General Deptula: It is a privilege and a pleasure to be here today to address and discuss with you the Quadrennial Defense Review or at least what we know about it so far. I thought probably the best way to start is to just give you a real brief overview of the origins of the Quadrennial Defense Review and then we’ll go into and discuss where we are in the time scales and then quickly move to what our Air Force objectives are, what our themes are, and then I’ll leave plenty of time to address your questions.

The Quadrennial Defense Review is a product of the Congress. It was established as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. What is the probably the most important piece of information on this chart is the fact that the owner of the QDR is not the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the individual Services, but it is the secretary of defense. The authorization language specifies that the secretary of defense conduct the review according to those elements that are listed there on the chart. The form and the function that the QDR will take is clearly up to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

A couple of things in QDR 2001 that weren’t in QDR 1997 are that the chairman has been designated to prepare and submit an evaluation, an assessment of the review, and more importantly, an assessment of the risk that goes along with whatever comes out of the QDR. As you can see on the chart, the report is due September of 2001.

Now what we’ll do is take a look at some of the key defense milestones. Many of you are familiar with the fact that the secretary has already established or begun conducting a strategic policy review, which, by the way, is exactly what all the Services wanted to have happen. If you recall a lot of the discussion leading up to the defense review and the QDR was we wanted to begin with an over-arching strategic look at what is going on before we delved into the programmatics and the program evaluations to determine what can most effectively support the strategy piece. That is ongoing right now and I’ll have a couple more words about the form and function of that.

The national security strategy is due out about the middle of June and then, as I mentioned before, the QDR report itself is due on the 30^th of September. There is some question as to whether or not that due date will remain September or the QDR report will slip three or four months. That is a distinct possibility. When Secretary Rumsfeld was testifying, there were indications from the Congress that they would be willing to allow a slip in the due date perhaps to a December time frame which would match where the nuclear posture review is due. At some point along the way, there may be a review of the Defense agencies and many of you have heard about the potential of a major aircraft review. We still don’t have any definitive information about when or how those reviews might be conducted. But they are out there. Next bullet.

What is going on in the joint world with respect to the Defense review? The joint strategy review is currently undergoing final revision in the review process. Many of you have heard about the Joint Staff preparation activities for the QDR and one of the major elements of that preparation effort has been the Dynamic Commitment series of exercises. We’ve had three Dynamic Commitment exercises so far and they’ve been extremely useful in terms of establishing the baseline for where the follow-on studies might go. Dynamic Commitment 4 has been canceled, however, because of the short runup time in the absence of any specific guidance about how that might fit into the overall review. However, Nimble Eagle stands out there on the horizon and that is a potential wargame that would involve a look at a major theater war kind of scenario. And of course the chairman’s assessment is waiting out there in the September time frame.

The Secretary of Defense’s strategic policy review, in essence, will last anywhere from 30 to 90 days. This is a scoping level effort that will take a look at the eight areas that you see listed there on the chart to provide the front piece for the follow-on programmatic reviews that might follow. The way the senior OSD staff is casting this is as a prelude to the QDR.

Now we are going to go into and take a look at what are the Air Force’s going-in objectives and then a more specific look at our themes. None of these that are listed here on the chart should really come as a surprise to any one of you in here. Obviously, what we want to do is obtain the resources that are necessary to provide the demands the nation has for our aerospace power forces. Along with that, the QDR provides us an opportunity to advance the understanding of what aerospace power can do for the nation.

I like to use the analogy that the QDR is not unlike, in the Air Force, an operational readiness inspection. We know that we are going to be evaluated, but it is also an opportunity for us to put our best foot forward and explain to people so that they understand how we fit into the overall national security equation. And we want to ensure that we participate effectively in each one of the QDR sessions and debates. Ultimately, it is all about doing the right thing for the nation.

I would also tell you that if you asked each and every one of the services what their bottom line for the defense review is, it is the same thing. To do the right thing for the nation. We are going into this defense review with a little bit different perspective than we did last time around. The Air Force recognizes, and all of us understand, that each one of the Services provides unique capabilities for the nation. We need everyone of those capabilities. We all want to have the strongest Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and Air Force in the world and we’ve been relatively stressed as many of you understand. The chiefs are going into this defense review with the understanding that they’d like to see the water in the bath tub filled up so that all the boats float up to the level of where their unique capabilities are most appropriate for use in meeting the nation’s security objectives.

Now let’s take a look in a little more specificity about the themes that the Air Force is launching into the review with.

This is perhaps the most important theme that we need to get across and one where we need your help in making sure the American public and the nation’s leadership understand. Modern aerospace capability is allowing us to conduct warfare and accomplish national security objectives in ways that we’ve never been able to do before. If you take a look at the leap-ahead systems that we are developing, not just systems, but also combined with our organizational transformation that provides the nation all kinds of different alternatives to conducting warfare using legacy constructs of operation. Alternatives like the ability to rapidly halt aggression. The use of, not just weapons, but information as well, to achieve desired effects in a variety of scenarios. And the ability to conduct coercive campaigns not unlike you saw unfold in the air war over Serbia. I would tell you that we’ve reached a state in our defense capabilities that is almost the opposite of what faced the air power pioneers in the 1920s and the 1930s. They had the vision. They understood the potential of aerospace power, but the challenge was, they were about 80 to 90 years behind in terms of capability to initiate those different concepts of operation. Where we are today is almost diametrically opposed. We face a situation where our capabilities, some would suggest, far outpace the way we currently plan to conduct our military operations. Let’s take a look at what I am talking about in just a little bit more detail.

Aerospace power expands the nation’s strategic options. I am going to talk a little bit more about revolution in military affairs later on and most people in this room are familiar with the fact that it brings new capabilities to challenge and meet emerging threats. I won’t go into each one of these in detail because I think this is a very aware audience and you know about each one of these things.

Let me talk a little bit about how they can all combine to provide us with some alternative solutions. Next bullets.

Inside the beltway right now people are talking about two ways of meeting the challenges of the strategy resource mismatch. One, you can adjust the strategy to better accommodate the resources that we have available to execute our tasking or two, you can adjust the resources and bring them up to the level of strategy that you want to make sure we can do it all. I would suggest to you that there is a third option that can contribute to either of these first two. That is to capitalize on the capability resident in our aerospace power forces to enhance our joint concepts of operations. Because, quite frankly, if you do that, we can retain the ability to engage in multiple operations around the world. Let’s take a look at how.

The president said it just a different way about three days ago when he was up visiting Joint Forces Command: "The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms." That is exactly what I am talking about. Let’s capitalize on what is unique to America’s military force to do business in a different and a more effective way.

General Hawley showed you these previously. I want to use them again to re-emphasize and describe how we do business today and what we can do differently in the future. Basically, it takes us time. We count on strategic warning and the associated time to allow us to build up forces in theater so that we can then respond to an adversary threat.

However, future aggressors out there have been watching and paying attention. They might not give us the gift of time that we’ve so often relied upon in the past. If they don’t, they can make life very hard for us. We will ultimately overcome and win, however, it might be at a very high cost and it will certainly take much greater time. We’d like to avoid these detrimental factors.

If we capitalize on the capabilities resident in America’s aerospace power from all the services – an General Hawley today and General Jumper yesterday gave you some specificity in terms of how we might do this – we can begin very early on in any conflict to halt adversary aggression, whether it is internal, whether it is cross border, whether it is done with some other means other than absolute use of force.

That was the first thing. Now, in the second one that I go into, I am going to give you a little bit more detail in terms of the specifics and how all of this can be combined. Let’s talk about revolution in military affairs. How many of you heard the term revolution in military affairs discussed prior to the Gulf war. I would daresay not a whole lot. Mr. Andy Marshall , who’s name has been in the press a lot, back in the early 1990s, was probably the first one to come up with a viable definition of what revolution in military affairs meant. It consists of three elements. First, new and enabling technologies that allow us to, second, put together innovative and different concepts of operations to accomplish our military missions. Third is the organizational change that goes along to codify the changes in technology and concepts of operations up front.

What happened during the Gulf War? I would tell you that the technologies that had matured to that point of stealth in conjunction with precision, the number one requirement for RMA, allowed us to accomplish and execute a different and a new innovative concept of operations, which has come to be known as parallel warfare: the simultaneous application of force across the breadth and depth of an entire theater. If you take a look at what happened in that first 24-hour time frame, we struck over 150 separate and distinct targets. That is more targets than were engaged in the years 1942 and 1943 combined in the combined bomber offensive over Central Europe. That is impressive stuff. That is a big change.

We kind of took that in stride and moved on, but there was a second element of your revolution in military affairs. What happened after the Gulf War? We in the Air Force got rid of Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command -- didn’t get rid of, but we replaced them with Air Combat Command -- with the underlying idea being that airplanes are not strategic and airplanes are not tactical. Airplanes are airplanes and weapon systems are weapon systems. It is how you use them that will determine whether you achieve a strategic or a tactical effect. There you have the three elements of the revolution in military affairs – technology, changed concepts of operation and organizational change. The Air Force has done that. We’ve been doing transformation since our initiation as a separate service.

As we moved into the time frame of the 1990s, what did we do? We saw that the grand national security strategy of containment had shifted to one of global engagement. Our organizations and structure were built during the period of time when containment was our grand national security strategy. We changed. Ergo, the Expeditionary Aerospace Force construct, relying on 10 separate and equal Aerospace Expeditionary Forces. Today, if the chief was here -- unfortunately he had to go back to Washington — he would tell you that transformation for the Air Force is not a destination, but it is a journey. We continue to transform. Let’s take a look at how for the future.

First, let’s take a look at transformation that are occurring today in the cyberspace realm.

Today, our space systems provide the nation vigilance, communications, navigation, precision, and some degree of reachback. But we are transforming today, as we move into the future, into a space-control force, a force that will ultimately provide us what I call persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance around the globe all the time, watching every move everywhere. Space-Based Radar is the kind of system that will allow us to do that.

National Missile Defense enabled by systems like SBIRS [Space-Based Infra-Red System]. What I like to call near real-time global force application, which will give us the next generation of national missile defense conducted from space-based platforms and the next generation of effects-based warfare.

What does near-real-time global force application mean?

The way I would explain it to you is when the National Command Authority decides they want to achieve a particular effect, within minutes of that decision being made, those effects are being accomplished. What is going to allow us to give that kind of option to the National Command Authority? Systems like Space-Based Laser, Common Aerospace Vehicles, Space Maneuver and Operations Vehicles and not just systems but also capabilities in the cyberspace world, like computer network defense and computer network attack. Again, not just systems, but the way we look at and integrate information technology so we can achieve what a lot of people talk about as dynamic battle space control, integrating and rapidly fusing information not just from air and space systems, but sea-based systems, land-based systems as well as air and space-based systems. Rapid analysis of that information and then dissemination to the force suppliers almost automatically to engage, to get ultimately to the point where General Jumper was talking about yesterday. And we are not talking about days or hours or weeks to plan. But we are talking about a system that allows us to execute in minutes to get us to predictive battle space awareness. To accomplish what I like to call global network-centric warfare, not just operating in small groups and affecting small locales, but operating across and impacting an entire theater. These are the kinds of things being done today in places like CAOC-X [Combined Air Operations Center — Experimental, at Langley AFB].

Let’s take a look at what we are doing in terms of transformation inside the atmosphere.

Continuous advances that many of you in this room are responsible for in precision munitions, force application and delivery vehicles, UAVs and command and control mechanisms. Leaps in means of force application, directed-energy systems incorporated in vehicles like the Air Borne Laser. These kinds of things will yield to us order of magnitude increases in our rapid precision engagement capability and our ability to operate in the third dimension, which will then allow us to rapidly apply force across an entire area of interest. Next Bullet.

The president again, had some remarks that basically summarized what we are talking about here.

A couple of words on the F-22 and JSF team. General Hawley alluded to these multiple capabilities that we can now combine together on one platform – air dominance, suppression of enemy air defenses, precision attack, all put together in one platform. That defines transformation in terms of platform perspective. Supercruise, advanced stealth, information integration. These are capabilities that no other nation in the world possesses today or will be able to possess in the future. That is what asymmetric means, and what we need to do is continue to capitalize on those kinds of advantages that you all are delivering to our military. The F-22/JSF team is another concept that some people seem to have difficulty understanding. Their inter-dependency is key to leap-ahead ability to operate effectively in any environment around the world.

Another point I’d like to highlight here today that is often overlooked by folks is JSF is also the foundation of our relationships with our allies. Thinking about it from a strategic perspective, if our allies operate similar equipment, it is more than just the inter-operability. It is the partnership and the bond that is created amongst and between our allies that contributes to our ability to operate effectively as a complete coalition in the future. At some point, numbers matter, not just for that big war fight, but also for the ability to operate in the daily global engagement operations that have stressed our people so much over the past decade. Next bullet.

This summarizes it all with respect to these two systems. Operating together, they will allow us to continue to be a global leader, and not slip down that slippery slope to becoming just another regional power, but a global leader in terms of war-time contingencies in peace and also in terms of maintaining our aerospace industry dominance.

A couple more words on the basic logic between our teaming of F-22 and JSF. The three-pronged approach, not unlike the way a three-legged stool operates. You need each one of the pieces for this whole thing to operate. We need new fighters. General Ryan yesterday talked about our recapitalization challenges. We are getting to the point where we are facing economic obsolescence and operational obsolescence which are causing costs to go up and capability to decrease. We need transformational fighters, not to be able to challenge the threat that exists just today or tomorrow but the threat that will exist out there 20, 30 and perhaps even 40 years into the future. We need sufficient numbers of these jets, like I said earlier, not just to fight the big one, but also to maintain that rotational base so we don’t drive our people into the dirt.

I’ve talked about systems. I’ve talked about concepts of operations. Transformation also applies to organizations. All of you are very much familiar with the way that we’ve changed organizationally in the move to an expeditionary aerospace force. But that journey is not complete. It is not over with yet. For this thing to work, what we need are ten fully capable and equally capable Aerospace Expeditionary Forces. We are not there yet. As a matter of fact, for example, there are only three out of our ten AEFs that have a stand-off precision engagement capability right now. What we are doing as part of the QDR is putting together what we will require to achieve a fully capable expeditionary aerospace force in each one of those categories.

When someone asks you, "We understand what you’ve done in the past. What is it that you are doing today in terms of transformation?", the answers are very simple. The transformation the Air Force is conducting by developing leap-ahead capabilities is already skipping a generation of technology. I know many of you out there have seen the video clip, I thought it might have been shown earlier today – that is why I didn’t show it – of the Su-35. It is an awesome airplane. It is out there today. Guess what? We had that capability. We took an F-15 – McDonnell-Douglas took an F-15, put canards on the front and put vectoring nozzles on the back. We could do the same thing. But we elected not to go into that generation of technology. We skipped it. Ergo, F-22, delivering us leaps in capability that will allow us to produce the effects of mass without having to mass in the function and in the way that we have in the past, ultimately allowing us to transform our concepts of operations for the entire military. Bullet.

And allowing the U.S. Air Force to contribute its part to this new architecture, to the defense of America and our allies, that the President talked about the other day.

Our third theme is our capability to defeat anti-access strategies. General Jumper and General Hawley gave magnificent presentations that laid out this concept, so I am not going to elaborate any further. Next bullet.

Air and space is one contiguous domain – aerospace. That should have been evident in some of the things I just previously said about how we need to bring together various elements of air and space. It is interesting that there is this underlying sentiment among some that we need to split up and develop a separate space force. I am reminded of the analogy of oceans. You don’t hear anybody calling for a separate submarine service do you? But operating underneath the water is very much different than operating above the water. An entire domain belongs to the U.S. Navy, as it should. Likewise, operations in the air and in space are very much different. But we need to retain, to be effective, that approach that says air and space is an indivisible medium. Because, if we split it up, we’ll lose the synergies that will occur in order to accomplish some of the things that I’ve talked about previously.

I recently went to a presentation by a new think tank in Washington. I went with my Marine counterpart. The individual giving the presentation had come up with this new defense program, their perspective and it gave something to each one of the services. Then it took something away. I listened very attentively. When he got to the Air Force slide, I asked him, "You don’t mention the word space anywhere on the slide". He said, "Don’t worry. Wait till I get to the transformation slide". He did and I got there. And there was a bullet for U.S. Space Command and an arrow going to U.S. Space Service and the words that went along with this chart said something like this: "I’ve been out to Air Force Space Command and they’ve got a magnificent master plan. They’ve got everything plotted out and they’ve got all the dollars associated with it. But they just don’t have enough money to do it". I said, "You’ve just put your finger on the head of the nail". The problem isn’t interest. There is nobody that is more interested in capitalizing on the virtues of space than guys wearing this colored uniform. The problem is, there are increasing demands on our forces and that is the challenge. Next bullet.

Future total force initiatives. I don’t think anybody in any of the services would argue that the U.S. Air Force is the model service when it comes to using all elements of our force. General Shaud mentioned it. I had the great privilege of being the commander of Operation Northern Watch for a very short 18 months. I would tell you I would much rather be up over Northern Iraq, having Iraqis shoot at me than where I am now because at least I knew who the enemy was. (Laughter). It is kinda tough in this job.

But, when I was there, for that short period of time, 49 percent of all the units that showed up were Guard or Reserve forces. Flying over Northern Iraq, with those Guard and Reserve forces, many of them on their first day, I can tell you that I couldn’t tell the difference between a Guard unit’s first day in the AOR or an active unit’s last day in the AOR and that is a real tribute. We need to continue that kind of integration of our Guard and Reserve forces with our active forces. Next bullet.

Last one, in terms of our themes, but perhaps the most imminent one in terms of need. Recapitalization. You heard the Chief talk about the need yesterday. The fact that we are on a 250-year recapitalization schedule with our infrastructure. The industry standard is 50 years. The Chief testified that we are looking at a bill to make our Air Force whole across the entire board of $20 to $30 billion. That is not over the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], that is a year. Again, a short story to help explain why recapitalization of our force is very important.

Twenty years ago I had the opportunity to fly F-15s at Kadena Air Base. F-15C’s and D’s. They were brand new airplanes. They still had that new airplane smell. It was a wonderful thing. One of my last missions that I flew in Northern Watch, I went back and I looked at my log book and the aircraft that were there were from Kadena. It turns out the airplane I was going to fly that day was the exact same tail number – 78-500 that I had flown 20 years before, except this time, it had 5700 hours on the platform. So I go out to fly it and I am coming out of the north, going to hit a tanker to get some gas and all of a sudden my emergency light panel over here lights up with all kind of bizarre stuff. I have a "fuel low" light; I have a "transformer rectifier" light; I have a "bleed air malfunction" light. It is weird stuff. I’ve been flying the airplane for 20-some-odd years and I kinda know what the emergencies are. To make a long story short, I turned away from the tanker, went back to Incirlik, landed. And here is what had happened: They discovered that the wiring bundle that has a sensor – the wires that go from all the sensors in the back of the airplane to the emergency light panel, all that insulation had turned to powder over time, sitting out in the sun and getting used and it just so happened that it had gotten to the point where all the wires fused together when I happened to be on that mission.

The essence of the story is that airplane is down now for a certain period of time while they take out that wire bundle, sent it back to the depot, get a new one from the depot, put it back into the airplane. The airplane is out. You’ve got to get another airplane from somewhere – Kadena. And do you know how many tankers it takes to ferry one airplane over? So there are tankers, there are people. That is increased cost. That is how our mission capable rates have gone down over the years because that airplane is out of service. Declining mission capable rates, increasing costs. That is why we need new airframes and new platforms. It is not because we just want to have new equipment. That is what happened to an F-15, average age around 17 years. That one was 22 years. The F-15s first flew in 1972. They will be over 30 years old, some of them, by the time we go IOC [initial operational capability] with the F-22. Think about our tanker force: average age today 38 years. Average age. What happens when the same kind of a wiring bundle malfunction happens across the entire tanker force? Now it is not just a problem for some small exercise going on over here or engagement scenario. The entire U.S. military gets affected. The only way we are going to fix this one is with a major increase in the Air Force budget.

The Air Force’s contribution to our joint force operations is made through our core competencies. Everyone in here is pretty familiar with those, so I am not going to go into a lot of detail here, but I do want to show them, just to remind you of what those core competencies are.

Aerospace superiority. Information superiority. Global Attack. Precision engagement. Rapid global mobility. Agile combat support.

The Air Force is committed to joint warfare.

We are committed to giving joint warriors the modern aerospace advantage, the kind of advantage that accrues from those characteristics that you see on the left side of the chart.

All the services are investing, to one degree or another, in the aerospace power advantage. I would tell you that we agree with that kind of investment, because it simply doesn’t make sense to expose young Americans to hostile fire without capitalizing on what is clearly our advantage up front. Last chart.

Many of you have heard people talk about adversary asymmetric advantages. You know what? We’ve got an asymmetric advantage, too. It is America’s joint aerospace power. You can argue until the cows come home over how Kosovo was executed or air war over Serbia, more properly stated, was executed. But nobody can argue that only the United States of America had the resident aerospace power capability to do what we did in 78 days. Right now there are over 40 nations engaged in peace keeping operations on the ground. But we are there, not because we have to be, but by choice. That wasn’t the case with our aerospace power forces. We had to use those to succeed to the degree that we did. Quite frankly, this is where we need your help, to make sure that people understand what America’s aerospace power advantage is and we need to ensure that we fully fund that advantage. Thank you.

Q. With the Andy Marshall review and what is going on in DoD, how does that influence the QDR in terms of process and then substance?

General Deptula: I hope I answer this in the way it was intended. A lot of people are making a big deal over the fact that certain people were selected to head up certain of these defense review panels. In fact, as I mentioned earlier, that is exactly what we wanted. We wanted an up front strategy review. That is exactly what Mr. Marshall has been asked to do by the secretary of defense. It is the secretary of defense’s prerogative to choose who he wants to conduct the strategy review. We don’t have any problem with it. In fact, we believe it is exactly part of the process that we had hoped, each one of the services had hoped, would happen. It is part of the process. We are looking forward to the outcome of the review and the Air Force quite frankly is excited about having an open and honest review of all of systems and capabilities.

Q. We have a traditional Air Guardsman now as President of the United States. As you develop the QDR, is there any change in this role that you perceive with regard to Guard and Reserve?

General Deptula: Yes. Increased utilization and incorporation and integration of the Guard and Reserve into the way we do business. As we get smaller in the active force, by necessity because of funding and smaller because of the resident increases in capability, we will rely to a greater and greater extent on our Guard and Reserve forces and there are some things that they can do and we can all do to work together that perhaps can increase the effectiveness of our overall total force. Units, for example, that are manned by elements of all three: active, Guard and Reserve. Incorporation in operation of new equipment. The step that we took in incorporating Guard and Reserve forces into our Aerospace Expeditionary Force operations was another great leap that allowed us to better integrate and capitalize on the kinds of attributes that Guard and Reserve forces bring to the defense table.

Q. What is your perspective on how defense industry input to or interaction with the QDR process might be helpful?

General Deptula: I would encourage everybody in here to do their best in explaining, when you have the opportunity to interface with the American public, just what the aerospace industry, in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force, is doing. Because frankly, a lot of folks don’t understand I would particularly encourage you to get together with those defense information houses, the RANDs, the CSISs [Center for Strategic and International Studies], Centers for Defense Information, those organizations that tend to be quoted and picked up by the press and help them understand what our real capabilities are so that we can get out the correct information with the assistance of our good friends in the media to the American public. This is all about understanding. It is all about education. Unless you are involved with a lot of this stuff internally, it is hard to grasp. We need to do it in a fashion that is easy for the man or woman on the street to understand. That is where we can use a lot of your help.

Quite frankly, and the Air Force Association is doing some great work for us already, but perhaps if we can put together some venues that expand upon each one of those themes that we talked about, that is another way that we can get the American people and our nation’s leadership to understand the value of aerospace power.

Q. You are an advocate of effects-based operations as a more effective way to accomplish the same goal with fewer resources. How does this advocacy figure into the Air Force planning in the QDR?

General Deptula: I think not just within the Air Force, but there is becoming an understanding across the security environment that the way we need to approach our national security challenges is not by defaulting a solution to the way we have employed force in the past. That is easy to do because the systems and capabilities that we have today are ones we’ve used in the past. An approach to take – let me go to the extreme end – ultimately, what the nation’s military would like to provide the National Command Authority with is an option to be able to influence a potential adversary to act in accordance with our strategic interest without that adversary even knowing that he or she has been acted upon. That is way out there. But if you think about ultimately our ability to influence people in that fashion, you begin to think about different ways to employ force. Clearly, force application is going to be part of achieving this goal, but we are a long way from it. It allows you to begin to think about employing weapons that don’t have a whole heck of a lot of explosives. Think about it: the only reason we’ve got high explosive in weapons is because we had to compensate for the lack of precision that we had in the past. I don’t care whether a weapon has any explosive in it at all. Five hundred pounds of concrete will ruin your whole day going 500 knots if it hits you. Effects-based thinking about how we do business is applicable across the board and we’ll be better off for approaching our security challenges if we think in that vein.

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