

062812 NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION AND RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION CAPITOL HILL BREAKFAST FORUM WITH LINTON BROOKS, SENIOR ADVISER AT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, U.S.-RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL, CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STRATEGIC STABILITY (For additional information on NDIA/AFA/ROA seminars contact Peter Huessy at [phuessy@afa.org](mailto:phuessy@afa.org)).

[This is a rush, unofficial transcript provided by National Security Reports.]

MR. PETER HUESSY: I want to thank you all for being here this morning. My name is Peter Huessy and on behalf of ROA, NDIA and AFA, I want to thank you for being here this morning to hear from our friend Linton Brooks. Frank Miller cannot be here today. For those of you who haven't heard, his son passed away suddenly last weekend and was unable to be here. And we send – all of you I wish send your condolences to Frank and his wife.

Just a couple of announcements. I want to thank also our friends from the Russian and British embassies that are here today. We do have one new speaker, and that is Secretary Donley of the Air Force, who will speak on July 25<sup>th</sup>. And the rest of the schedule stays as it is. We have four events the week after July 4<sup>th</sup>, so please let us know if you'd like to attend.

Many of you know Linton Brooks. And, of course, he needs no introduction. But as Dr. Kissinger once said to me when I had the honor of introducing him, he said, "Peter, I like introductions," especially when they're as lengthy as they are for Dr. Kissinger.

Linton, as you know, is a consultant and senior adviser at CSIS. He's a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University, an adviser to four of the U.S. Department of Energy national labs. Between July 2002 and January 2007 he was administrator of DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration, where he was responsible for the U.S. nuclear weapons program and for DOE's international nuclear nonproliferation programs.

Ambassador Brooks has nearly 50 years of experience in national security, a lot of it – most of it – associated with, of course, nuclear weapons. He's been deputy administrator for nuclear nonproliferation at NNSA, been assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, been chief U.S. negotiator for the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty, director of defense programs and arms control on the National Security Council staff. And he's had a number of U.S. Navy and Defense Department assignments over a 30 year career, also as a Navy officer.

He holds degrees in physics from Duke University and in government and politics from the University of Maryland. And he is a graduate of the United States Naval War College. He's been associated with the CSIS Project On Nuclear Issues, called PONI, since its inception.

So on behalf of our sponsors, on behalf of NDIA, AFA and ROA, Linton, I want to thank you for coming here and speaking with us today about the whole range of nuclear weapons issues. Would you give a warm welcome to Ambassador Linton Brooks?

(Applause).

MR. LINTON BROOKS: Those of you who looked carefully at Peter's schedule and saw the titles of these talks and came precisely because of those titles, may want to slip out now.

(Laughter).

Because those are the titles of what Frank and I did last year, and we hadn't quite sorted out what we were going to do this year before the tragedy with Cam (ph), with Frank's son. So let me tell you what I'm going to do. I'm going to do two things. I'm going to spend a little time talking about China.

But mostly what I'm going to do is I'm going to walk through the issues that whoever is running the federal government on January 21<sup>st</sup> is going to face in the nuclear arena. And I'm going to talk a little bit about which of those issues are likely to have solutions, and which aren't. Some of you have heard me say one of the biggest myths in Washington is that just because you can describe a problem, that proves there's a solution. And those of you who want a really good example, think of Iran.

And in the middle of that, when I get to China, I'm going to spend a little more time on China because I think China is one of the areas in which who gets elected matters, at least in terms of the lens through which they view things. So first of all, I tell you the obvious. The election will be decided entirely on things other than nuclear weapons policy. I'm willing to bet there is not a single human being in the country who will make his or her decision on that. And yet, the election will make a significant difference for nuclear weapons policy, not just because of the question of who's president, but because who the cabinet and sub-cabinet officers are.

So let me give you a little thought experiment. It's January 21<sup>st</sup> and you are the national security adviser, either because you're who Governor Romney picked or because Tom Donilon decided to go do something else and the president was looking around. And you're sitting down and you're trying to say, in the nuclear area, what are the issues that I'm going to have to worry about?

So here's a partial list. There will be a lot of noise about things you really don't have to worry about because they're not real issues. So the first issue which probably isn't a real issue, but we'll put it first because it has gotten some press, and that's the NPR follow-on analysis.

The administration, for reasons that are not entirely clear, has been very slow to find the right time to rollout what this analysis was. There's all sorts of conspiracy theories, which I don't believe. I think this is typical bureaucratic, well the right guy is going to be on travel and so we have to wait.

But as often happens when administrations choose not to roll things out, somebody rolls it out for them. And so we have at least the outlines, published by Bill Gertz, based on some things somebody said to the Japanese. And they are entirely predictable, that the administration has settled on a policy of seeking a deployed force level of 1,000 warheads in conjunction with some kind of negotiated reduction with the Russian Federation.

Now that should not come as much of a surprise because there was a major study done in 2007 signed by pretty much everybody who now has a policy position in the administration, that said the right thing to do is go to about 1,000 deployed warheads. So this is not much of an issue. And what it means is -- since I'm going to argue there isn't going to be any arms control with the Russians -- this is not going to be very important.

What we don't know, and what will be politically but maybe not substantively important, is what this effort will say about non-deployed weapons. The administration had 5,100 warheads in DOD custody as of the end of 2009. That's more than you need. You don't have (hooks ?) to upload all of those, so some would argue that you should reduce that number. Will the administration decide to do that and if they do will that become a political unilateral disarmament lightning rod? I don't know.

It's not substantively important. The nation -- if you retired an extra 700-800 warheads, first of all the only thing that happens is they get a different label and they stand at the end of a very long line waiting for dismantlement. And does that matter? I don't know. But that's an issue the next president will have to face.

A much more significant issue the next president will have to face is funding for the nuclear weapons complex. You remember that this administration voluntarily increased significantly the funding for the nuclear weapons complex, and then was strong-armed by the Senate into increasing it still further, and then after the Budget Control Act un-increased it. And they did it in a way that I wish I'd had the guts to do when I was the administrator. Rather than stretch out a whole bunch of things they took one big thing and said not going to do that for a long time, which everybody says that's the kind of decision you make, until somebody actually makes it, and then people get a little grumpy.

So the focus we have right now is on whether the facility called CMRR, Chemical, Metallurgical, Radiological Replacement Facility in Los Alamos, should be built. Now the first thing to say about that is it should be built but not for any of the reasons that people are arguing. It's basically a facility that will help continue to keep us up to date in plutonium science. It's not a pit production facility. You make pits next door.

It will enable making more pits. Right now we've demonstrated a rate of 20 a year, for a very brief period. And some believe we could make 30 a year.

There are assertions that if CMRR were there you could make 50 to 80 a year. The question is, do you care about that difference? And I invite your attention to the fact that we have thousands of pits we've already made that are sitting in Texas in little sealed cans.

So this is a risk. It's probably more a risk to long-term scientific health than it is to force structure. What is a risk to force structure and what the next administration, and to some extent this administration, has to deal with is the life extension program for the B-61 bomb. The B-61 bomb comes in a couple of variants, and the variant that has gotten all the attention is the one that's deployed in Europe. But our strategic arsenal depends, in part, on the B-61 bomb.

The life extension program for that is probably underfunded, widely believed to be in disarray, and probably will take both some real management attention, which it's now getting, and some real money, which we'll have to see whether it gets. So you're the national security adviser and you're faced with either throwing more money at an area or accepting more risk, and how do you do that? So that's the next issue.

Now we get to the first of the issues that unambiguously the election matters, and it's called de-alerting. De-alerting is a solution looking for a problem. De-alerting is an idea that says we should increase the time it takes to launch primarily ICBMs, although the purists want to do it for submarines as well, because in time of great tension that will prevent an over-reaction.

That may have had some logic when we had a lot of ICBMs with multiple warheads. It has no logic on the U.S. side for single RV ICBMs. And on the Russian side there may be a Russia who likes de-alerting – in fact, I actually know two who like de-alerting. They share the fact that they're not in the Russian government, and there's no evidence that the Russians will follow us in that because they can't.

So this idea has been a formal part of the administration position, but got walked back very elegantly in the Nuclear Posture Review, but it keeps popping up because – I think de-alerting is nonsense, but there are smart people who don't and some of them keep raising the issue. So if you're the national security adviser and you come from a new administration, your problem is how do I put a stake in the heart of de-alerting so we can concentrate on other things? If you come from this administration, it's an IOU and we don't know quite how to do it. What do I do about it?

Now we get into I think areas that are much more important. And let's talk about Russia. Here's where we are with the Russian Federation in the nuclear area.

First, and I think you have heard from people who are experts on Russia, you probably can't find very many people in the administration who worry about Russia as a military threat. But if you look at the Russian military doctrine, you will find that of their top ten threats six of them are associated with the United States and NATO. And they do worry about us as a threat. And whether that's sensible or not it probably is really the way they think.

Where this is likely to show up for the next administration is in two places. One is the Russians are fanatically paranoid about ballistic missile defense. And their rationale, to the extent that this is a rational issue, is first Russians have always had a very high regard for American technology. Secondly, Russians have always had a tendency, because they are worst-case planners, to take today's view graphs and sort of act like those programs are really here.

So the Russians look at our Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe, which as you know is a four step process built around increasingly capable variants of a Navy missile called the SM-3. And they look at the final state, which we claim will be here around 2020, and budget realities will probably push that considerably to the right. And they sort of can convince themselves that maybe it will have some threat to some of their ICBMs.

But then they say, we know how America works. You won't stop with phase four. There'll be a phase five. There'll be a phase six. And you will have all this momentum and all these agreements in place and you will expand numbers and you will really threaten our deterrent.

And therefore, even though what you're doing now, today, in the next five years, is aimed at missiles that Russia doesn't have and we don't have – so you would think it'd be easy to cooperate because we're not taking any risk at all – we're unwilling to do anything until we get guarantees that you're not going to have missiles that are aimed at us. And the way we'll know those guarantees mean it, is when you limit the performance of your missiles in a legal way, particularly by limiting the interceptor speed and a few other parameters.

Now this administration has absolutely no interest in doing this. The people I know who think they're going to be part of the next administration have even less interest in doing this. And the chances of the Senate ratifying any agreement on that are – nonexistent is probably the good shorthand. So that's not going to happen.

President Putin has said that's a prerequisite for doing anything in arms control. President Putin is going to be the president of Russia for the next six years. So what we're going to have – you're the national security adviser in January – you're problem is not what's the next step in arms control. You may or may not need to have a next step so you can make a speech so you can look like you love arms control for international and domestic political reasons, but that's not your real problem. Your real problem is, what do you do given that there's not going to be arms control?

Transparency is the suggestion du jour. I will walk out of here and go back to a meeting with the Russian Academy of Sciences where we're talking about transparency. These are the people who want to cooperate with the United States. And if their attitude reflects the attitude of those who don't particularly want to cooperate with the United States, don't hold your breath until you see a real robust transparency agreement.

Now that does not mean arms control with Russia is dead. Russia will not want New START to expire without something replacing it. That means that four years from now when we're talking about the 2016 election, we can say with a straight face that whoever is elected will have to deal with a Russian arms control plan. But in the next term there's not going to be – remember I'm the guy who missed the end of the Cold War, so take all predictions with a little bit of skepticism –

MR. : You ain't the only one who missed that.

MR. BROOKS: The odds of anything meaningful happening on the arms control front with Russia are very small. The odds of our going forward with NATO missile defense are pretty large. And therefore, what the next national security adviser has to do is try and (wall ?) off that tension from doing other things with Russia where we might be able to make some progress.

And that brings us to NATO. The next national security adviser, like the current one, like the last one, will have to face the difficulty that every time NATO is asked about does it want U.S. nuclear

weapons in Europe, it unanimously answers yes at the level of governments. But people who claim to know better say these governments don't really represent (the public ?).

The guys I talk to are clear that everybody wants weapons out of Europe, so we ought to look at it again. You know, it's not unknown in the political arena to not like the answers but to keep asking the question. But twice in the last three years NATO nations have had the chance and have unanimously endorsed retaining nuclear weapons. And most recently at the Chicago summit, they said that the decision to change it would be a decision that had to be made by consensus, which is actually stronger than NATO has said.

So what the next national security adviser will have to do is – how do I get the arms control community to stop focusing on this so I can pay attention to the things that actually matter for the defense of the country? Because if there were a major negotiation with Russia, then there's a real issue about should removal of weapons be an acceptable outcome. But the idea that somehow we really have to make our NATO allies happy by unilaterally taking weapons out, that some of them really care about a lot and all of them formally endorsed, strikes me as odd.

And it's odd because it is a failure to recognize that extended deterrence -- that is the notion that our allies are in some sense protected by American military strength, including American nuclear strength -- extended deterrence is still real for our allies. We need to take that seriously.

Now there is a recent report by Global Zero that got a fair amount of press because the former vice chairman of the JCS, Hoss Cartwright, is associated with it. And it says that extended deterrence can be done entirely based on American conventional superiority. General Cartwright has had more thoughtful ideas driving to work than most people have in a lifetime, but I believe he is wrong on this.

Our allies think that the nuclear component is important. They don't think that there's going to be a nuclear war with the Russian Federation. They do think, some of them, that they're not entirely comfortable with living next door to a great big Russia. Remember, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were part of the Soviet Union and have uneasy relations with their big neighbor and they'd like to think that when they joined NATO they didn't just do it because they liked the meetings. They did it because they thought they wanted to be part of a collective security alliance and that collective security alliance is inherently nuclear.

So my colleague Bruno Dertrais has said that there are monuments to the failure of conventional deterrence in every French village, and I think that's right. Conventional deterrence is important, but it has not got a perfect track record. And so I think that our allies – we talk about extended deterrence but we really shouldn't.

Extended deterrence means convincing the Russians that we'll fight if they invade one of our allies. That's relatively easy. It's reassurance, convincing our allies we will fight.

We spent a huge amount of time and energy during the Cold War trying to convince our European allies that yes we would risk the destruction of the United States to protect them. Well,

Russia could devastate the United States. We need to continue to work to convince our European allies that yes we would risk that to protect them.

And – and I'm going to say a little bit more about this when I talk about China – we need to continue to work to convince our Japanese and South Korean and Australian allies that yes we would take risks to the United States to protect them. Extended deterrence is important and the next national security adviser is going to have to deal with, how do we make this credible primarily to our allies? It's already credible to Russia and China. How do we make it credible to our allies?

So the national security adviser designate is sitting there and says that's a pretty good list. Is there anything else? And obviously, now we get into the hard issues.

Iran. Are we going to use military force in Iran? I don't know. The press tells me 2013 is the year we're going to have to decide that, but last year the press told me 2012 was the year we're going to have to decide that.

The problem with military force is that in a widely dispersed program the best it can do is set the program back. And the price for setting the program back is to take a program that some believe they've not yet made a decision about actually deploying a nuclear weapon, and making that decision easy. And some believe that there is contention within the government. But nothing unites a people more than being attacked, especially a people who have a sense of history as the Persians do.

So you're the national security adviser and you've got a tough problem because I have been in study group after study group that purports to say, let's figure out what we're going to do if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. And on about day two they decide this is too hard and they say let's figure out how to keep Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. And by day three they've degenerated to do, do what we're doing now but do it better. So remember my previous thing that not all problems have solutions.

You're the national security adviser and you're going to have to help the president decide that, unless we can find a way to live with an Iran that has a substantial capability. Can we live with that? Can we live with an Iran that can enrich to – pick your level – which means it's closer to a weapon?

Can we live with an Iran that continues to test ballistic missiles? The truth is, you don't care very much sitting here if Iran has a nuclear weapon. You care a lot if Iran has a nuclear weapon they can deliver on U.S. allies or U.S. forces or the U.S. homeland.

So the national security adviser will probably hedge his or her bets by saying absolutely we've got to keep going with missile defense in Europe to protect our allies and forces. And then who knows what he or she will decide to do with Iran. The history of the last 10 years is whoever is in power, the people out of power say what you're doing isn't working. And then we change teams and the people who are now out say what you're doing isn't working. And they're both right.

(Laughter).

But now the national security adviser has another problem, and that is Pakistan. I don't think Pakistan is on the verge of breaking up. I don't subscribe to alarmist views. But it is clear that relations between the United States and the government of Pakistan are as bad as they've been at any time since I've been paying attention.

And it is clear that Pakistan is on its way to being a very substantial nuclear power. And it's clear that Pakistan depends for its deterrent effect on what Schelling use to talk about, "the risk that leaves something to chance." And it's clear that there are people in Pakistan who would not be adverse to seeing nuclear weapons in the hands of all sorts of people.

I don't think those people are running Pakistan. Still less do I think they are running the army. Still less do I think they're running the SPD. But if you're the national security adviser you'd probably want to worry about that a little bit.

And then we move over into, what can we do to reduce future cases like that? And then you will look back at a theory which this administration has embraced and its predecessor did not. And the theory goes like this.

If we show that we are serious about our commitments under the NonProliferation Treaty on disarmament, it will be easier to mobilize responsible states to take actions which may hurt them in the short term in order to suppress proliferation. Now the theory gets mischaracterized as if we disarm then Iran will not be interested in nuclear weapons. That's nonsense. Nobody believes that.

The argument is if we show we're serious toward disarmament it will be easier to get people to say yeah we make good business from selling things to Iran, Myanmar, Syria, whoever the bad guy of the day is, but in the interest of nonproliferation we will give that up. That's the argument. It assumes, as the lawyers say, facts not in evidence.

It sounds right. People say it's right. But we really don't have any good empirical evidence.

But what we do have empirical evidence is that we'd better hope it's not right because the next national security adviser will note that we're now four years past the Prague speech and we're not any closer to universal disarmament than we were. There's not going to be a CTBT in the next term, maybe the next two terms. There's not going to be a fissile material cutoff treaty, and I just told you there's not going to be any more East-West arms control. So the people who think that they should cooperate because of superpower restraint are not going to find next year a happy time. And if you're the national security adviser you have to figure out what to do about that.

Now let's talk a little bit – real quick, about China. Let me refresh your memory a little bit on China. China has a very minimal deterrent they call (lean and effective ?). They have a criteria that they need to be able to reliably deliver a very small number – maybe a single digit number – of warheads to the United States in retaliation. Their modernization appears – can be explained by – a desire to preserve that capability.

They're moving to ballistic missiles at sea for survivability. This so-called Great Wall tunnel system got a lot of press lately as though it had just been discovered. The Chinese announced it several years ago. I mean, it's not a new thing. But it's a huge investment in mobile missile protection by a long series of tunnels.

The Chinese almost always, when they talk to Americans, stress that their forces are aimed at the United States. Their criteria is to be able to do damage to the United States, not U.S. forces abroad, not scare Japan out of the war. Now our Japanese allies are not quite as convinced of that, so they – back to extended deterrence and missile defense.

China claims a no first use policy. I am skeptical of no first use policies, but in this particular case there is every evidence it really is the way they think internally. They have no warning system at all. And no Chinese (with whom ?) I have ever discussed thinks that's any big deal. So they clearly are dependent on survivable systems that can retaliate somewhat.

They maintain very low peacetime readiness. And their attitude towards transparency – and this is where we get into tensions with them – is very clear and probably what we would have if the situation were reversed. And here's their attitude.

The United States needs to be transparent because it's big and powerful and it needs to show it is not threatening. We are weak and it is unrealistic of you to expect that we will reveal exactly how we are. So Americans say transparency leads to predictability leads to stability.

The Chinese say transparency leads to increasing the ability to attack, leads to instability. And the Chinese claim at the strategic level they're completely transparent: minimal deterrent, no first use. What else do you need to know?

The Chinese worry a lot that we don't accept the fact that they have a small deterrent. Their buzz word for this is accepting mutual vulnerability. And this is a problem within the United States, because there is consensus on ballistic missile defense to guard against North Korea and Iran, both parties. There is consensus in both parties – I mean, there are individual outliers but it is not within our ability to deploy a ballistic missile defense that prevents Russia from devastating the United States, and we will have to therefore depend on deterrence.

There is not consensus on whether we should think of China as a small Russia to be deterred, that is mutual vulnerability is a fact of life; or a large rogue where we could defend – that is mutual vulnerability as a policy choice. This administration's clear belief is it's a fact of life, but they're not going to say so. The next administration, if it's a different party, clear belief based on most of the people who talk about that, is it's a policy choice. But it's not clear that they're going to actually do something about it, because we didn't when we were the Bush administration.

The risk for the national security adviser is on an issue that is so fraught with emotional baggage between those who think as I do – full disclosure – that the competition with China is going to dominate the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but the nuclear part of it is an after-thought and we shouldn't be thinking about that --

we should be thinking about cyber and space and anti-access and economics -- and those who think that China is the new Soviet Union and there's going to be a sprint to parity and we don't know what's in those tunnels. The risk for the national security adviser is we'll have the rhetoric that we can't accept vulnerability, which will encourage the Chinese to build up. We won't actually invest the money in missile defense, so we'll get the worst of both worlds. We'll still be vulnerable.

And I believe that that is the outcome that will happen with a sophisticated adversary over a long term if they want to compete. But I could be wrong. The risk for the national security adviser is we'll still be vulnerable, but we'll have gotten people who have a lot of money and a lot of capability and who can build a whole heck of a lot of missiles to make more of them nuclear armed. And it's hard to see where that's in our interest.

So now the final thought when you're the national security adviser is this. Nuclear weapons policy has been remarkably consistent between administrations. There are studies after studies. Specialists see a lot of change. You know, works like me, we see a lot of change. But in fact, at any reasonable level there's a huge amount of consistency.

Not so for arms control policy. There, there are real differences. But for actual nuclear policy, there's consistency.

The biggest challenge for the national security adviser, the biggest challenge for the next president, the biggest challenge for the people in this room, is to guard against the tendency to make issues that have been the subject of consensus split along partisan lines. It is not in our interest to have competing political party views of the fundamental nature of American power and deterrence, especially in a society that's reasonably closely divided so people are going to take turns being in power. And so what I urge you to do is think about that whole list.

If one of them caught your attention and you've got a good answer, we need to talk, because I think there are not easy answers for any of them. But even if you don't have a good answer, think about how we rebuild the consensus that we have had historically on issues associated with nuclear policy. And your interest in that, whether you loved the part of the Prague speech that said "world without nuclear weapons" or whether the part you liked was the part that said "going to maintain a safe, secure and effective deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist." I mean, everybody loves half the Prague speech.

So I've left very little time for questions.

(Applause).

MR. PHILLIP HUGHES: Let me ask you -- (off mic) -- to be clear our allies take extended deterrence seriously. But earlier in your talk you discussed two trends that are at work today -- (off mic) -- taking alert weapons down to 1,000 or so weapons and the idea of de-alerting. Taking them down to 1,000 or so weapons and (pursuing ?) arms control -- (off mic).

MR. BROOKS: Which I do not believe is what the administration's position will be because they're not stupid.

MR. HUGHES: Okay. But how do those things fit together if you're serious about extended deterrence? Is there any connection between the size of the arsenal and –

MR. BROOKS: There appears to be a connection, not between the absolute size of the arsenal. I mean, at the levels we're talking about – you know, the truth is that in nuclear weapons the number 1,500 and the number 1,000 is really sort of like the same number. But in reassurance terms, there is a need to be perceived as second to none in some sense.

There has always been the U.S. policy -- we've never quite said it that way -- that in order to reassure our allies we need to be perceived as second to none. That's why the debate about Russian tactical nuclear weapons sort of breaks down in because we're equal at the strategic level does this mean we are now, as Bob Joseph said, second to one? Or, are those not really very important? They're vestigial and so we're equal.

So I think our allies need the level to be comparable with Russia. That's why I don't believe this administration will, and I would be very reluctant to see them, do a significant reduction in deployed strategic weapons except in parallel with the Russian Federation.

De-alerting – somebody once said the ability to hold contradictory ideas at the same time is the sign of a – I can't remember the quote, but you get the idea. Our allies want it both ways. They love arms control. They also want a robust deterrent.

De-alerting has been sold as somehow another step along the grand progress to a nuclear-free world. I think de-alerting – well, you've heard what I think about de-alerting. And I actually think the administration's stated policy on de-alerting – read the Nuclear Posture Review. I love that. I wish I had written that. It's just that within the administration and within the administration's sort of natural constituency, there are people who don't believe that. And some of them, like Senator Nunn, have earned the right to be taken seriously and have very good ties with the president. So you would have to manage that. The administration has kicked the can, the follow-on ICBM – we'll monitor that.

I forgot one thing that I wanted to say, if you'll excuse me, and that is I wanted to say a couple of things about non-issues; issue that Peter will invite somebody to come in and they'll come in and they'll talk about. And there'll be conference, competing conferences at Heritage and at Brookings. But they actually don't matter: CTBT. CTBT doesn't matter because it's not going to get ratified and it's neither as dangerous as the critics claim or as important as the supporters claim. And so it's not useful.

Eliminating ICBMs. Those of you who heard Larry Welch have heard the argument against eliminating ICBMs. There'll come a time for that fight, and that time is when 2030 is closer and it's a question of a big ticket investment. But to go now and spend the money -- costs more to get rid of them than to keep them – is not sensible and it's not going to happen. And so spending a lot of time worrying about it happening is probably not good.

Unilateral cuts in deployed weapons, I believe that's not going to happen. And finally, there will be conferences about multi-party arms control and how do we involve China? And you know, if you're bored, go.

(Laughter).

But there are only a handful of people in this room young enough to still be alive when this turns out to be a real issue. I mean, we are talking something that's decades into the future even if we had a somewhat more cooperative attitude on the part of the Russian Federation.

MR. WILLIAM CURTIS: I am Dr. Curtis from the U.S. Naval Academy. My question has to do with the strategic choices that these states like Iran and so forth – (off mic). And as you are fully aware of, during the Cold War there was this perception that deterrence was based upon essentially – that a rational opponent existed and that the threat of nuclear destruction of the country would make them more rational.

In the case of, let's say Iran, I think the argument has to do with our definition of rationality. I believe that we have a Western definition of rationality. And the Soviets, to some extent, bought into that.

However, I remember reading about Operation Able Archer in the '80s and we see how close we came to actually the Soviets thinking that we actually could have engaged in a situation which would end in an attack on their country. So I'm wondering, when we talk about Iran, for example, and its leadership and the problems that they're having, whether or not this idea of rationality as we define it applies to their leadership's perception of rationality? And my question has to do more with the Persian cultural influence on decision making and whether or not we are approaching it from the point of view of the president versus their ayatollah. And maybe we were wrong in thinking about the rationality of the leadership in that they would essentially use nuclear weapons or deploy those weapons to terrorists?

MR. BROOKS: Well, there are multiple questions in there, some of which I know a little bit about, some of which I probably don't. First of all, your point about Persian pride is really important. Iranians have this sense of being part of a great and historic civilization, a civilization that of course should have the instruments of large scale power because they deserve it. A little bit of that same attitude exists with India. I mean, yes there's a security dimension but there's also a "we're great."

I don't think there's any question that the Iranians are rational, but I think you are on to two things. One is their rationality may not be as expressed the same way we do. That's the first thing.

Secondly, decision making in Iran is opaque to many of us. It's a very complicated society. We've been very fortunate in President Ahmadinejad because he says such outrageous things it helps us get pressure.

But he actually doesn't have any authority over the nuclear program. That's the supreme leader, and the Revolutionary Guards, maybe. So we don't quite understand their value system. We

don't quite understand how they make decisions. And we don't quite understand how they process information. That's the reason why there's been consensus that we should hedge our bets through ballistic missile defense.

Now I do not believe – and this is a longer conversation and I may be wrong – that giving a weapon to terrorist: people with nuclear weapons tend not to want to lose control of them. North Korea may be an exception. So I don't know that that's an issue.

And if you look at it from an Iranian point of view, they're Persians in sea of Arabs. They are Shia in a sea of Sunnis. They've got nuclear weapons on all sides of them. The ayatollah, the supreme leader, appears to be convinced that our policy is regime change no matter what, and therefore there's no point in talking to us. And so that's one of the things that makes Iran intractable.

Your point on Able Archer reveals something real important. We threw a huge amount of money during the Cold War into Soviet studies. I mean, let me just name a couple of people who got Ph.D.s in that area: a guy named Bob Gates; a lady name Condie Rice. We put a lot of money.

We have not thrown the same kind of national defense education act effort into understanding the culture of emerging nuclear weapons states. We'll be sorry for that someday because in fact the biggest danger that we have is we don't understand honor-shame societies. We don't understand them historically. We don't understand them now.

We don't understand how Japanese military officers could have wanted to overthrow their semi-divine emperor to fight to the death because it was dishonorable to surrender. We don't understand the culture in which there were 23,000 dead Japanese and 500 prisoners on Iwo Jima. We don't understand some of the things that go on in Pakistan in honor-shame societies. And so we need to understand how that plays into nuclear deterrence. And I think that's a topic for the academic community, but the recognition of the need is a topic for the policy community.

Now there are a lot of people who are working very hard on that in the government, and I don't mean to denigrate that. But we don't have the same understanding. And with all that effort that we put into understanding the Soviet Union, we never actually believed they thought we might attack. And it is now very clear they did.

It is very clear that when the Soviets said that they feared a NATO attack, and we said that's shameless propaganda, that for at least some of them they really thought that NATO would attack. And the fact that we think that's a silly perception doesn't mean that it's not a dangerous perception for people who had both a pre-emptive mindset and a whole lot of forces. So I think we ought to mine that for the lessons for the Middle East.

Peter's giving me the look. Oh, you're not? I'm fine. I've just got to go talk to Russians about verification for a treaty we're not going to negotiate.

(Laughter).

More questions?

MR. : Hopefully a short one. I wonder if you could clarify why you believe that de-alerting is a solution in search of a problem? And I'll ask the question. Is it because our ICBMs are only one warhead per missile now rather than being MIRV'ed? Is that the basic reason?

MR. BROOKS: Two reasons. First, on the U.S. side, you've got it. The idea of de-alerting – the issue about attacking ICBMs – attacking ICBMs is uninteresting if you're the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation in a situation – my apologies to my Russian colleagues. Old habits die hard.

It is uninteresting to the Russian Federation's military planners because almost everybody assumes that you will want to use two warheads to attack a silo. That silo only contains one warhead and you each are limited to the same number of strategic warheads. You don't benefit yourself by that attack. Nobody believes that you can get all of the ICBMS, setting aside launch under attack. So you still can't spare yourself substantial retaliation.

We put the ICBMs where there wasn't a whole lot else. And I don't mean to trivialize the effect on states like Wyoming and North Dakota, but the overall functioning of the country is not there. So the risk of an attack on U.S. ICBMS is very, very low.

If you de-alert, and therefore take away launch under attack, you don't make that risk less, you actually make it more because now you might think you could pull it off. But the real reason de-alerting is a bad idea is that what we're worried about is not U.S. ICBMs, but Russian ICBMS, because the Russians have more of their force in land-based missiles than we do, and a strategic and emotional connection to that as the heart of deterrence.

And the Russians have a large-scale MIRV force and are probably going to build more. They've got this new heavy liquid, which if they actually build, will not be a helpful development. And so the Russians are not going to de-alert those systems.

So de-alerting reducing the risk of miscalculation only if it happens on both sides. What we need to do is continue to encourage – and I don't think we have very much say about this – the Russians to move to mobile systems. That's where the Russians are going, but they're going there fairly slowly. Because stability will be enhanced when both of us have systems that can't easily be attacked: in our case because they're at sea or on bombers; and in the Russian case because they're on mobile missiles.

And they say they're getting back – they've announced that they will be resuming patrols with the SSBN force. They've announced that the new Bulava missile has effectively reached its IOC. So they're also rejuvenating their submarine force, which I think we should actually welcome.

MR. HUESSY: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

(Applause).

General Klotz tomorrow is going to put what Linton said, and other speakers, into the context of how do we view nuclear forces from the perspective of not just the national security adviser but America's security as a whole? And he will be speaking here tomorrow.

Also a note that Larry Welch makes, the submarines in port are vulnerable and can be easily taken out even without nuclear weapons. That does not mean you de-alert the submarines any more than it makes sense to de-alert the ICBMs.

The ICBM Senate Caucus, chaired by Mr. Enzi and Mr. Conrad, will be having a July 11 conference on the Hill with members of the administration: Madelyn Creedon, General Chambers, General Kowalski; and a representative from NNSA to talk about the contribution of ICBMs to the nuclear deterrent issue. I think Brandon Teachout of Senator Conrad's office, if you are from the Hill and want to attend, contact him. And after General Klotz we will take a break for the July 4<sup>th</sup> recess and we'll come back here on July 10<sup>th</sup> with Don Cook from NNSA.

Linton, that was more than spectacular. It was wonderfully done and thank you very much.

(Applause).