of love.

My wife grew up in the Air Force. Her father was career Air Force. And so she grew up in the Air Force. And I actually met here when she came to Minot, North Dakota and was stationed at the Minot Air Force base. And so I've got a long love affair, if you will, with the Air Force, just on a personal level, before I even get into the merits of what you do that's so vital to our country, not only the security of our country, but I believe freedom and liberty in the world.

Let me introduce a couple of my folks that are here, Josh Carter. Josh, if you would, stand up so they can admire you, will you?

(Laughter).

Josh has worked on the Hill for a number of years. He also worked at the Pentagon and now does military stuff for me, and he's really good. Josh Carter. And if we can help you with something, call him up. You'll find he's really knowledgeable and he's great to work with.

And then I've got my chief of staff back by the door, Don Larson (ph). And you would expect that a Senator from North Dakota would have a chief of staff named Lars, right? I mean, it's going to be Lars, Olie or Sven. Well, I got Lars. And he's great too.

And actually his father is a retired master chief? Chief master sergeant from the Air Force. So there's a pretty good tie there. He obviously grew up in the Air Force as well.

Was there someone else from our crew here today? Just you two guys? Well, that's great. If we can be of help, we want to.

I am on the Appropriations Committee, so obviously I work with funding these issues, and it's incredibly important. I know today's focus is on the triad. I'm a strong believer, a strong supporter, a strong advocate for the nuclear triad.

During the Cold War, we had 12,000 warheads. We're now down to 1,550. I did not, nor do I support New START because I felt it took us too low. So I for darn sure don't want to go any lower, okay? I guess that's about as plain spoken as I can be on that issue. I was governor of North Dakota for 10 years. And I'm in my second year as a Senator, so I've got a lot to learn but I'm working on it pretty hard. And I feel to go any lower on warheads would be unilateral disarmament. And so if this administration or anyone else recommends that, my response would be that that's a serious mistake. I will strongly and aggressively oppose it. And I think it would be tantamount to unilateral disarmament. And I think those are the terms I would use to try to make sure that there's some clarity, because sometimes around here things aren't always so clear.

And I think when you look around at what's happening today – I mean, check out today, all the goings on at our embassies all over the world, and what happened on 9/11 in Egypt and Libya. I was in Libya with John McCain just a few months ago. And you know, they have these militias in Benghazi, in Tripoli, in Misrata. We're a long ways away from a stable government, obviously.

I was also in Egypt. We went to the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood. They're a long ways away from a stable government.

We were in Tunisia. They've got incredible financial problems. They're a long ways from a stable situation.

We were in Afghanistan. It was right at the time, I think the day after they had the Koran burning incident. So we know what the situation is there.

We know what's going on right now in Iran. This is not a time for us to back off our strength in terms of support for the nuclear triad. It is a credible, cost-effective deterrent that we need.

Look at what Iran is doing right now. I mean, they are basically thwarting the world in order to try to get a nuclear weapon. And so we're going to disarm unilaterally? We're going to weaken or dismantle our nuclear triad? I think not. I think not.

And so I think as we go forward it's very important that we be mindful of the planning, whether it's at the Air Force level, any of the service levels, obviously from the Navy and submarines, part of the nuclear triad. But at the service level, the DOD level, the administration level, we need to be very attentive. I think we need to be very forceful that we need the nuclear triad and I'll do everything we can to continue to support it. I think I've probably just about used up my five minutes, so I just would like to thank all of you. I want to thank not only our Minot crew, but our Grand Force crew, who do such a fabulous job all the time of supporting the Air Force. This isn't just a once a year trip to Washington, D.C. for these guys. They do this 365 days a year. And so I want to thank the great support in my state for the Air Force and for the triad. And I want to thank all of you. There's so many in this room that have served, and just know that we appreciate you and your service to our great country.

Thank you so much.

(Applause).

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S SECURITY" WITH ADMIRAL TERRY BENEDICT, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAM, UNITED STATES NAVY

MR. HUESSY: We now would like to proceed to the next three speakers, of which we have: Admiral Terry Benedict, General Kowalski, and Greg Hulcher. And I'd like to begin with Senator -- Admiral Benedict. I also would like you to know that my -- you're being promoted, depending on how you look at it.

(Laughter).

I'm going to dispense with biographies -- you can find them -- in the interests not only of time, but to give our speakers more time to not only talk to you but also to get Q&As. We will do this three person panel, and then we'll move to what I call the wizards, which is with Fred Celec and Mark Schneider, and with Keith Payne is going to follow, and Dave Trachtenberg. And then we will have Keith Payne say some concluding remarks and then General Davis from ROA will say thank you.

And with that, I'd like to introduce our good friend, the director of SSP, Admiral Terry Benedict.

(Applause).

ADM. TERRY BENEDICT: Well, good morning, everyone. And thanks, Peter, for the introduction. It's an honor to represent the men and women of Strategic Systems Program in the United States Navy here today.

I had the privilege of joining Air Force and OSD colleagues at a Senate ICBM coalition discussion earlier this year. I appreciate the opportunity to include the Navy perspective here today. I'd like to thank the NDIA, the Air Force Association and the Reserve Officers Association for all the work that they put into hosting this event.

As I look around, I'm the lone sailor in this room, but I'm certainly not alone. The triad and the strategic deterrent is definitely a team effort, and it's really my privilege to be here with my colleague, Lieutenant General Kowalski from the Air Force Global Strike Command and Mr. Greg Hulcher from OSD. I'm also privileged to work with the dedicated team of sailors, marines and Coast Guardsmen, civil servants and industrial partners in support of the Navy's responsibilities to the strategic deterrence mission.

SSP designs, develops, produces and ensures the safety of the Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent, the Trident II D-5 weapons system. The Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile is the nation's survivable second-strike capability. And while our daily focus at SSP is on the technical authority and the accountability of the Navy's nuclear-capable SLBMs, we recognize that our system provides a political stability and has a significant influence on diplomacy and global affairs.

To that end, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reinforced the mission of ballistic missile submarines and the strategic weapons they carry. Under the New START Treaty, SLBMs will comprise the majority of the nation's operationally deployed nuclear warheads. However, our capability remains only one leg of the strategic deterrence triad, a triad with the primary mission of deterring nuclear war and assuring our allies against the threat of nuclear aggression.

While SSBNs and strategic bombers are based at only a handful of locations, ICBMs provide 450 dispersed targets. And strategic bombers further serve to provide a visible demonstration of resolve. And with equal parts diversity and compatibility, all legs of the triad are import to the overall deterrence capability today and into the foreseeable future. To sustain the Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent, I am focusing on four priorities: nuclear weapons security; the Trident II D-5 strategic weapons system life extension program; the Ohio replacement program; and opportunities for future collaboration with the Air Force as we both modernize our deterrent capabilities.

First and foremost is the safety and the security of the Navy's nuclear weapons. At its most basic level, this priority is the physical security of one of our nation's most valuable assets. While SSBNs maintain an ever present, yet virtually undetectable alert status at sea, normal operational rotation does require return to port.

There, along with the ship's crew, marines and Navy master-at-arms at our strategic weapons facility in Kings Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington, provide an effective and integrated elite security force. U.S. Coast Guard maritime force protection units are commissioned at both facilities to protect our submarines as they transit into and from their dive points. Together, the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard team form the foundation of our nuclear weapons security program.

Our weapons system life extension efforts is my next priority for SSP. The Trident II D-5 SWS continues as a credible demonstrated deterrent, exceeding the operational requirements established almost 30 years ago. Our allies, and any potential rival, knows without a doubt that the sea-based ballistic missile system is ready, credible and effective.

However, we must remain vigilant. The system has been deployed on Ohio-class subs for more than 20 years, and is planned for a service life of 50 years. Like the B-52 and the Minuteman III systems within the other legs of the triad, this is well beyond the D-5's original design life of 25 years, and more than double any historical service life of any previous sea-based deterrent system.

As with our Air Force counterparts, SSP is engaged in significant efforts required to sustain a credible and viable system. The Navy is proactively taking steps to address aging and technology obsolescence through an update to all of the Trident II D-5's subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control, guidance, missile and re-entry. All are undergoing life extension programs. Many of the sub-system efforts are being conducted in cooperation with the United Kingdom.

Under the auspices of the Polaris Sales Agreement and with the collaboration of the Air Force and the Department of Energy, is the ongoing re-entry system life extension efforts. To sustain the Trident II D-5 SWS, SSP is extending the life of the W-76 re-entry system through a refurbishment

program known as the 76-1. This will maintain the military capability approximately an additional 30 years. This program is in partnership with the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration/ NNSA.

The Navy, in collaboration with the Air Force, is also in the initial stage of refurbishing the W-88 re-entry system, arming, fusing and firing. These efforts are designed to provide the weapons needed to meet the operational requirements through the Ohio service life and for the planned follow-on SSBN platforms. SSP is extending the life of the Trident II D-5 SWS to match the Ohio service life into the 2040s, as well.

Efforts include, continuous production of energetic components, such as solid rocket motors, providing the missile and the guidance system we need to meet the operational requirements. Our flight hardware, missiles and guidance, those life extension efforts are designed to meet the same form, fit and function as what we have today, in order to keep the deployed systems as one homogenous population and to control costs. Further, the life extended systems will serve as the initial baseline as we move to the Ohio replacement submarine platform.

The SSP team continues to move forward with many successes to date, throughout the process, and in terms – and in teams with several areas are ahead of the schedule. These successes highlight the level of importance each individual of the SSP team places in ensuring life extension work provides the continued viability of our strategic assets for the defense of our nation.

Another major step to ensure the continued sustainment of the SWS, is our ship-borne systems integration efforts, using open architecture and commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software systems, we are deploying on our SSBNs. This effort is a re-refresh of ship-born electronics hardware and software, which provides for greater ease of maintaining the SWS into the future. Planning and budgeting for much of the life extension work now going on was begun more than a decade ago, and it will be several years before we have operational deployments of missiles which have undergone full life extension efforts. Stewardship of the Trident II D-5 SWS remains key to ensure a credible and reliable system is deployed today on Ohio, and in the future on the Ohio replacement SSBNs, not only for the United States but for the United Kingdom.

Arguably, one of the highest Navy priorities SSP supports is the Ohio replacement program. The continued assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires a credible SWS, as well as the development of the next class of ballistic missile submarines. The Ohio replacement program will replace the existing Ohio-class submarines with the initial replacement boat expected to begin service on its first strategic deterrent patrol in 2031.

The Ohio replacement is a national asset for the future. To lower development costs and lever the proven reliability of the Trident II D-5 SWS, the Ohio replacement SSBN will enter service with the Trident II D-5 SWS, and the life extended D-5 missiles onboard. These D-5 life extended missiles will be shared with the existing Ohio-class submarines until the current Ohio class submarine retires.

This is certainly beneficial from a cost, performance and risk reduction standpoint. A critical component of the Ohio replacement program for which SSP is responsible, is the development of the common missile compartment. The CMC, common missile compartment, will support Trident II D-5 deployment on both Ohio-class replacement submarines, as well as the successor SSBN in the United Kingdom. The U.S. and the U.K. have maintained a shared commitment through the Polaris Sales Agreement since 1963, and the CMC is certainly an extension of previous agreements.

Now, it is well known that the Navy delayed the Ohio replacement program by two years. And while the overall program is being delayed by two years, we are maintaining the original program of record for the design of the common missile compartment, as well as all strategic weapon system deliverables in order to meet our obligations to the United Kingdom. These efforts continue to move forward, as highlighted by the recent signing of the U.S. and U.K. program officials of the Ohio replacement first article (quad-pac ?) specification document. This documents sets critical design elements necessary to ensure the CMC capabilities for both programs and for both countries.

As I've mentioned, the Navy is not the only one faced with the need to update aging systems and prepare for the future of our nation's strategic defense. It is truly a team effort with the Air Force as we look for opportunities to collaborate on systems for the future. The Navy has been invited to participate in the upcoming Air Force-planned AOA that is scheduled to begin in fiscal year '13. And we look forward to supporting the Air Force in their efforts to better understand where collaboration may be possible in the long-term.

I've been invited to address General Kowalski's staff at Global Strike Command this fall. And recently, my technical director was at Hill Air Force Base discussing opportunities in multiple areas where the Navy and the Air Force have great potential for modernization collaboration, both in the short-term and beyond. This is particularly important in areas of industry where skill sustainment is a priority.

An example of this is recently SSP moved maintenance and production efforts for our primary navigation guidance system to a facility in Heath, Ohio. With our industry partners at Boeing, we consolidated Navy SLBM navigation efforts to their already established facility, which has a long history of navigation work for the ICBMs and the strategic bombers. The Heath workforce has a unique skill set. Both the Air Force and the Navy, along with the leadership at Boeing, recognized this, and we all recognize that we can consolidate at the Heath facility, thereby reducing costs, maintaining the workforce with the skills for both of our systems, and creating opportunities to grow a future workforce for this important effort.

General Kowalski and I agree, now is the time to look at resource and component commonality to determine where it makes sense for the future. This is not only good business in times of austerity, but also we ensure resource management to provide unique materials and people with critical skills necessary for the long-term sustainment of our programs.

I look forward to the efforts ahead as SSP continues to maintain a safe, secure and effective strategic deterrent focused on the custody and accountability of the nuclear assets entrusted to the

Navy. I thank you for the opportunity to talk here this morning, and I'd be willing to take any questions at this time. Thank you.

(Applause).

Any questions? Yes, sir?

MR. : General, what the actual situation with respect to command and control of the submarines – (off mic). I've noticed with interest in some foreign military writings – (off mic) – the argument is made in some of these writings that the sea-based deterrent is only as effective as the communications – (off mic). The Tacamo aircraft on alert, now we've only got three not even on strip alert at Seagler (ph) Air Force Base. What about, as you think about modernizing that command and control, are we thinking about improving that in any way as we look to the future?

ADM. BENEDICT: Yes, sir. So I will tell you – and I'll be careful in my answer because we can very quickly move into a classified posture here. But I will tell you with OSD leadership the Navy and the Air Force, with StratCom, is very much engaged in ensuring that the command and control is modernized as well as the delivery platforms: ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers. It would make no sense to modernize the delivery capability of the three legs of the triad and fail at the same time to ensure that we can communicate effectively with those three legs. I will tell you today we can, with confidence at all times, communicate with the SSBNs, if that was required. And I'll stop right there, but command and control is certainly and definitely, in different circles, being modernized appropriately.

Yes, sir?

MR. : Good morning. You mentioned about the CMC, which – and you will correct me if I'm wrong. I hope, involves 12 missile tubes and quite a lot of other infrastructure as well, including cruise -- (off mic) – and the like. The 12 missile tubes obviously will need adding to with four or so, to bring the number up, and the British will be only using eight. Does that difference in requirement introduce some complexity that otherwise it would be cheaper if the Americans were going in?

ADM. BENEDICT: So the common missile compartment's primary purpose is to provide a stable section of the submarine in order to do a strategic weapons launch. So as we've looked at the design for the common missile compartment, it is truly within the tubes required by both countries, common. We are building it in a quad-pack formulation, four tube sections. So you are correct in identifying that the U.S. will use one more quad-pack than the United Kingdom.

But I will assure you that within the quad-packs necessary for the United Kingdom, are all the necessary systems in order to do a launch. And that's critical because both the United States and the United Kingdom have made the determination that the baseline strategic weapons system for both sides, both countries, will be the Trident II D-5. And so the plan is that there will be a section of the compartment which is, indeed, common. It will fulfill all the U.K. requirements. And then we will have the additional quad-pack added for United States' requirements.

MR. HUESSY: Thank you, Admiral.

ADM. BENEDICT: Thank you.

(Applause).

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S SECURITY" WITH GENERAL JAMES KOWALSKI, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

MR. HUESSY: Would you welcome General Kowalski?

(Applause).

GEN. KOWALSKI: It's great to see so many people that are interested in this, so many friends and supporters. I'd like to thank Peter for the welcome and the invitation, thank Task Force 21 for sponsoring this and the Reserve Officers Association for hosting it, NDIA and the Air Force Association. I have a lot of peers and mentors and friends here in the crowd, many people here who could grade my paper, but I am glad Frank Miller left because that's one person I wouldn't want to grade my paper.

(Laughter).

I read a book about a year ago called "Black Swan," by Gary Talob (ph). Some of you may be familiar with it. And it really speaks to this business of deterrence. And there's one quote I'd like to share with you from his book, and that is, "Acts of prevention get no reward."

And that is what we had for 67 years. We've had peace between major world powers, and that is unheard of in modern human history, for the major countries, the major nations, the major states, to not be in some sort of conflict for a period of 67 years. Now I can't say with any authority that that is because of nuclear weapons. But I am hesitant to say, let's get rid of them, because they were part of what has brought us 67 years of peace between major world powers.

So it is important to be cautious as we go forward. I stand here representing Air Force Global Strike Command, 24,000 people across six wings. We're a service component to U.S. Strategic Command for nuclear deterrence and global strike operations. We organize, train and equip, maintain and sustain, ICBMs, B-52, B-2 bombers, gravity nuclear weapons, nuclear cruise missiles and the UH-1 helicopter fleet. And we are the lead Air Force major command for the nuclear command and control system.

The latest Nuclear Posture Review published in 2010 outlined the following objectives: strategic stability, deterrence of nuclear regional adversaries, and assurance to our allies. Day to day, our nuclear forces provide for strategic stability with the largest nuclear powers, Russia and China. With Russia, this stability is based on force structure parity and exercising a diplomatic framework for continued dialogue, military-to-military engagements and transparency between our nations.

Of the three legs of the triad, the ICBMs make a unique contribution to strategic stability. The size of this force, on alert, in hardened structures, located in the heart of our homeland, presents any adversary decision-maker a near insurmountable challenge. Our nuclear forces are also one element of

our security structure for deterring regional threats. Bomber forces are particularly well suited to this role, able to display resolve through visible forward positioning, and in turn complicating adversary planning with a range of both conventional and nuclear weapons.

Finally, our nuclear forces extend deterrence to friends and allies. This assurance mission serves our nation's nonproliferation goals by showing that our allies' security interests can be protected without them having their own nuclear arsenals. But extended deterrence is fragile, and both our capability and our will have to be unimpeachable.

While there has been talk of lower force structures, the president has made it clear that as long as these weapons exist we will have a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter potential adversaries and to assure our allies. I'm confident that we can do that at the New START Treaty limits. But I am concerned that by pursuing a lower force structure we could be on a course that would require us to be at least thoughtful and considerate of some factors that need to be out in the public arena.

Such discussions need to be taken at a measured pace. They need to be informed by analysis. And they need to be bounded by the real politik of international relations.

These considerations include force structure parity with Russia. While we don't anticipate that Russia would have the intent to pursue conflict, it would be irresponsible to ignore their capability. Capabilities take years to develop. Intent can change very quickly.

We must also think about the temptation that lower numbers might be offering other nations to expand their arsenals and to join us at the high-end of nuclear capability. Another consideration should be continuing to provide credible assurance to allies so we don't risk the consequences of either proliferation or accommodation. We must also be thoughtful about the risks of a smaller force, such as technical failure, disruptive technologies or rapid geopolitical shift. A triad of SSBNs, ICBMs and bombers allow us to hedge against those risks, and the importance of that triad increases – increases as we reduce the size of our forces to meet the New START objectives.

ICBMs provide a robust and responsive deterrent on alert at 450 hardened and dispersed locations. Ballistic missile submarines provide a survivable alert force. Bombers give us the flexibility to demonstrate national intent through generation, dispersal and the ability to be recalled. Furthermore, a triad serves to complicate both the offensive and defensive plans and resource decisions of potential adversaries.

Finally, we must consider what force size is needed to ensure we have adequate human capital, adequate intellectual infrastructure in the laboratories and an adequate industrial base. Those are three things that I have seen absent from the conversation to this point. As Secretary Kissinger and Mr. Scowcroft stated in an April 2012 article in the Washington Post, "Nuclear weapons will continue to influence the international landscape as part of strategy and an aspect of negotiation. The lessons learned through seven decades need to continue to govern the future."

To keep a viable triad, we have to sustain and enhance our current force while modernizing for the future. Our major weapons systems are, on average, over 40 years old, with the problems of physical aging, declining industrial base, vanishing vendors and rising depot costs. When the Minuteman III came online in 1970 it had an expected lifespan of 10 years. Today, this force still stands watch with an alert rate of over 99 percent, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. And we will have to stay innovative to keep this system in service until 2030.

The ICBM force has several key deterrent attributes, of which three characteristics emerge to make them critical to our national defense. First, ICBMs provide a rapid response capability, ensured by the most secure command and control in the triad. It serves to dissuade an adversary from considering a first-strike attack. The existence of this large ICBM force, and its ability to rapidly execute upon an order from the president, enables the rest of the triad to operate in a more flexible role at lower alert postures.

Second, any large-scale attack directed against America's ICBM force is quickly detected and attributable. There is no ambiguity associated with an attack against the ground-based leg of the triad.

Finally, the high cost to defeat our ICBMs requires an adversary to commit a massive portion of their force, leaving them vulnerable to retaliatory attack. The prospect of an adversary committing or threatening to commit the massive number of weapons required to eliminate our ICBM force is strikingly remote. The result is a robust and secure force upon which to build a national security strategy.

In our fiscal year '13 budget, we fully funded the warhead fuse replacement initiatives in partnership with the Navy, fully funded a new transporter-erector, and started the next solid rocket motor program. Furthermore, we continue to collaborate with the Navy on strategic application programs such as guidance, propulsion and re-entry vehicle bodies to maximize the efficient use of resources between our services. This collaboration includes developing common technologies such as solid state guidance sensors, propulsion stage casing materials and propellants.

As we look forward into the future, we have begun the groundwork necessary to ensure a replacement for the Minuteman III. We completed a capabilities-based assessment for the Minuteman III follow-on, and we'll work the analysis of alternatives in fiscal year '13.

For our bombers, the B-52 delivers the widest variety of stand-off direct attack nuclear and conventional weapons in the United States Air Force. Our B-52 fleet is at the half century mark, but will remain viable through 2040. Our bombers are capable across the spectrum of conflict, and their value in conventional operations has been demonstrated in every major conflict since World War II.

We've been investing in multiple improvements, such as the combat network communications technology program. This is a significant modernization that will add 21<sup>st</sup> century capability to the aircraft. This will be going into low-rate production in 2014.

We recently tested a bomber flight control software block upgrade to significantly improve our advanced targeting pod capabilities and to employ the miniature air-launched decoy. And we started the internal weapons bay upgrade program to increase the payload of precision munitions by two-thirds. Looking ahead, we'll need to replace the radar, which is a critical component of the deterrence mission.

On other bomber platforms, the B-2 is the nation's only stealthy, long-range anti-access penetrating strike platform, capable of delivering both nuclear and heavy conventional payloads. We've made significant progress with the radar modulation program during the past year, and now have 18 aircraft completely upgraded. We're also upgrading the B-2's defensive management system to allow it to continue to operate in anti-access environments.

We are aware of the unique nature and role of nuclear weapons, and the special trust and responsibility that comes with the nuclear mission. Our goal is to provide combat ready forces to guarantee that should any nation choose to be our adversary, they must face the uncertainty created by our conventional force, and the fear generated by our nuclear force. In the words of General Marshal, our flag will be recognized throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one hand and of overwhelming force on the other.

I'd be happy to answer any questions.

(Applause).

MR. : Sir, Admiral Benedict in his remarks touched upon the importance of maintaining solid rocket motor production for the Navy. The Air Force seems to be going another way. Why is that and why does the Air Force believe that its approach is best?

GEN. KOWALSKI: I'm not the acquisition person and I'm not in charge of solid rocket motors. But I will tell you that the Air Force also believes in the importance of maintaining a solid rocket motor line. It's just not something that has proven to be affordable in the last couple of years for the Air Force to also participate in. But I'd be happy to get with you off-line with the experts on that.

MR. WILLIAM CURTIS: Good morning, sir. Dr. Will Curtis with the Naval Academy. We talked a lot about the hardware of the weapons systems and so forth. As you recall, the Schlesinger report mentioned – (off mic) – targeting deficiencies (in education ?) within the Air Force. Are you satisfied with the progress that's being made in the Air Force, especially regarding providing the education for enlisted officers at the top?

GEN. KOWALSKI: There have been a number of changes that the Air Force instituted. We have retired General Don Austin here in the audience. Don, raise your hand. So we can all talk to Don later. Don actually was in charge of headquarters Air Force A-10, which was the staff office established by chief Schwartz to initiate this review and figure out what the nuclear enterprise needed.

And Don and his team came up with an array of things. One of them was establishing Air Force Global Strike Command, and one of them was refocusing on the education of the force, and then that human capital development piece.

I think we're satisfied that we've made significant progress in the education part. We have a series of courses that have been put into place. We've accomplished the special experience identification – I'm so use to using acronyms it's hard for me to remember what they are -- but the SEIs that we use to determine who is experienced.

And then we've done on the demand side is we've laid out the billets, the spaces, where we need key nuclear expertise. And now the system, over the last couple of years, has been matching those up as we continue to refine both the people who have the experience and the requirements. But this is something that we're going to have to (evolve ?) to.

We're not going to have a 16 year master sergeant who is highly experienced after two or three years. It's going to take us a while to grow out of this. It's the same thing with the culture.

Culture is behavior over time. And we are not going to get to the culture that we all agree we want – and that culture is one where every one of our airmen understands and embraces the special trust and responsibility -- over night. But we can get the behaviors we want. That's what we can encourage and create out there, and we're satisfied that we're on the right track.

That's what we see. And there's a lot of people who have negative experiences with Strategic Air Command. Air Force Global Strike Command has picked up the Strategic Air Command history. But there is one thing that people cannot be negative about with Strategic Air Command, and that is the culture of disciplined professionalism. And that is what we have tried to bring back within our command.

MS. ELAINE GROSSMAN: Thank you. Elaine Grossman with National Journal Group. I'm wondering if you, in expressing your concerns about the kind of analysis that needs to take place before further arms control reductions are taken, if you're feeling some level of disappointment or dissatisfaction with the amount of analysis that has taken place in the NPR implementation study? And do you feel, that that is teeing up future reductions in a way that just may not (be supported ?)?

GEN. KOWALSKI: No, don't misunderstand me. I'm not part of any other group that's doing analysis. I'm just here providing what I see as my military advice. I am comfortable at 1,550 we're good. If we decide to pursue a number lower than 1,550, I'm laying out a list of things that need to be part of that consideration. I mean, that's where I'm at – you know, force structure parity. In fact, I even had a discussion – hopefully my friends from Minot won't throw me out of the room, but I've had a discussion with Joe Cirincione of Ploughshares. And there is widespread agreement that there are things in here that have to be thought about, that the world we live in today is not a world that is ready for zero nuclear weapons. So we need to think about – the point that I was trying to make about human capital, intellectual infrastructure and industrial infrastructure are not points that I've seen discussed broadly. Most of the discussion -- and rightly so -- most of the discussion has been about political implications

and what's the right level of weapons to ensure deterrence and assurance. At the same time, I'm charged with organizing, training and equipping the force. So I not only have to keep those airmen motivated so that they understand that what they do is important, but I also have to think about how do I develop human capital, how do I make sure I have the intellectual infrastructure: Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, Los Alamos, etcetera, to continue to support us long-term, and then how do I ensure that there's enough business out there for industry that the kind of expertise that we heard talked about up at Heath, Ohio continues to be in place? And that was the key point I was trying to make. Thanks for letting me clarify.

MR. : General, Carl Osgood with Executive Intelligence Review. If I understood you correctly, you indicated that you have a role in military-to-military engagement with Russia. Could you expand on that a little bit and sort of give a sense of your assessment of how that engagement is going? Are the discussions as open and frank as you would like, and so on?

GEN. KOWALSKI: Right. Let me clarify. Military-to-military engagement is part of what happens within that framework of strategic stability. And that's pretty clearly outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review.

My role in that is, frankly, relatively small. If General Kehler calls me up or the chief of staff of the Air Force calls me up and they say, hey Jim, you're getting a visitor next week, then I get ready to have a visitor next week. But we certainly don't initiate any military-to-military engagements with the Russians at our level.

But we have hosted General Zaleb (ph), the Russian chief of staff of the air force, last summer. We had good discussions with him and several members of his staff. In fact, we hosted another group from Russia at Camp Guernsey, which is where we do some of our security forces and convoy training, specifically to build expertise for our missile field operations. And we hosted them out there as sort of a sharing discussion on how we do missile field security and how we do convoy security.

And I think Don Austin could talk to that. He was the 20<sup>th</sup> Air Force commander at the time. I will share with you one comment, and that was that we had been over – the Air Force, I guess, had participated several years previously in Russia on a similar exchange. And the retired Russian general said something along the lines of you clearly learned much from us.

(Laughter).

MR. : In your exchanges with the Russians, have they ever disclosed to you what they're doing at Yamaka (ph) Mountain? In the Clinton administration, Congress put out a Congressional resolution calling upon disclosure of that. And to my knowledge, they've never gotten an answer.

GEN. KOWALSKI: I had with General Zaleb (ph) some briefings. We had a very nice lunch, and that was the end of my engagement with the Russians. So we didn't get to any other topics.

MR. TOM JACOBSON: Thank you, General. Todd Jacobson with Nuclear Weapons and Materials Monitor. I wanted to ask you about the cost increase to the B-61 warhead refurbishment. As you know,

it has virtually doubled, depending on if you go with the NNSA estimate or the DOD estimate. And I wanted to ask you what more of a role does DOD need to play to get the cost of that refurbishment to stay within certain parameters, and what risk is there to the overall interest of modernizing the warheads and the infrastructure at NNSA from a cost growth like that?

GEN. KOWALSKI: The Air Force's part of this is the tail kit. And the tail kit is funded and on track. We need to have the B-61 life extension program in order to retain the weapons system, to retain the viability of the weapons in Europe, and to retain the viability of the B-2 within the nuclear role.

I don't have any acquisition authorities. I'm not an acquisition expert. The way the Air Force is structured as a lead major command, we set out the requirements. As such, I'm a demanding customer and I share your frustrations.

MR. : Hi, General, I'm – (off mic) – from General Dynamics. As we face the challenges of modernizing the ICBM force going forward, I wonder if you could add a little more color on what you see as the short-term and long-term priorities as we focus on achieving that objective?

GEN. KOWALSKI: Right. Near-term, as I think I mentioned in my remarks, we're completing about \$7 billion worth of improvements across the system. And those were laid in place several years ago through Air Force Space Command to get the weapons system through 2020. What's unique, of course, about the ICBM is it's not just the missile.

The missile is one part of this larger system that includes the launch control centers. It includes the command and control networks. It includes the launch facilities, ground support equipment, surface support equipment, etcetera.

Now as we go forward under Congressional direction to take the ICBM out to 2030, there are a number of things that we're going to have to do. One of them is, clearly, to replace the booster again. Those last about 10 years and we'll be coming to the end of life of the one we completed a few years ago. So it's about time to start programming and planning for that. So that's probably one of the near-term things.

We're proceeding fairly well with the fuse replacement – the fuse refurbishment on the W-87. But we're going to have to take a long-term look at what we need for that in terms of in 15 years to get to 2030, what else do we have to do? We're pursuing a common fuse for the W-78 as we go forward. So these are probably the big ones.

And then as we move to a W-78b life extension program out in the mid-20s, then you're also talking about is our missile guidance set adequate? And frankly, is the missile guidance set, even without a W-78 life extension, do we need to upgrade it in order to keep it viable? Then how do we transition from that to whatever the follow-on is for the Minuteman III?

So there's a couple of things out there. We have worked through the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center demonstration and validation program. And they're coordinating directly with the Navy SSP on all of those things.

(Applause).

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S SECURITY" WITH GREG HULCHER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR STRATEGIC WARFARE, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MR. HUESSY: Without any further ado, Greg Hulcher from OSD. Would you welcome Greg?

(Applause).

MR. GREG Hulcher: As I walked in this morning I said to Peter that I'm counseled with increasing frequency that I ought to get out more, and so here I am. I do have a job at OSD. It's in acquisition.

And this gives me a public opportunity to express my admiration for the mission, General and Admiral, that you described up here. It gives me an opportunity to acknowledge the large number of professionals that you have under your command and related commands. And it gives me a chance to thank you for the on-time budget data that we're going through now.

One of my jobs is, in fact, to integrate, judge, scrutinize and analyze the budget for presentation to leadership as we prepare the president's budget. The budget that goes to Congress is by service by service, and therefore it's leg by leg of the nuclear triad. But I can say to you that with the help of the teaming of the different service groups, we're able to, in the Pentagon, judge the budget as a package for the new triad.

And so what I'd like to acknowledge is that there are certain areas – they may sound a little mundane – but there are certain areas that have a great deal to do with the integrity of the triad presentation and so forth, but don't make the big headlines in the budget. And they're really irrespective of all the numbers arguments and so forth. There are three hallmarks of the triad, the nuclear triad, that are front and center of my evaluation of the budget.

Number one, the reliability of the force. This is the reliability of the entire operation. And that calls to your attention a couple of things that we have to be careful to continue to fund that are below the radar – pun intended here.

And one is the testing program. The infrastructure, the national infrastructure for testing is an important ingredient for not only the triad, but a number of other – all of our other force elements. And so the budget process is a time to see that we have the consolidated infrastructure at the service of all of these components.

Another part of reliability is security. You brought up security. In fact, there will be nothing I'll say that hasn't already been mentioned. But the idea of security exercises and security visibility is enormously important and we want to see that it continues to be funded.

There's another area, somewhat more esoteric, that has changed color a little bit in the past 10 years, and that's nuclear hardness and survivability. But we have to see at the OSD and DOD level that the talents and the industry base for nuclear hardness and survivability are maintained. That has to be supported in the resourcing and budget.

So what I really want to say about reliability is that it is demonstrable, it is demonstrated, it is exercised. And it has to be budgeted to sustain that for planning in the out-years. By the way, they just had the 50 year birthday for the radar at Kwajalein Island Atoll. And so there are a lot of historical legacy capabilities that continue to be exercised as part of our future forces.

The second hallmark is capability, and this is brought up in various ways. As we look at the total of the budget and the resourcing and how the services team together, you do bring into that the operational elements, C2, command and control, intelligence and warning systems and so forth. And so as we do our resourcing we want to see that the whole team, including the StratCom operations and all of that, are adequately funded.

I find that the attribute of capability is also very dependent upon our analysis of the targeting, intelligence and so forth. The capabilities that are demonstrated by the new systems that we are analyzing have to be threat-centric as well. So, there was mention by both Admiral Benedict and General Kowalski the concept of analysis of alternatives. That's more than a paper exercise. The analysis of alternatives of any future system involves all the services that are involved, not just the service that will own the system. And this has been a tremendous ability for us to bring to the same ledger, if you will, the capabilities that each can bring to the triad.

So capability, I believe, is plannable. And that's important operationally and that's important for acquisition. The triad has a long record of being able to be able to plan the acquisition of capabilities in phases and to be demonstrated. That's hugely important for stability.

The third attribute is affordability. I'm going to just simply say that it is gratifying that we're able to draw on the service professionals for predictable spending and predictable costs. The many decades of triad investment, and the future investments, I think for all of the range of systems that we deal with in OSD acquisition, there is an element of predictability and confidence in the costing that I truly admire and that we have to count on.

So, I'd say that in offering my respect to the services and for what they do to maintain your triad, that the three-legged triad is stable. It is stable as a policy matter. It's stable as an operational matter. And I'd like to say that it's stable as a budgetary matter as well.

That's what I'd like to say.

(Applause).

I still stand before you if you have a question.

MR. : Since you're in acquisition, you were probably involved in the DOD review of what DOE was spending on modernization. And it was your money. What has transpired as far as DOD is concerned, with regard to DOE and trying to get the costs down, not having rises (in cost ?) and others -- I know there was a task force from DOD that looked at what was going on, it was not written, but was orally delivered to DOE -- with regard to these, what I would call astronomical rises in costs that shocked the Department of Defense?

MR. HULCHER: That's a work in progress, believe me. I think you said that you're having some later sessions with John Harvey and others, and I recommend that you actually pursue this as it works along. But I'd have to say that as we're right in the middle of the budget preparation process, there isn't anything particularly useful I can say to that. But boy we are looking at it hard.

I want to say, though, that along with my earlier remarks, obviously the planning, the predictability of acquisition of triad delivery systems and platforms and so forth, is matched up with what can be delivered and so forth by way of the modernized warhead business. So that's got to be linked. That's got to be designed to be affordable in that regard. But with regard to the particulars on the cost growth, I'd prefer to leave that to those that will speak with some authority at the right time.

(Applause).

MR. HUESSEY: I want to thank Admiral Benedict, General Kowalski and Greg for superb three presentation. Thank you. We learned a lot.

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S SECURITY" WITH DAVID TRACHTENBERG, PRESIDENT, SHORTWAVER CONSULTING

MR. HUESSY: The next session is what I call my wizards panel. They don't work in the government so they can say things maybe that they couldn't say when they were in government. But they all are friends.

They all are significant thinkers in this business. And I'm going to ask my friends to go in the order of Dave Trachtenberg, and then I think Mark Schneider and then Dan Goure and then Fred Celec. And then we'll hear from Keith Payne.

Now, I asked them basically to take any issue of the triad they wanted to talk about. And therefore, what they say is going to be as much a surprise to you as it is to me. And I hope that you will – each of the speakers will then take questions from you after about 10 minutes. And that's the way we're going to do it.

First I'd like to introduce Dave Trachtenberg, president of ShortWaver Consulting, and he's going to be our first speaker.

David.

(Applause).

MR. DAVID TRACHTENBERG: Thank you, Peter. Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this important forum. I want to thank the sponsors and hosts as well, very much.

I don't think I've ever been introduced before as a wizard, Peter. I would have dressed differently if I had known.

(Laughter).

In listening to the prior speakers I was also going through my remarks and crossing off everything that had already been said so as not to be redundant. What I was left with was the following, thank you very much for your attention.

(Laughter).

But at the risk of boring you further, I will plow on and say not only is this an important discussion, but a timely discussion. Certainly in the wake of the latest September 11th tragedy, we are reminded yet again that the United States faces significant security threats on multiple fronts. And

while the consideration of nuclear threats has tended to recede into the background in the face of other threats like we witnessed two days ago, they are potentially more catastrophic.

Also two days ago, on September 11<sup>th</sup>, we were reminded by China's People's Daily, that nuclear weapons are still considered valuable currency in international relations. The paper called for China to, quote, "accelerate upgrading and strengthening of its nuclear deterrent to narrow the nuclear gap between China and the United States, and to make China a large country that no country dare provoke easily," end quote. Now, such statements should reinforce for us the importance of the nuclear mission today, and drive home the necessity of ensuring our nuclear deterrent remains robust and viable.

Reliance on the triad has been a central feature of U.S. nuclear deterrence for most of the nuclear age. Yet today, the notion of the triad is itself at risk. Some believe, as we've heard previously, that the triad has outlived its usefulness, that it is a Cold War anachronism in a post-Cold War era, or that it is too costly to sustain, especially in today's austere budgetary environment. Some argue that it provides capabilities that are redundant and therefore unnecessary, or that our continued reliance on it damages our nonproliferation policy, or that it stands as a symbolic roadblock to the current administration's stated goal of moving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

All of these arguments can be properly challenged and you've heard others say here this morning, that the triad is stabilizing, that it broadens the set of deterrent options available to the president, that it is relatively inexpensive, and perhaps most importantly, that it has an unblemished record of success in accomplishing its mission, which first and foremost is not to fight a nuclear war, but to deter one. When I consider the future of the triad, I am reminded of the Hippocratic Oath, "Above all, do no harm." I'm also reminded of the statement, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."

The triad has worked well for decades, and it ain't broke. But it can be broken, if essential modernization programs remain underfunded and if pressures for ever-greater reductions to U.S. nuclear forces make the continued deployment of multiple delivery platforms impractical or perceived as cost-ineffective. It's worth recalling, I think, that the overwhelming body of expert opinion assessing this issue over the years has pronounced the triad both vital and valuable for U.S. security.

For example, the 2009 report of the Bipartisan Strategic Posture Committee concluded, and I quote, "Each leg of the triad has its own value, and provides unique contributions to stability. As the overall force shrinks, their unique values become more prominent." I think it's also worth noting that every U.S. administration, both Democrat and Republican, has seen value in preserving the triad, including the two Democratic administrations since the end of the Cold War.

The first post-Cold War Nuclear Posture Review, undertaken by the Clinton administration in 1993, concluded that, "The concept of a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers remains valid," noting that each leg of the triad has "unique characteristics and specific advantages," and that "the hedge it provides against the failure of any one leg is a primary reason to retain a triad." Under President George W. Bush, the 2001 NPR also reaffirmed the value of the traditional nuclear triad, even as it recommended incorporating those abilities into an expanded new triad. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld

was explicit in stating, quote, "ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and nuclear weapons will, of course, continue to play a vital role in meeting the nation's defense goals in the 21<sup>st</sup> century."

And as we've heard, the Obama administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that "retaining all three legs of the triad will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities." The NPR also pledged that, quote, "During the 10-year duration of New START, the nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers will be maintained," end quote.

Now, despite this pledge, some administration officials have hinted that the triad's days may be numbered. Yet, there are few national security issues that have enjoyed more bipartisan support than the preservation of the strategic nuclear triad. In short, preserving the triad has never been a partisan issue. Its value has been acknowledged as enduring and essential to U. S. security, even in the post-Cold War world, by experts on both sides of the political divide. Yet the triad may become the victim of its extraordinary success, in what has been dubbed by some as nuclear fatigue.

Of course, deterrence works best when adversaries believe the costs of an attack outweigh the benefits. Maintaining a triad of nuclear forces, with each leg presenting unique targeting challenges has ensured that no adversary can launch an attack without contemplating the risk of significant and costly American retaliation. The greater the number of targets an adversary has to strike in order to avoid retaliation, the more difficult it becomes to launch a successful attack, and the stronger deterrence becomes.

So from my perspective it is odd that among the three legs of the triad, the ICBM leg appears to be the most frequently mentioned candidate for elimination, for it's the ICBM leg that presents the greatest number of targets for an adversary to strike. Major General Mike Kerry (ph), commander of the 20<sup>th</sup> Air Force Global Strike Command at F.E. Warren, recently noted, quote, "As nuclear weapons numbers decline, the value of our sovereign-based dispersed force will continue to present adversaries with a near impossible targeting challenge. The number of weapons required by an adversary to disarm the ICBM force would all but exhaust their ability to prosecute attacks against the other two legs of our triad," end quote.

General Kowalski made similar arguments just a few minutes ago. Both generals are correct. But that is just the kind of targeting challenge that we should want to present to adversaries. If we eliminated the ICBM leg of the triad, we would reduce the number of targets an enemy would have to hit from nearly 500 to a handful which by any standard could hardly be considered stabilizing.

Because of its synergistic capabilities, the triad is resilient, it is flexible, it is adaptable, and it is survivable. Eliminating it and moving to a dyad or even less will likely be perceived by some as a further sign of America's distaste for nuclear deterrence, including the extended deterrence that the triad has provided to American friends and allies. It may also be seen as the next step in implementing a plan to get us out of the nuclear weapons business entirely. By heightening the level of anxiety and uncertainty of America's commitment to provide a nuclear security umbrella to others, it may lead others to seek their own nuclear capabilities. Such an outcome is hardly in the interest of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

Thankfully, the Cold War is over. But today's world is no less dangerous. With China engaged in significant nuclear upgrades to its own nuclear triad; with Russia developing and deploying a range of new more sophisticated and technologically advanced long-range nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and threatening U.S. allies with nuclear attack; with Iran seeking nuclear weapons and cooperating with a nuclear armed North Korea; and with concerns growing about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, the notion that we are safe from nuclear threats today is wishful thinking at best.

In this context, abandoning the triad means assuming greater risk. I believe it would send the wrong signal to the wrong actors at the wrong time. It would be ill-advised strategically, politically, militarily, and fiscally. It would overturn decades of bipartisan consensus. And it would lead to doubts about U.S. resolve, emboldening adversaries and unnerving allies.

Finally, let us not fall into the common trap of confusing cost with value. Budgets are a key issue today. We all know that.

But when we consider the potential consequences of a failure of deterrence, it becomes clear that the deterrent value of the triad far exceeds its monetary cost. The triad has served us well and should continue to do so for years to come. Thanks very much.

(Applause).

MS. : I think maybe Greg could answer this question, but I'm going to ask you about sequestration. What will happen to the nuclear programs should sequestration be applied to the budget?

MR. TRACHTENBERG: I think that's a great question, and I'm not optimistic about the future of nuclear programs or the budget associated with nuclear programs. I'm not optimistic about it now, I'm even less optimistic about it in the event sequestration takes effect. It's very difficult to argue that nuclear programs should have priority or should be prioritized above other programs, especially when the prevailing view within the current administration seems to be we should be moving towards eliminating these capabilities entirely. So I foresee an even great difficulty in sort of trying to maintain the necessary resources and investment portfolio of these particular kinds of programs, which I believe are essential.

MR. HUESSY: Thank you, David.

MR. TRACHTENBERG: Thank you.

(Applause).

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S SECURITY" WITH DAN GOURE, VICE PRESIDENT, LEXINGTON INSTITUTE

MR. DAN GOURE: I'm here to speak in favor of nuclear weapons. In fact, if I could figure out a way for us to have more of them, I'd be all for that too. Nuclear weapons, in particular the strategic triad, I will argue has been the most strategically and fiscally effective tool that not just the United States but that any major power has ever created, probably as far back as the Byzantine Empire and Greek fire. I might even go back and say the Roman legion of more than 2,000 years ago.

Now just think of that for a moment. It has prevented major war between great powers for nearly three-quarters of a century. It has allowed the United States to play a global role, along with its allies, in a manner that we could not have done before. So before we speak about these weapons as being Cold War relics, irrelevant, we need to consider that fact.

I think the reason we forget this point is because we've almost been too successful in dealing with the Cold War overhand, political and military, that sort of existed after the end of the Soviet Union. We managed the breakup of the Soviet Union. We managed their strategic retrenchment. We prevented those weapons and most of the know-how and technology from leaking out. And we managed to bring the forces down by about 90 percent.

But because we've been so successful and because we've focused on other things, we sort of acquired what I call a form of strategic amnesia. We've forgotten what the weapons are about, what role they've served, and how in a sense we can use them politically. So I want to talk about politics here more than technology or structure or exchanges, all that stuff which matters but on the other hand is hard to communicate to the American people and to constituencies.

It is very easy when you look at today's threats to simply say these weapons are irrelevant or Cold War relics. It is even easier -- I think this may be even the toughest argument to counter -- to deal with the current notion that the sole role of nuclear weapons is to deter other nuclear weapons. Now if you think about it, it's really easy to go from there to an argument that therefore they have no utility at all, right?

And I think that argument is there in part because if you deny those weapons a strategic context, if you separate them from state to state politics, from concerns about stability, from problems of alliances, all those kinds of things, it's very easy to argue that they're irrelevant -- and therefore very costly if they're irrelevant -- and consequently subject to zeroing out. But nothing could be further from the truth. And I'm going to re-emphasize something that Frank Miller said earlier this morning.

Nuclear weapons were, during the Cold War, and remain today, political instruments. They're not war-waging instruments, although there are scenarios in which we've all thought about them being

used. They were designed, built, deployed and structured so as to enable various nations to pursue their political strategies.

During the Cold War, the West used its nuclear arsenal as a lever for shifting the competition with the Soviet Union and its allies from the military domain to the arena of politics and economics, battlefields where we were sure we could win. The existence of that secure, robust, responsive nuclear force posture denied the Soviet Union the option to employ its conventional superiority in a manner to counter the very strategy the West was pursuing. It denied them the ability to use their strength against our weakness, and allowed us to use our strength against theirs.

Nuclear weapons also allowed the West to carry on the competition against the Soviet Union without the crushing defense burden that would have been required had deterrence relied on conventional forces alone. We decided back in the '50s we could not do this with conventional means. We had two forces: withdraw, choose defeat, or use nuclear weapons to essentially make up the difference, and that's exactly what we did.

Nuclear weapons continue to serve as political instruments to this day, even if their roles in U.S. strategy and that of our adversaries has changed. Today, it's America's adversaries who seek nuclear weapons to serve as a shield underneath which they can pursue their preferred strategies of unconventional, asymmetric or hybrid warfare, whatever you want to call it. For the United States, the challenge is now one of countering these strategies at the lowest level of force and at the lowest cost, while at the same time ensuring that prospective adversaries have no doubts about our will and capability, not only to respond, but if necessary to escalate.

Now, the West was successful in keeping the competition with the Soviet Union on its terms during the Cold War, primarily because of the investment in the strategic triad. Because try as it might, the Soviet military could never figure out a way of denying the West the ability to employ its nuclear weapons, first to counter Soviet conventional aggression, or once nuclear weapons were used, to escalate to larger and more lethal strikes. The United States sort of ran the entire escalation ladder. We also had the prospect to sort of dominate that process, and that was important.

To have even the faintest prospect of limiting damage, the Soviet Union had to attack the continental United States. Such a strike had to be of such a magnitude that it would inevitably prompt full retaliation. So the Soviet Union faced the problem -- any kind of contemplated conventional aggression, low-level aggression, asymmetric aggression -- of where that conflict would lead when the U.S. and its allies responded. It would lead to the Soviet Union having to make the choice to essentially commit suicide. That's the point here.

It was placing the Soviet Union in the position of recognizing that it had to make the decisive choice. Once it launched that strike, we didn't have a problem. We knew what we were going to do. We all knew it. We were going to launch a full retaliatory strike.

Once we saw thousands or 5,000 or 10,000 RVs in the air, the game was over. We'd both lose, but the Soviet Union had the choice. And it couldn't figure out any place on that continuum where it could gain a strategic advantage.

I would argue to you that a robust, secure, responsive triad is just as important today as it was during the Cold War. The United States needs to be able to leave a trail of bread crumbs that even a blind (hog ?) could follow between our commitments to defense of vital interests, friends and allies abroad, all the way up to the inevitable destruction -- or loss of what they value, defeat of their objectives, whatever kind of course you want to talk about -- that the aggressor would suffer at the hands of U.S. strategic forces. That doesn't mean we're going to use them, but they have to be made to recognize that this will only end one way if they -- actually two ways -- if they start. They lose at the local level, or they commit suicide. Those are the only two choices available.

In particular, an aggressor needs to have no illusions that he can deter a U.S. conventional response by threatening to use limited nuclear weapons regionally; nor that he can engage in a successful damage limiting strike against the U.S. homeland. Those are the two things. In order to impose this perspective, or this view on adversaries, the U.S. needs to maintain a triad of certainly no less than what we have now, if not more. That triad, or that force, has to be postured not only to be usable, according to the national command authority, against a range of threats, but it must be designed in such a manner as to present the potential aggressor no option other than a first strike if they're going to seek to survive in the escalatory process, but one that would inevitably bring upon that aggressor, a massive retaliatory strike.

And Joe Closkey (ph) was even talking about that. The reason you keep 450 Minutemen and all the associated stuff, in part, is not only to have weapons put away to address all the range of threats you may have, sequential or whatever, but to also pose to an aggressor an insoluble problem. I use to do this kind of red-blue analysis as my career for a long time. And when you looked at what it took the Soviet Union in terms of weapons, timing, all this, to get all our ICBMs and their related forces, it was a tough exercise by somebody who had a real surfeit of weapons.

Once you start dropping those numbers down -- we talked about having a handful of targets -- it's real easy by comparison. So that large number of targets really puts the idea of being able to win the escalatory game outside the bounds of just about any would-be superpower, and certainly even today's Russia.

So we need a force that has that flexibility, that responsiveness, that assurance in the Minuteman; that signaling capability in the bombers; and then the assured second-strike capability represented by the submarines. The ICBMs provide the operationally responsive capability, the assurance that the RV will get through. It also presents a targeting problem to the aggressor that they cannot solve by any sleight of hand, any cheap shot.

The SSBNs then guarantee that such an attack will result in the destruction of the nation that launches it. As a result, even when nations are thinking about challenging the U.S., threatening allies at the local level by non-nuclear means, hoping that a nuclear shield will protect them, that nuclear

capability that we have today in fact denies them that possibility. They may think they can – and they may hope that they can start the conflict perhaps -- but they have to be assured by our nuclear forces that it ends on our terms, not theirs.

I rest my case.

(Applause).

MR. PHILIP HUGHES: I'm Philip Hughes from the White House Writers Group. Your talk and Dr. Trachtenberg's talk have emphasized the importance of the triad from the standpoint of preventing a conflict over half a century between the world's major powers, a significant dividend. It's hard for us, I think, from the shared perspective of most of us in this room, to fully get into the mindset of those who are deeply opposed to the whole nuclear project, in the latest manifestation of that opposition, Global Zero. But I wonder if in the post-Cold War world there isn't another dimension of the triad and U.S. nuclear deterrence that irritates our opponents and is part of your unannounced thinking here. So I want to ask you about that.

Given that we and the Soviet Union don't anticipate an exchange and our forces predominate over China, that gives us a lot of freedom of action in the world. Each of the interventions or involvements that we've pursued over the last decade or so has been done with the knowledge that we have absolute escalatory dominance ultimately guaranteed by our nuclear forces. If we didn't have that, of course, we might be more reluctant to become involved elsewhere in the world. Do you detect that anything like that is part of the thinking -- sort of constricting our ability to intervene -- is part of the thinking of our nuclear opponents?

MR. GOURE: I suppose for a very few. I don't know if they make that connection. I think that they do sort of characterize it the way you did initially, which is who's the enemy who acquires that? And as a result, we can just sort of take these weapons down and it sort of is all kind of nonsense and frankly going to a couple of hundred weapons to that only deter (nuclear) weapons is a faux area.

I'm not sure that there is any -- nobody has really been able to demonstrate in any useful way any landing spot short of where we are now in terms of credible options for the U.S. to use. So I think the real problem here is at lower numbers with fewer -- with no options, with a force that is not just retaliatory only, but let's just call it city-busting only, you really are in the position of having to choose, as a Chinese general said, Los Angeles or Taipei.

I think there was a question asked earlier about the French and European nuclear arsenals. And what Frank didn't say, because sometimes he thinks he's still in government, I think, is that the French built the force d'frappe for one reason. They didn't believe that we would trade New York for Paris. And who knows, at times they may have been right. It was really the thought, would we really do that?

But I think that's the problem. What we need in the way of declaratory policy and even negotiating strategy, but certainly in the character of the force, is to make clear to any potential aggressor is that's not the trade. That's not where the game is played. That's not where the game ends.

And if we can do that, then essentially we keep the option of freedom of action we have that we would otherwise, I think, lose.

MR. HUESSY: Thank you, Dan.

(Applause).

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S SECURITY" WITH MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR MILITARY ANALYST, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

We will now hear from Mark Schneider from the National Institute for Public Policy.

(Applause).

MR. MARK SCHNEIDER: Thank you. Since just about every speaker that we've heard today has talked about the value of the triad, I'll skip what I planned to say other than the triad today is very much at risk. There are three serious threats to the continuation of the triad. And the biggest threat, of course, is to the continuation of the ICBM force, despite the fact that it's the cheapest element of the triad: the cheapest to maintain; the cheapest to replace, that it gives us the most secure command and control; and it forces any adversary, if they want to take it out, to launch an attack that unquestionably would be large enough to eliminate any doubts about how the U.S. would respond to it.

The three threats that I see right now to the triad is sequestration; unilateral U.S. nuclear weapons cuts, which have been discussed in the press and which the administration has actually confirmed in a generic sense; and the lack of adequate modernization programs to extend the triad beyond 2030 under existing funding levels. Now sequestration, according to the secretary of Defense, will eliminate the ICBM force almost instantaneously, as fast as you can take it down; will cut the Trident force to 10 boats, again as fast as it can be accomplished; and it will kill the existing bomber modernization program with a re-start in the mid-2020s. The threat of unilateral weapons cuts, I think, is also very much a threat to the ICBM force.

The numbers that have been reported in the press range from 300 to 1,100, with recently a number of reports suggesting 1,000 to 1,100. You take the best case here and you come up with a force structure consistent with what the administration decided in the New START force structure, and you're down to 260 to 280 ICBM silos. The reason for that is we're downloading them all to one to meet the New START force structure and you can't download them below one. So in effect, we lose or we have empty silos. And that alone will probably, if that actually happened, would probably reduce the chances the administration will fund a Minuteman follow-on program.

Now the third factor is the overall modernization program itself, which is very drawn out and incomplete. In a number of respects the biggest incompleteness here is the fact that there is no money in the budget for a replacement ICBM or life extension of the Minuteman beyond 2030, other than to study alternatives for maintaining the ICBM force. This is not by any means a good situation.

The Nuclear Posture Review that was published in April 2010 made no new decisions on modernization. The only program that was continued was the Trident replacement program with a follow-on missile notionally in the 2040s. The 1251 report which was sent to the Senate in October of

2010 was clearly intended to sell New START ratification, promised a new heavy nuclear-capable bomber and a new nuclear-capable cruise missile. Again, no decision was made on the future of the ICBM force beyond 2040.

Now, the House Armed Services Committee has cast some doubt whether the administration is serious about a nuclear-capable bomber or a nuclear-capable cruise missile. Here, I'm going to take the best case situation, which is the administration is serious about the programs it has announced. If that's the case, U.S. delivery systems will be between 36 to 71 years of age in 2031 when we get the first Trident replacement submarine. No other country in the world that has nuclear weapons is pursuing this type of, quote, "modernization" program.

There's a lot of risk associated with this. The NPR itself placed a number of constraints on nuclear weapons developments. It prohibited, essentially, all changes without presidential approval. And a lot of the cost factors, the cost increases that are being talked about now, is a direct result, I believe, of the limitations we've imposed on ourselves involving nuclear testing and nuclear weapons development.

In the FY '13 budget that was delivered to Congress in January 2012, all modernization programs were delayed by two years, and 90 percent of the programmed increase in nuclear weapons infrastructure went away. So we are really pursuing a very modest and very long-term modernization program. If I had to sum it up in a sentence, I'll steal the title of a publication from David Trachtenberg from the 1990s, what I would call "Erosion by Design."

There is no question, I think, that over the next 20 years, until the follow-on systems actually come into being, that there will be a gradual erosion in our ability to assure the destruction of targets, particularly in Russia and China where you have modern air and increasingly likely missile defense systems that will be deployed over the next 20 years and beyond. One of the biggest problems, I think, in the next 20 years, before we get any follow-on systems, is the U.S. nuclear (aging ?) of the AGM-86, which is already 30 years old, and there are questions about our ability to sustain it to 2031. And I think there are even more significant problems with its ability to penetrate advanced air defenses that will be deployed in both Russia and China over the next 20 years.

So we will see, I think, at best, a gradual erosion of our capabilities. And this is in stark contrast to what is going on in Russia and China. Both are pursuing programs that will completely modernize their strategic forces over the next 15 years.

The Russians, since the ratification of new START – excuse me, the Senate approval of New START in December of 2010, have announced three new ICBM programs: the heavy ICBM that Frank Miller mentioned this morning and has been confirmed by the Obama administration; the second one was announced by the head of the strategic missile forces in December 2011, and he characterized it as a new medium ICBM; and then in May of 2012 they tested what they characterized as a new ICBM. The Chinese are doing much the same. Over the last few years they've been introducing two new ICBMs, the F-31 and the F-31 A. Press reports within the last few weeks, both in the United States and in China, say that the F-41, which is reportedly a MIRV'ed ICBM, has just been tested.

In the worst case, we are moving toward a weak dyad of SLBMs and bombers. And I think that's a significant mistake. I think the Air Force is serious about the new bomber, but I'm not sure the Obama administration is. It could easily become a victim of the next round of budget cuts. And I don't know if the next round of budget cuts is going to be the last round of budget cuts. I kind of doubt that.

Since the Senate ratified New START in December of 2010, we have seen the Russian defense minister say on three separate occasions that he intends to increase the number of deployed nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles over the life of the START Treaty. The Chinese have announced the expansion of capabilities as far back as 2006. The decline in the U.S. deterrent capability, I think, is of concern, particularly in the context of the nuclear threats that are coming out of Moscow. Frank Miller summarized those very well in his opening address this morning. They are very numerous and they are continuing. And we see similar threats, although not of the same blatancy, from Chinese generals. I believe that their no first use policy is not real.

Thank you. Any questions?

(Applause).

MR. : Hi Mark. For the record, you wrote in my design paper –

MR. SCHNEIDER: Oh, I'm sorry –

MR. : -- that since the end of the Cold War more than a dozen times Russia has leveled nuclear threats against the United States. In your long experience in working these issues in the community, how do you explain it? Because, I don't understand it, that we even have a faction that wants to go to global zero, in light of such nuclear saber rattling. How do you think they rationalize that?

MR. SCHNEIDER: It's been rationalized pretty much the same way, through my professional career and even 20 years before that. There has been a faction in the United States that started with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and has grown much more widespread as the decades passed, that don't regard nuclear weapons as necessary, as critical for deterrence, that wants to reduce the numbers to zero or very small numbers, adopt silly targeting strategies, blowing up cities, things that have the least credibility, to reduce the number of nuclear weapons required. For extended deterrence purposes we need capabilities that are robust, that are diverse and that are capable of promptly responding to actual attacks if they occur. And that's not what you get under minimal deterrence.

MR. MIKE STAGER (ph): Good afternoon. Thank you for the presentation. Mike Stager with LTI (ph). I hate to be the bearer of bad news. I think it's clear that under the current circumstances, the financial circumstances of our country are only going to get much worse. But I do think obviously with Russia's response to the missile defense system, this discussion is incredibly relevant.

What is the – (triads ?) are good, (quartets ?) are often better. What is your sense of a revival that came out of Russia -- Mr. Rogozin presented – a revival of President Reagan's SDI, called the SDE? And I wanted to know if there's any discussion that you've been part of or what's your take on a possible

revival of this strategic program? What are the general comments in terms of the national (state of things ?)?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, one of the factors in Russian defense policy that's hidden in plain view is their missile defense policy. For many years they have announced that they're going forward with a nationwide missile defense system. Rogozin is one of the most extreme advocates of that, and he's doing it for the wrong reasons. It's not aimed at rogue states. It's not aimed at the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. It's aimed at us.

And they have no intention – and Rogozin has said this on more than one occasion, I believe, but he certainly said it once – which is no matter what we do in missile defense they're going ahead with a missile defense system. They've announced, in addition to the S-500, which will be their new missile defense interceptor – they claim 2015, more likely 2017 to 2020 – there will be programs after that. There's no question, they've announced a couple of them. And there are obviously programs we don't know about.

MR. HUESSY: Mark, thank you.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Thank you.

(Applause).

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S SECURITY" WITH KEITH PAYNE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

MR. HUESSY: Before we hear from Keith Payne, I'd like to make a few comments. I want to thank all our extraordinary speakers, but some things that have not been addressed need to be. One is the idea that nuclear weapons don't refer to or deter any current threat. And it's a theme General Cartwright testified to before the Senate Appropriations Committee a couple of weeks ago.

If you look at the number of conflicts in the world today, I think it's 87, either guerrilla wars, things like in Somalia. And you could say that the entire U.S. conventional deterrent failed to stop any of them. So then do you decide to get rid of the U.S. conventional deterrent?

When I was at the National Defense University we once did kind of a formula of all the threats currently and in the future. And we looked at EMP. We looked at pandemic flu. We looked at cyber.

And we said, to what extent do each element of the U.S. military capability: the Coast Guard, Homeland Security, the FBI, deal with any one of them? Well, none of the agencies, none of the organizations of the U.S. government dealt with any more than about a quarter of the threats. Well that doesn't mean you get rid of them because they don't deal with all of them.

The second thing is I think what a lot of people are worried about is the threats in the Cold War we thought were attributable. The Soviets would go across the Fulda Gap, we would know who they are. Right now, we're facing -- and the Soviet Union by the way, was the beginning, the funder and creator of most of the guerrilla wars and most of the terrorists in this world today. Go read Bob Gates' book that was released in 1996. He was at the agency when he was told by CIA Director Casey to look into that issue.

We are looking at non-attributable and attributable cases. And the non-attributables are often state sponsors of terror that as Larry Welch reminded us, a state sponsor of terror can eventually be found out like we found out the Taliban in Afghanistan were harboring the people that attacked us on 9/11. But we also know from a court case that just came out a number of months ago, that the Iranians gave training to the hijackers of 9/11.

That's in the 9/11 Commission report. And funding came from a member of the royal family in Saudi Arabia. So the question is, not all unattributable attacks necessarily unattached to state actors as well, and those folks can also have weapons of mass destruction.

The most interesting thing that Senator Nunn and others have been talking about is the moral authority of going to lower numbers, means Brazil, Turkey and other countries that join with us and go after the Iranians and North Koreans and accept sanctions and divestments and things we need to do to put pressure on the Iranians to stop their nuclear weapons program. I don't know how you can describe

it any other than restraint, what we have done since 1981 when Ronald Reagan became president and reduced nuclear weapons from then 12,000 plus deployed nuclear weapons – those were just strategic – to where we are today at 1,550. That's restraint.

Plus the fact, as Mark Schneider points out – and, I believe, our former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates pointed out – we're the only strategic nuclear state that's not modernizing. We are just barely beginning that process since he talked, but a lot of these things have been delayed. So I'm not sure why it is people think that North Korea and Iran look to the moral authority of the United States for guidance as to what they do.

As someone who was a student in South Korea many, many years ago as an undergraduate, and who's Korean father was the national security adviser to the president of the country, and he always told me, interestingly, that when North Korea gets a nuclear weapon the last thing you want to do is withdraw from this peninsula. Because if you do, they will invade.

And also, finally, I want to talk about cost. The statistical abstract of the United States is a fascinating document. I don't know how many of you read it. It's from the Commerce Department. There are a couple of authors in this town that got famous by going through it and finding out how many toilets there are per household, how many cars, ovens, toasters, you name it. And everybody thought they had gone around the country and actually done surveys, and all they did was take it out of this statistical abstract.

I looked at Bruce Blair and Mr. Cartwright's proposal that we have 450 deployed weapons. And I said okay, I won't go with the 450 you say you will add in a crisis. I guess sending the boats back to harbor and they'll order up some warheads. But let's take 450 as the number you have available for retaliation, which under their scenario won't happen unless you went first.

But 450 warheads cost us now between \$1.3 and \$2.6 million dollar, when you divide the entire cost of the O&M, procurement, RDT&E, personnel of the SLBM, ICBM and bomber wings, it comes out to between \$1.3 and \$2.6 million. If you're talking about 400 retaliatory weapons, you're talking about \$500 million to \$800 million, which is 1/50<sup>th</sup> of what Americans spend every year going to the movies.

Let me say it again. Take the amount of money you spend on movies, divide by 50, and that's what it costs you to have the retaliatory weapons in our deterrent which, without getting classified, is generally what people have considered somewhere between 100 and 600 -- is that good enough – of warheads available. And that's what it costs us. And people say that it costs too much money.

Another way to look at it is \$21.5 billion every year for 10 years is what the president has proposed, compared to in 10 years we will be spending \$5.4 trillion a year in the federal government. Over the next 10 years we are going to spend \$45 trillion. So therefore, the ICBM, SLBM and the bomber wings of the triad cost us \$1 out of every \$282 that we spend at the federal level. And if you go on the basis of all government, it's \$1 out of \$462 that we spend on the number one deterrent capability of the United States that keeps the peace.

So with that, I will introduce my dear friend, Keith Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy, a member of the Strategic Forces Commission, and one of the finest thinkers on strategic issues today. Would you all welcome Dr. Keith Payne?

(Applause).

MR. KEITH PAYNE: Thank you, Peter, for that nice introduction and the remarks. I'm going to talk today about the numbers and the goals of U.S. nuclear capabilities within the strategic triad and within the administration's expressed nuclear policy agenda. These are my own personal views. They don't necessarily reflect any of the institutions with which I am affiliated.

Let me start by noticing that often here some brave sounding person says that nothing has changed since the Cold War with regard to U.S. forces and U.S. policy. This usually is sort of a cheap rhetorical trick for them, suggesting that dramatic changes actually are necessary. Let me note that that frequent statement is nonsense. Since 1991, based on open source data, the U.S. has accepted approximately an 85 percent reduction in the number of START accountable strategic nuclear weapons, and approximately a 66 percent reduction in the number of accountable launchers, and approximately a 90 percent reduction in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons.

Given these accepted deep reductions, the question is, why go further? What's the point? What's the value of doing so?

Let me note in this context that there appears to be a threat to the triad that is part and parcel of the fabric of the current announced nuclear policy agenda and our current budgetary woes. I noticed that my good friend Greg Coutur (ph) from OSD said that he would like to be able to say that there is budgetary and policy certainty with regard to the future of the triad, but he didn't say that he could say it – very carefully crafted. Let's very briefly review four of the announced administration's initiatives in this regard.

First, there's a policy presented in the Nuclear Posture Review that there will be no new U.S. nuclear capabilities -- no new U.S. nuclear capabilities. Well, that may sound good to you until you understand that other states are developing new nuclear capabilities, and we may need to as well at some point if we want to continue to be able to deter and assure.

A second initiative, again announced in the Nuclear Posture Review, is the United States would like to move towards a sole purpose standard for U.S. nuclear weapons. That was, the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter other nuclear weapons. That's their sole purpose.

Now that sounds balanced and proportional, perhaps, and maybe it sounds reasonable to you and even good to you, until you realize that there are also biological and chemical weapons out there and at least some of those could be as lethal as nuclear weapons. Do you really want to give up nuclear deterrence against such horrific threats?

The third initiative was a policy of moving towards nuclear zero, with a de-emphasis on nuclear deterrence in favor of conventional deterrence. Again, movement towards conventional deterrence and

away from nuclear deterrence may sound good to you, perhaps until you understand that conventional deterrence, as valuable as it is, has a history of catastrophic failures. In the first half of the last century, the world suffered approximately 100 million casualties in approximately 10 years of warfare. One hundred million casualties in approximately 10 years of warfare before we had nuclear deterrence. Why should conventional deterrence work any better in the future?

Nobody has suggested a possible answer to that question beyond, “the world will change.” We just get the same unsupportable assertion that somehow conventional deterrence will now be effective. I ask again, why now when not in the past?

Also movement towards nuclear zero may sound good until you understand that U.S. withdrawal from nuclear deterrence scares the heck out of some of our key allies, who may consider going nuclear themselves in response. And some have hinted in that direction.

The fourth initiative is for the pursuit of nuclear reductions below the New START Treaty ceilings. Again, that might sound good until you understand that the administration’s 2010 New START Treaty effectively required reductions by the U.S. alone – yes, unilateral reductions – a fact which the Russians greatly and publicly appreciated, and the U.S. State Department denied. Do we really want to reduce further at this point? And again, the fundamental question is, why do so? What’s the value of that?

The administration’s answer to this question really explains quite a bit. The administration’s answer is that further U.S. nuclear reductions will serve the administration’s highest priority of strengthening the global nonproliferation regime as a critical step towards nuclear zero. That’s in the Nuclear Posture Review executive summary, page six. Let me say it again, further nuclear reductions will supposedly will serve the administration’s highest priority of strengthening the global nonproliferation regime and is a critical step towards nuclear zero, which is the highest priority.

The administration says that the U.S. must lead this process and set a good example around which others will rally in support of nonproliferation and movement towards nuclear zero. So we now have a nuclear targeting review for the publicly announced specific purpose of further reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal below the New START Treaty ceilings. DOD reportedly has responded to this with options for reductions down to levels as low as 300, 700 to 800 and 1,000 to 1,100 warheads, all below the New START Treaty ceilings.

Let me just take a minute to describe what I think are the fundamental problems and risks with this agenda. Let me start with what we know. We know that nuclear weapons help to deter war, including WMD attacks, and help prevent war escalation. We know that nuclear weapons help to assure allies, and thereby contribute to our alliances and to nuclear nonproliferation. Finally, we know that deterrence can fail, and leave us no alternative but to defend against attacks.

What does that tell us? These are things we know. What does it tell us?

It tells us that the measure of our strategic forces must take into account the requirements, the broad sweep of requirements, necessary to deter attack, to extend deterrence to allies, to assure allies, and to defend if necessary. If you want the measure of U.S. force adequacy, you must take each of these goals into account. And each of these goals suggests a different set of capabilities. Some of them overlap, some of them don't.

My conclusion in this regard is that the administration's apparent push for further deep reductions poses two serious risks. First, further nuclear reductions risk the promotion of nuclear proliferation by giving our allies and friends new incentives to go nuclear themselves under certain circumstances. And second, further nuclear reductions, and prospective limits on ballistic missile defenses, risk degradation of the U.S. ability to deter attacks, to assure allies, and to defend in the event deterrence fails.

The administration essentially claims that U.S. assurance and deterrence missions can be accomplished with fewer, or indeed in the future perhaps no, U.S. nuclear capabilities. We supposedly can deter chem and bio threats with fewer or no U.S. nuclear capabilities. So deep reductions should be considered acceptable.

We supposedly can extend deterrence for allies with fewer or perhaps in the future no U.S. nuclear capabilities so further U.S. deep reductions can be considered acceptable. We supposedly can assure allies with fewer or no U.S. nuclear capabilities so further U.S. deep reductions should be considered acceptable. Indeed, in a recent report chaired by General Cartwright that Peter referred to, the report proclaimed that a few hundred nuclear weapons would be more than adequate to meet U.S. deterrence and assurance requirements, and that the U.S. should abandon ICBMs and the triad in the process of reducing to that level.

What's fundamentally wrong with such claims? First, such a minimum standard of force adequacy would make U.S. forces more vulnerable to an opponent's covert or deceptive deployments, would ease the technical and strategic difficulties to counter or get around our deterrence strategies, possibly encouraging some to move in more aggressive directions than they otherwise would. It could actually encourage competition, particularly with regard to Russia and China, but perhaps with North Korea and Iran. I believe reducing ICBMs dramatically is particularly problematic in this regard.

Second, much lower U.S. nuclear force levels could reduce the credibility of our extended deterrent and motivate some allies to seek their own independent nuclear capabilities, i.e. it could contribute to incentives for nuclear proliferation among our allies and friends. Third, minimal nuclear force standards almost inevitably lead to deterrence policies based on either implicit or explicit deterrence threats to destroy large numbers of civilians or civilian targets. Successive U.S. administrations, Democratic and Republican, for five decades, essentially have rejected this approach to deterrence as being illegal, immoral and ultimately incredible.

These are the reasons why numbers matter. As Hagel said, quantity has its own quality. These are the reasons that numbers matter and why Democratic and Republican administrations have rejected very low U.S. nuclear force standards, as I said, for approximately five decades.

These reasons remain sound. That's not Cold War discussion, these reasons remain sound. And I believe the burden of proof must now be on those who claim that much lower levels of U.S. nuclear forces would stem proliferation and provide adequate support for deterrence, assurance and defense.

But there is no such proof. There is no such proof. I've seen zero evidence linking further U.S. nuclear reductions to improved nuclear nonproliferation. I've seen considerable evidence to the contrary. And we cannot know that fewer U.S. nuclear weapons will be adequate for deterrence and assurance in the future, because the future threats and related requirements for deterrence and assurance are unpredictable.

Given a fluid and unpredictable threat environment, nobody can tell you with honesty that locking in ever lower numbers of nuclear forces will be compatible with future requirements for deterrence and assurance, because no one knows what those threats and requirements are going to be. Remember that when someone next tells you that 300 or 500 or 1,000 weapons surely will be adequate. They don't know. They either have to be omniscient or omnipotent to be able to give you assurances like that.

I don't know anyone like that, at least not in this room. This leads to my main point, and that is given the unpredictability of threats the most fundamental requirement for strategic forces and planning is their flexibility and their resilience. For flexibility and resilience to change and surprise, their ability to adapt to new strategic threats, new environments, particularly given the life span of our force structure.

Sustaining U.S. nuclear force numbers and diversity are critical for precisely this reason. When you add up all the discussion of why is it important for policy reasons, for the political reasons, for assurance, for deterrence, for extended deterrence, the reason is because a triad helps provide the flexibility and resilience that's really important to be able to support those goals. It helps provide the critical flexibility and resilience to U.S. forces.

Yet, flexibility and resilience is precisely what the announced nuclear agenda threatens to degrade. In sum, U.S. strategic forces must be of sufficient size, flexibility and resilience to adapt to future environments so that now and prospectively forever U.S. strategic forces can deter credibly across a wide range of possible threats, can discourage opponents from placing any confidence in their offensive nuclear strategies, can assure allies now and in the future that they do not need to acquire their own nuclear capabilities because ours are credible and capable. We want to be able to, for now and in the future, avoid deterrence policies that are dependent upon targeting civilians and civilian centers for their deterrent effect. And for now and prospectively forever in the future, we want to be able to defend the U.S. and allies, including U.S. society, if deterrence fails.

Again, the size, the flexibility and the resilience of our forces is necessary for these purposes, which is precisely what we risk if we move to further deep force reductions. The bottom line here is that the administration has expressed its intention for further limitations and nuclear reductions beyond those made since 1991. And there is a prospective threat to the triad in this agenda.

However, the reduced U.S. force posture, U.S. flexibility and resilience at still lower numbers would likely undermine the U.S. capability to adjust to future conditions, as may be necessary; to deter future wars, as may be necessary; to assure allies, as certainly will be necessary; or to defend if deterrence fails, as may be necessary. The goals of deterrence and assurance and the force flexibility and resilience needed for those goals should not be subordinated for the sake of further deep nuclear reductions and nuclear zero.

The White House vision of nuclear zero is the ultimate emotional trump card when such deterrent concerns are raised about further reductions. But we've been to the nuclear zero mountain top before. We were there for a millennia of recorded history and it was ugly beyond compare. Remember 100 million casualties in approximately 10 years of combat in the first half of the last century, courtesy of the failure of conventional deterrence. In a dangerous and uncertain world, we should not sacrifice the numbers and types of U.S. capabilities that may be necessary for deterrence and assurance now and in the future in a Don Quixote like quest to return to nuclear zero. Deterrence and assurance, and thus the triad, are too important for such a dubious and risky political science experiment.

Thank you.

(Applause).

Peter has given me license for one question.

MR. WILL CURTIS (?): (Off mic) – the Cold War deterrence policy was based on the assumption of a rational opponent. And you were quite critical of that moving from a Cold War environment to a post-Cold War environment. Have you changed your views any?

MR. PAYNE: First of all, let me offer my appreciation for the fact that you have three of my books.

(Laughter).

Even my mother hasn't done that, so I greatly appreciate it. The U.S. deterrence policy during the Cold War was based on the assumption of a rational Soviet Union. But in some ways it was even worse than that. It wasn't just that it was a rational Soviet Union. I think the assumption of a rational actor tends to be a legitimate assumption.

Historically, there are very few cases where leaders who suffer from great psycho-pathologies got to power and stayed in power. So it's not the rationality that I'm so concerned about, the assumption of rationality, it's what we input to what rationality means. When we think of a rational actor we attribute our own characteristics to that condition.

So for us to attribute rationality to opponents, they tend to have to think in very Western enlightenment terms. And we distinguish as irrational folks who don't. They may be very rational in the

bounded sense of that meaning. In other words, their actions will service their highest goals and they will practice tradeoffs with what their actions are. They understand that. They're informed.

But what if their highest goals are so far outside what we consider the norm that it leads them to take amazingly aggressive steps? We tend to dismiss that as irrational. It's not irrational. It's a very different understanding of what is acceptable behavior. It's outside of the Western definition of rationality, so we in somewhat ethnocentric ways say they must be irrational.

Remember what the response was when the Pakistanis and the Indians started doing nuclear tests. The U.S. officials said that's irrational. Really? Was it irrational for India and Pakistan to have those nuclear tests at that time?

They didn't think so. And I believe by their own lights it wasn't irrational for them. But it seemed irrational to folks in the government at the time, and so they consigned it to irrationality.

During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis we now know that Cuban leaders, for example, were insisting that the Soviet Union use nuclear weapons against the United States. They wanted a thermonuclear war -- we know that -- on the presumption that socialism would not triumph over capitalism. If there had to be a war, this was it, and let socialism triumph.

It was an ideologically driven position by the Cuban leadership. It sounded irrational to us. It sounds irrational today. You want a thermonuclear war?

We know that some of the Cubans at the time, according to the Soviet histories, said that Cuba will perish but socialism will triumph. Cuba is ready for martyrdom. Were national leaders ready to accept nuclear destruction because their ideology tells them that socialism will triumph, really? Yeah, really.

So it's not necessarily the rationality that I'm so concerned about, although in some cases there is a chance that irrationality will prevail, psycho-pathologies will prevail. It has, in the past, on occasion. But I am more concerned about the views, our views, of what characterizes, what constitutes irrationality and really misjudging opponents and expecting them to behave as if they were Western enlightened leaders when they're not. They are their own people. They come from their own culture. And it can lead them to very different behaviors than we expect.

I think in that are the potential seeds of profound deterrence failure. That's what scares me the most. Thank you.

(Applause).

MR. HUESSY: I'd like to finish our program with our host, General Davis. But first I wanted to thank Keith, Richard, Kim, Bob Feidler and Al, the staff here.

(Applause).

And also thank the wait staff for a wonderful session with 192 people, who did an extraordinary job. And that's a thank you to you, General, for ROA and especially our friend Bob Feidler. Thank you, sir, very much.

(Applause).

MR. DAVIS: Well that certainly was an interesting four hour presentation, particularly for a Marine like me who, I guess, could be described as the fourth part of the triad and deterrence. Any other Marines in the audience? Okay.

Thanks to all of you for giving up half of a very important day in your lives for this exploration of a vital topic, the security not only of our nation but of the world. And I particularly want to thank Peter Huesy and the Air Force Association for his many years of work in this field. He really is one of our national treasures when it comes to the gravity of thought on security.

I also want to thank the National Defense Industrial Association for partnering with us, and echo Peter's thanks to my colleague Bob Fiedler who runs our defense education forums. It was also particularly gratifying to work with Task Force 21 from Minot, North Dakota. And Mr. Jantzer, thanks for all your efforts.

And thanks, too, to our web audience. This was a milestone with new technology we're exercising here, and we trust that this went out to the infinite world of the web so that a broader audience than 192 shared in this important program.

We heard from speakers from Congress, the executive branch and undeniable experts from the think tanks. They talked about the reliability, capability and affordability of the triad, which is clearly a military and undeniable political force in the defense of our nation. And you even managed to educate a dumb Marine. I am not like General Cartwright, who started as an aviator and wound up as one of our great strategic leaders.

We'd like to welcome you to come back to a defense education forum at the Minuteman building of the Reserve Officers Association. We run between 60 and 70 of these programs per year. They range from longer forum programs like this to 45 minute or hour long single panel discussions of very narrow topics. And we have plans to take these on the road and do more web casting.

If any of you would like to partner with us on a topic of interest to you or your organization, we really do welcome your input and your partnership. Our point of contact is Bob Feidler, that's [rfeidler@roa.org](mailto:rfeidler@roa.org). We would be interested in your input.

I'd like to – I'm almost done – there's no such thing as a free breakfast, but we do have a free resource to all of you. And that is the ROA Smart Brief, which is a free daily email news feed of the eight to ten most important stories on national defense. Now I know most of you have access to – many of you have access to the Early Bird. But you know when you sit down to your computer in the morning and you see the Early Bird pop up, that there's 180 to 240 stories and you're facing the daunting task of wading through all of it in your busy day.

Well, our computers and the two editors who manage the algorithm will do that filtering for you. And at about 2 o'clock everyday you'll get a feed of, as I said, the eight to ten most important stories about national defense. To subscribe, you go to [www.smartbrief.com/roa](http://www.smartbrief.com/roa).

And all we need is your email address. We're going to ask for more profile information. You're free to volunteer that, but that will not preclude you from becoming a subscriber to Smart Brief. So please, join us.

And finally, my final commercial is if you or your organization would like to use this space, and we have a smaller meeting space downstairs, the Minuteman building is available to you. And I think you can see the capability of our catering service and the audio-visual and staff are here to serve you.

So, that is it. Thanks to all of you again for sharing a piece of your day with us, and go forward and do great things.

(Applause).

091312 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND TASK FORCE 21 CONFERENCE ON "THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRIAD'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S SECURITY" WITH KEITH PAYNE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

MR. HUESSY: Before we hear from Keith Payne, I'd like to make a few comments. I want to thank all our extraordinary speakers, but some things that have not been addressed need to be. One is the idea that nuclear weapons don't refer to or deter any current threat. And it's a theme General Cartwright testified to before the Senate Appropriations Committee a couple of weeks ago.

If you look at the number of conflicts in the world today, I think it's 87, either guerrilla wars, things like in Somalia. And you could say that the entire U.S. conventional deterrent failed to stop any of them. So then do you decide to get rid of the U.S. conventional deterrent?

When I was at the National Defense University we once did kind of a formula of all the threats currently and in the future. And we looked at EMP. We looked at pandemic flu. We looked at cyber.

And we said, to what extent do each element of the U.S. military capability: the Coast Guard, Homeland Security, the FBI, deal with any one of them? Well, none of the agencies, none of the organizations of the U.S. government dealt with any more than about a quarter of the threats. Well that doesn't mean you get rid of them because they don't deal with all of them.

The second thing is I think what a lot of people are worried about is the threats in the Cold War we thought were attributable. The Soviets would go across the Fulda Gap, we would know who they are. Right now, we're facing -- and the Soviet Union by the way, was the beginning, the funder and creator of most of the guerrilla wars and most of the terrorists in this world today. Go read Bob Gates' book that was released in 1996. He was at the agency when he was told by CIA Director Casey to look into that issue.

We are looking at non-attributable and attributable cases. And the non-attributables are often state sponsors of terror that as Larry Welch reminded us, a state sponsor of terror can eventually be found out like we found out the Taliban in Afghanistan were harboring the people that attacked us on 9/11. But we also know from a court case that just came out a number of months ago, that the Iranians gave training to the hijackers of 9/11.

That's in the 9/11 Commission report. And funding came from a member of the royal family in Saudi Arabia. So the question is, not all unattributable attacks necessarily unattached to state actors as well, and those folks can also have weapons of mass destruction.

The most interesting thing that Senator Nunn and others have been talking about is the moral authority of going to lower numbers, means Brazil, Turkey and other countries that join with us and go after the Iranians and North Koreans and accept sanctions and divestments and things we need to do to put pressure on the Iranians to stop their nuclear weapons program. I don't know how you can describe

it any other than restraint, what we have done since 1981 when Ronald Reagan became president and reduced nuclear weapons from then 12,000 plus deployed nuclear weapons – those were just strategic – to where we are today at 1,550. That's restraint.

Plus the fact, as Mark Schneider points out – and, I believe, our former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates pointed out – we're the only strategic nuclear state that's not modernizing. We are just barely beginning that process since he talked, but a lot of these things have been delayed. So I'm not sure why it is people think that North Korea and Iran look to the moral authority of the United States for guidance as to what they do.

As someone who was a student in South Korea many, many years ago as an undergraduate, and who's Korean father was the national security adviser to the president of the country, and he always told me, interestingly, that when North Korea gets a nuclear weapon the last thing you want to do is withdraw from this peninsula. Because if you do, they will invade.

And also, finally, I want to talk about cost. The statistical abstract of the United States is a fascinating document. I don't know how many of you read it. It's from the Commerce Department. There are a couple of authors in this town that got famous by going through it and finding out how many toilets there are per household, how many cars, ovens, toasters, you name it. And everybody thought they had gone around the country and actually done surveys, and all they did was take it out of this statistical abstract.

I looked at Bruce Blair and Mr. Cartwright's proposal that we have 450 deployed weapons. And I said okay, I won't go with the 450 you say you will add in a crisis. I guess sending the boats back to harbor and they'll order up some warheads. But let's take 450 as the number you have available for retaliation, which under their scenario won't happen unless you went first.

But 450 warheads cost us now between \$1.3 and \$2.6 million dollar, when you divide the entire cost of the O&M, procurement, RDT&E, personnel of the SLBM, ICBM and bomber wings, it comes out to between \$1.3 and \$2.6 million. If you're talking about 400 retaliatory weapons, you're talking about \$500 million to \$800 million, which is 1/50<sup>th</sup> of what Americans spend every year going to the movies.

Let me say it again. Take the amount of money you spend on movies, divide by 50, and that's what it costs you to have the retaliatory weapons in our deterrent which, without getting classified, is generally what people have considered somewhere between 100 and 600 -- is that good enough – of warheads available. And that's what it costs us. And people say that it costs too much money.

Another way to look at it is \$21.5 billion every year for 10 years is what the president has proposed, compared to in 10 years we will be spending \$5.4 trillion a year in the federal government. Over the next 10 years we are going to spend \$45 trillion. So therefore, the ICBM, SLBM and the bomber wings of the triad cost us \$1 out of every \$282 that we spend at the federal level. And if you go on the basis of all government, it's \$1 out of \$462 that we spend on the number one deterrent capability of the United States that keeps the peace.

So with that, I will introduce my dear friend, Keith Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy, a member of the Strategic Forces Commission, and one of the finest thinkers on strategic issues today. Would you all welcome Dr. Keith Payne?

(Applause).

MR. KEITH PAYNE: Thank you, Peter, for that nice introduction and the remarks. I'm going to talk today about the numbers and the goals of U.S. nuclear capabilities within the strategic triad and within the administration's expressed nuclear policy agenda. These are my own personal views. They don't necessarily reflect any of the institutions with which I am affiliated.

Let me start by noticing that often here some brave sounding person says that nothing has changed since the Cold War with regard to U.S. forces and U.S. policy. This usually is sort of a cheap rhetorical trick for them, suggesting that dramatic changes actually are necessary. Let me note that that frequent statement is nonsense. Since 1991, based on open source data, the U.S. has accepted approximately an 85 percent reduction in the number of START accountable strategic nuclear weapons, and approximately a 66 percent reduction in the number of accountable launchers, and approximately a 90 percent reduction in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons.

Given these accepted deep reductions, the question is, why go further? What's the point? What's the value of doing so?

Let me note in this context that there appears to be a threat to the triad that is part and parcel of the fabric of the current announced nuclear policy agenda and our current budgetary woes. I noticed that my good friend Greg Coutur (ph) from OSD said that he would like to be able to say that there is budgetary and policy certainty with regard to the future of the triad, but he didn't say that he could say it – very carefully crafted. Let's very briefly review four of the announced administration's initiatives in this regard.

First, there's a policy presented in the Nuclear Posture Review that there will be no new U.S. nuclear capabilities -- no new U.S. nuclear capabilities. Well, that may sound good to you until you understand that other states are developing new nuclear capabilities, and we may need to as well at some point if we want to continue to be able to deter and assure.

A second initiative, again announced in the Nuclear Posture Review, is the United States would like to move towards a sole purpose standard for U.S. nuclear weapons. That was, the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter other nuclear weapons. That's their sole purpose.

Now that sounds balanced and proportional, perhaps, and maybe it sounds reasonable to you and even good to you, until you realize that there are also biological and chemical weapons out there and at least some of those could be as lethal as nuclear weapons. Do you really want to give up nuclear deterrence against such horrific threats?

The third initiative was a policy of moving towards nuclear zero, with a de-emphasis on nuclear deterrence in favor of conventional deterrence. Again, movement towards conventional deterrence and

away from nuclear deterrence may sound good to you, perhaps until you understand that conventional deterrence, as valuable as it is, has a history of catastrophic failures. In the first half of the last century, the world suffered approximately 100 million casualties in approximately 10 years of warfare. One hundred million casualties in approximately 10 years of warfare before we had nuclear deterrence. Why should conventional deterrence work any better in the future?

Nobody has suggested a possible answer to that question beyond, “the world will change.” We just get the same unsupportable assertion that somehow conventional deterrence will now be effective. I ask again, why now when not in the past?

Also movement towards nuclear zero may sound good until you understand that U.S. withdrawal from nuclear deterrence scares the heck out of some of our key allies, who may consider going nuclear themselves in response. And some have hinted in that direction.

The fourth initiative is for the pursuit of nuclear reductions below the New START Treaty ceilings. Again, that might sound good until you understand that the administration’s 2010 New START Treaty effectively required reductions by the U.S. alone – yes, unilateral reductions – a fact which the Russians greatly and publicly appreciated, and the U.S. State Department denied. Do we really want to reduce further at this point? And again, the fundamental question is, why do so? What’s the value of that?

The administration’s answer to this question really explains quite a bit. The administration’s answer is that further U.S. nuclear reductions will serve the administration’s highest priority of strengthening the global nonproliferation regime as a critical step towards nuclear zero. That’s in the Nuclear Posture Review executive summary, page six. Let me say it again, further nuclear reductions will supposedly will serve the administration’s highest priority of strengthening the global nonproliferation regime and is a critical step towards nuclear zero, which is the highest priority.

The administration says that the U.S. must lead this process and set a good example around which others will rally in support of nonproliferation and movement towards nuclear zero. So we now have a nuclear targeting review for the publicly announced specific purpose of further reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal below the New START Treaty ceilings. DOD reportedly has responded to this with options for reductions down to levels as low as 300, 700 to 800 and 1,000 to 1,100 warheads, all below the New START Treaty ceilings.

Let me just take a minute to describe what I think are the fundamental problems and risks with this agenda. Let me start with what we know. We know that nuclear weapons help to deter war, including WMD attacks, and help prevent war escalation. We know that nuclear weapons help to assure allies, and thereby contribute to our alliances and to nuclear nonproliferation. Finally, we know that deterrence can fail, and leave us no alternative but to defend against attacks.

What does that tell us? These are things we know. What does it tell us?

It tells us that the measure of our strategic forces must take into account the requirements, the broad sweep of requirements, necessary to deter attack, to extend deterrence to allies, to assure allies, and to defend if necessary. If you want the measure of U.S. force adequacy, you must take each of these goals into account. And each of these goals suggests a different set of capabilities. Some of them overlap, some of them don't.

My conclusion in this regard is that the administration's apparent push for further deep reductions poses two serious risks. First, further nuclear reductions risk the promotion of nuclear proliferation by giving our allies and friends new incentives to go nuclear themselves under certain circumstances. And second, further nuclear reductions, and prospective limits on ballistic missile defenses, risk degradation of the U.S. ability to deter attacks, to assure allies, and to defend in the event deterrence fails.

The administration essentially claims that U.S. assurance and deterrence missions can be accomplished with fewer, or indeed in the future perhaps no, U.S. nuclear capabilities. We supposedly can deter chem and bio threats with fewer or no U.S. nuclear capabilities. So deep reductions should be considered acceptable.

We supposedly can extend deterrence for allies with fewer or perhaps in the future no U.S. nuclear capabilities so further U.S. deep reductions can be considered acceptable. We supposedly can assure allies with fewer or no U.S. nuclear capabilities so further U.S. deep reductions should be considered acceptable. Indeed, in a recent report chaired by General Cartwright that Peter referred to, the report proclaimed that a few hundred nuclear weapons would be more than adequate to meet U.S. deterrence and assurance requirements, and that the U.S. should abandon ICBMs and the triad in the process of reducing to that level.

What's fundamentally wrong with such claims? First, such a minimum standard of force adequacy would make U.S. forces more vulnerable to an opponent's covert or deceptive deployments, would ease the technical and strategic difficulties to counter or get around our deterrence strategies, possibly encouraging some to move in more aggressive directions than they otherwise would. It could actually encourage competition, particularly with regard to Russia and China, but perhaps with North Korea and Iran. I believe reducing ICBMs dramatically is particularly problematic in this regard.

Second, much lower U.S. nuclear force levels could reduce the credibility of our extended deterrent and motivate some allies to seek their own independent nuclear capabilities, i.e. it could contribute to incentives for nuclear proliferation among our allies and friends. Third, minimal nuclear force standards almost inevitably lead to deterrence policies based on either implicit or explicit deterrence threats to destroy large numbers of civilians or civilian targets. Successive U.S. administrations, Democratic and Republican, for five decades, essentially have rejected this approach to deterrence as being illegal, immoral and ultimately incredible.

These are the reasons why numbers matter. As Hagel said, quantity has its own quality. These are the reasons that numbers matter and why Democratic and Republican administrations have rejected very low U.S. nuclear force standards, as I said, for approximately five decades.

These reasons remain sound. That's not Cold War discussion, these reasons remain sound. And I believe the burden of proof must now be on those who claim that much lower levels of U.S. nuclear forces would stem proliferation and provide adequate support for deterrence, assurance and defense.

But there is no such proof. There is no such proof. I've seen zero evidence linking further U.S. nuclear reductions to improved nuclear nonproliferation. I've seen considerable evidence to the contrary. And we cannot know that fewer U.S. nuclear weapons will be adequate for deterrence and assurance in the future, because the future threats and related requirements for deterrence and assurance are unpredictable.

Given a fluid and unpredictable threat environment, nobody can tell you with honesty that locking in ever lower numbers of nuclear forces will be compatible with future requirements for deterrence and assurance, because no one knows what those threats and requirements are going to be. Remember that when someone next tells you that 300 or 500 or 1,000 weapons surely will be adequate. They don't know. They either have to be omniscient or omnipotent to be able to give you assurances like that.

I don't know anyone like that, at least not in this room. This leads to my main point, and that is given the unpredictability of threats the most fundamental requirement for strategic forces and planning is their flexibility and their resilience. For flexibility and resilience to change and surprise, their ability to adapt to new strategic threats, new environments, particularly given the life span of our force structure.

Sustaining U.S. nuclear force numbers and diversity are critical for precisely this reason. When you add up all the discussion of why is it important for policy reasons, for the political reasons, for assurance, for deterrence, for extended deterrence, the reason is because a triad helps provide the flexibility and resilience that's really important to be able to support those goals. It helps provide the critical flexibility and resilience to U.S. forces.

Yet, flexibility and resilience is precisely what the announced nuclear agenda threatens to degrade. In sum, U.S. strategic forces must be of sufficient size, flexibility and resilience to adapt to future environments so that now and prospectively forever U.S. strategic forces can deter credibly across a wide range of possible threats, can discourage opponents from placing any confidence in their offensive nuclear strategies, can assure allies now and in the future that they do not need to acquire their own nuclear capabilities because ours are credible and capable. We want to be able to, for now and in the future, avoid deterrence policies that are dependent upon targeting civilians and civilian centers for their deterrent effect. And for now and prospectively forever in the future, we want to be able to defend the U.S. and allies, including U.S. society, if deterrence fails.

Again, the size, the flexibility and the resilience of our forces is necessary for these purposes, which is precisely what we risk if we move to further deep force reductions. The bottom line here is that the administration has expressed its intention for further limitations and nuclear reductions beyond those made since 1991. And there is a prospective threat to the triad in this agenda.

However, the reduced U.S. force posture, U.S. flexibility and resilience at still lower numbers would likely undermine the U.S. capability to adjust to future conditions, as may be necessary; to deter future wars, as may be necessary; to assure allies, as certainly will be necessary; or to defend if deterrence fails, as may be necessary. The goals of deterrence and assurance and the force flexibility and resilience needed for those goals should not be subordinated for the sake of further deep nuclear reductions and nuclear zero.

The White House vision of nuclear zero is the ultimate emotional trump card when such deterrent concerns are raised about further reductions. But we've been to the nuclear zero mountain top before. We were there for a millennia of recorded history and it was ugly beyond compare. Remember 100 million casualties in approximately 10 years of combat in the first half of the last century, courtesy of the failure of conventional deterrence. In a dangerous and uncertain world, we should not sacrifice the numbers and types of U.S. capabilities that may be necessary for deterrence and assurance now and in the future in a Don Quixote like quest to return to nuclear zero. Deterrence and assurance, and thus the triad, are too important for such a dubious and risky political science experiment.

Thank you.

(Applause).

Peter has given me license for one question.

MR. WILL CURTIS (?): (Off mic) – the Cold War deterrence policy was based on the assumption of a rational opponent. And you were quite critical of that moving from a Cold War environment to a post-Cold War environment. Have you changed your views any?

MR. PAYNE: First of all, let me offer my appreciation for the fact that you have three of my books.

(Laughter).

Even my mother hasn't done that, so I greatly appreciate it. The U.S. deterrence policy during the Cold War was based on the assumption of a rational Soviet Union. But in some ways it was even worse than that. It wasn't just that it was a rational Soviet Union. I think the assumption of a rational actor tends to be a legitimate assumption.

Historically, there are very few cases where leaders who suffer from great psycho-pathologies got to power and stayed in power. So it's not the rationality that I'm so concerned about, the assumption of rationality, it's what we input to what rationality means. When we think of a rational actor we attribute our own characteristics to that condition.

So for us to attribute rationality to opponents, they tend to have to think in very Western enlightenment terms. And we distinguish as irrational folks who don't. They may be very rational in the

bounded sense of that meaning. In other words, their actions will service their highest goals and they will practice tradeoffs with what their actions are. They understand that. They're informed.

But what if their highest goals are so far outside what we consider the norm that it leads them to take amazingly aggressive steps? We tend to dismiss that as irrational. It's not irrational. It's a very different understanding of what is acceptable behavior. It's outside of the Western definition of rationality, so we in somewhat ethnocentric ways say they must be irrational.

Remember what the response was when the Pakistanis and the Indians started doing nuclear tests. The U.S. officials said that's irrational. Really? Was it irrational for India and Pakistan to have those nuclear tests at that time?

They didn't think so. And I believe by their own lights it wasn't irrational for them. But it seemed irrational to folks in the government at the time, and so they consigned it to irrationality.

During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis we now know that Cuban leaders, for example, were insisting that the Soviet Union use nuclear weapons against the United States. They wanted a thermonuclear war -- we know that -- on the presumption that socialism would not triumph over capitalism. If there had to be a war, this was it, and let socialism triumph.

It was an ideologically driven position by the Cuban leadership. It sounded irrational to us. It sounds irrational today. You want a thermonuclear war?

We know that some of the Cubans at the time, according to the Soviet histories, said that Cuba will perish but socialism will triumph. Cuba is ready for martyrdom. Were national leaders ready to accept nuclear destruction because their ideology tells them that socialism will triumph, really? Yeah, really.

So it's not necessarily the rationality that I'm so concerned about, although in some cases there is a chance that irrationality will prevail, psycho-pathologies will prevail. It has, in the past, on occasion. But I am more concerned about the views, our views, of what characterizes, what constitutes irrationality and really misjudging opponents and expecting them to behave as if they were Western enlightened leaders when they're not. They are their own people. They come from their own culture. And it can lead them to very different behaviors than we expect.

I think in that are the potential seeds of profound deterrence failure. That's what scares me the most. Thank you.

(Applause).

MR. HUESSY: I'd like to finish our program with our host, General Davis. But first I wanted to thank Keith, Richard, Kim, Bob Feidler and Al, the staff here.

(Applause).

And also thank the wait staff for a wonderful session with 192 people, who did an extraordinary job. And that's a thank you to you, General, for ROA and especially our friend Bob Feidler. Thank you, sir, very much.

(Applause).

MR. DAVIS: Well that certainly was an interesting four hour presentation, particularly for a Marine like me who, I guess, could be described as the fourth part of the triad and deterrence. Any other Marines in the audience? Okay.

Thanks to all of you for giving up half of a very important day in your lives for this exploration of a vital topic, the security not only of our nation but of the world. And I particularly want to thank Peter Huesy and the Air Force Association for his many years of work in this field. He really is one of our national treasures when it comes to the gravity of thought on security.

I also want to thank the National Defense Industrial Association for partnering with us, and echo Peter's thanks to my colleague Bob Fiedler who runs our defense education forums. It was also particularly gratifying to work with Task Force 21 from Minot, North Dakota. And Mr. Jantzer, thanks for all your efforts.

And thanks, too, to our web audience. This was a milestone with new technology we're exercising here, and we trust that this went out to the infinite world of the web so that a broader audience than 192 shared in this important program.

We heard from speakers from Congress, the executive branch and undeniable experts from the think tanks. They talked about the reliability, capability and affordability of the triad, which is clearly a military and undeniable political force in the defense of our nation. And you even managed to educate a dumb Marine. I am not like General Cartwright, who started as an aviator and wound up as one of our great strategic leaders.

We'd like to welcome you to come back to a defense education forum at the Minuteman building of the Reserve Officers Association. We run between 60 and 70 of these programs per year. They range from longer forum programs like this to 45 minute or hour long single panel discussions of very narrow topics. And we have plans to take these on the road and do more web casting.

If any of you would like to partner with us on a topic of interest to you or your organization, we really do welcome your input and your partnership. Our point of contact is Bob Feidler, that's [rfeidler@roa.org](mailto:rfeidler@roa.org). We would be interested in your input.

I'd like to – I'm almost done – there's no such thing as a free breakfast, but we do have a free resource to all of you. And that is the ROA Smart Brief, which is a free daily email news feed of the eight to ten most important stories on national defense. Now I know most of you have access to – many of you have access to the Early Bird. But you know when you sit down to your computer in the morning and you see the Early Bird pop up, that there's 180 to 240 stories and you're facing the daunting task of wading through all of it in your busy day.

Well, our computers and the two editors who manage the algorithm will do that filtering for you. And at about 2 o'clock everyday you'll get a feed of, as I said, the eight to ten most important stories about national defense. To subscribe, you go to [www.smartbrief.com/roa](http://www.smartbrief.com/roa).

And all we need is your email address. We're going to ask for more profile information. You're free to volunteer that, but that will not preclude you from becoming a subscriber to Smart Brief. So please, join us.

And finally, my final commercial is if you or your organization would like to use this space, and we have a smaller meeting space downstairs, the Minuteman building is available to you. And I think you can see the capability of our catering service and the audio-visual and staff are here to serve you.

So, that is it. Thanks to all of you again for sharing a piece of your day with us, and go forward and do great things.

(Applause).