MR. PETER HUESSY: I want to thank you all for being here today. My name is Peter Huessy and on behalf of ROA, NDIA and AFA, thank you for attending this next in our series of seminars on missile defense and strategic nuclear issues. I want to also thank our friends here from the embassies of Israel and Germany, Austria, Poland, Russia, Britain and the Czech Republic. Frank’s running for Secretary-General of the UN.

(Laughter).

He has eight votes. And also I want to thank our members of our military that are here today, as well as our corporate sponsors, and to remind you that next week Trent Franks is going to be talking about missile defense, and in particular some of the issues related to EMP and what occurred during the House Armed Services Committee markup.

And we’re honored today to have Frank Rose, who as I think said to me, has been attending the seminars since I think 1994 when he was over in the House Armed Services Committee. And previously to that, as you know, he was with Senator Kerry, and then in the department of Defense during the Bush administration. He is currently the deputy assistant secretary of State for space and defense policy and responsible for advising the assistant secretary and the undersecretary for arms control on international policy on key issues related to arms control, defense policy, and in particular ballistic missile defense, and military space policy and conventional arms control.

And as I noted, prior to the State department he was with the House of Representatives and on the Intelligence Committee as well in the House. And Frank, I want to just tell you on behalf of our three sponsoring organizations and our corporate sponsors and our guests, I want to thank you for coming over and sharing with us your views, particularly on the EPAA and European, U.S., NATO missile defense. Would you all give a warm welcome to Frank Rose?

Frank has asked, if we could, that his remarks are on the record, but his Q&A is off record, if we could observe that? And his remarks will be posted on the State Department web site after his remarks this morning.

MR. FRANK ROSE: Well, Peter, thanks so much. It’s a real pleasure to be here. After coming to your breakfasts for the past 16 years and eating all these free breakfasts, I thought I’d kind of repay the
favor and speak. But again, thanks so much, it’s great to be here, great to see so many friends and colleagues from throughout my career.

(Remarks from Prepared Statement) At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense. In that capacity, it was my responsibility to negotiate the details of the BMD agreements with Poland, Romania, and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach. I will touch more on this later in my presentation, but suffice to say that I have been focused over the last couple of years on ensuring that we are able to meet the vision the President laid out in his 2009 announcement regarding the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

Today, the threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to our deployed forces, allies, and partners is growing. This regional threat is likely to increase in both quantitative and qualitative terms in the coming years, as some states are increasing their inventories, and making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, mobile, and survivable.

Recognizing the seriousness of the ballistic missile threat, the United States seeks to create an environment, based on strong cooperation with allies and partners, which will eliminate an adversary’s confidence in the effectiveness of ballistic missile attacks. This will devalue and provide a disincentive for the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles. To that end, President Obama has made international cooperation on missile defense a key priority, and we are pursuing a region-by-region approach based on the following three principles:

First, the United States will deter adversaries through strong regional deterrence architectures built upon solid cooperative relationships with an eye toward efficiently incorporating assets and structures that our partners already have today or are seeking.

Second, the United States will pursue Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAAs) within key regions that are tailored to their unique deterrence requirements and threats, including the scale, scope, and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. We will phase in and implement the best available technology to meet existing and evolving threats, and adapt to situations that evolve in an unforeseen manner.

Third, recognizing that our supply of missile defense assets cannot meet the global demand we face, the United States is developing mobile capabilities that can be relocated to adapt to a changing threat and provide surge defense capabilities where they are most needed.

Missile defense plays an important role in the broader U.S. international security strategy, supporting both deterrence and diplomacy. Missile defense assures our allies and partners that the
United States has the will and the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a limited ballistic missile attack against the U.S. homeland and regional ballistic missile attacks against our forward deployed troops, allies, and partners.

I’d like to focus today on our work in Europe, which continues to receive a great deal of attention. In order to augment the defense of the United States and a future long-range threat and provide more comprehensive and more rapid protection to our deployed forces and European Allies against the current threat, the President outlined a four-phase approach for European missile defense called the European Phased Adaptive Approach or EPAA. Through the EPAA, the United States will deploy increasingly capable BMD assets to defend Europe against a ballistic missile threat from the Middle East that is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The EPAA will protect our deployed forces and our allies and partners in Europe, as well as augment the defense of the U.S. homeland against a potential by ICBMs from the Middle East in several ways. As part of Phase 1, we have deployed to Turkey missile defense radar, referred to as the AN/TPY-2 radar, which will provide data earlier in the engagement of an incoming ballistic missile from the Middle East. This radar enhances the homeland missile defense coverage of the United States provided by our Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) capabilities in Alaska and California.

A year ago last week, we concluded negotiations with Romania to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 BMD interceptor site, designed to provide protection against medium-range ballistic missiles. The land-based SM-3 system to be deployed to Romania is anticipated to become operational in the 2015 timeframe. We also reached an agreement with Poland to place a similar U.S. BMD interceptor site there in the 2018 timeframe.

Defense of the homeland will be further augmented by the basing in Poland of the SM-3 IIB interceptor, which is a future evolution of the SM-3 series of interceptors. The SM-3 IIB interceptor will provide us an opportunity for an early-intercept against potential long-range missile launched from the Middle East. It is important for everyone to know that we are already protected from limited ICBM attacks by the GBIs we have deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg, California.

The EPAA will eventually provide us with additional protection, ensuring that we can take multiple shots at a long-range missile heading to the United States. The EPAA – in all of its phases – also provides protection to for the thousands of U.S. military personnel based in Europe.

The Obama Administration is implementing the EPAA within the NATO context. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a new Strategic Concept and decided to develop the capability to defend NATO European populations and territory against the growing threat from ballistic missile proliferation. The Allies also welcomed the EPAA as a U.S. national contribution to
the new NATO territorial missile defense capability, in support of our commitment to the collective defense of the Alliance under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. At the Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government also decided to expand the scope of the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to serve as the command, control, and communications network to support this new capability. NATO allies have committed to investing over $1 billion for command, control, and communications infrastructure to support NATO missile defense.

These decisions have created a framework for Allies to contribute and optimize their own BMD assets for our collective defense. Our Allies possess land- and sea-based sensors that could be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems that can be integrated and used to provide point defense. For example, Germany and the Netherlands each have Patriot PAC-3s while Spain and Greece have Patriot PAC-2s. Turkey is also considering Patriot PAC-3s to address its air defense and BMD requirements. On the sea-based side, the Dutch announced in September 2011, their intention to upgrade the SMART-L air search radars on their De Zeven Provinciën-class frigates with an extended long-range (ELR) mode. In December 2006, the Dutch frigate Tromp participated in an Aegis BMD test during which it demonstrated the capability of a modified radar to track ballistic missiles.

Germany also has the SMART-L and Active Phased Array Radars (APARs) on its F-124 frigates and may decide to pursue a BMD capability in the future, while Spain has frigates equipped with a version of the SPY-1 radar used on our Aegis BMD ships. In June 2007, the Spanish frigate Méndez Núñez, participated in a BMD test off of Kaui, Hawaii, during which it was able to detect and track a ballistic missile with a minor modification to its Aegis Weapon System. Italy and Germany are also working with the United States to develop a Proof of Concept for MEADS, which will allow all three nations to harvest the advanced technologies of MEADS for follow-on systems.

Later this month on May 20-21, the NATO Heads of State and Government will meet in Chicago for the NATO Summit. Our goal is to declare an interim NATO MD capability at the Summit. What this means is that the United States could transfer select missile defense assets to NATO operational control should conditions warrant which results in a limited NATO missile defense capability. Over time, through additional contributions by the United States and other Allies, NATO missile defense will become even more capable.

Separate from the EPAA, it is important to note that our European allies are contributing directly to the defense of the United States today. The United Kingdom and Denmark each host an Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Fylingdales and Thule, Greenland, respectively. These radars are critical to the defense of the United States against a potential long-range missile threat from the Middle East. I would also note that U.S. EPAA capabilities will provide protection for these important assets. Therefore, I think it’s fair to say that the defense of the U.S. homeland is linked to the defense of Europe.
An update on missile defense cooperation with Europe should also include a discussion of our efforts to pursue cooperation with Russia. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is a Presidential priority, as it has been for several Administrations going back to President George H.W. Bush in the early 1990s.

When President Obama announced his new vision for missile defense in Europe in September 2009, he stated that “we welcome Russia’s cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests.” Missile defense cooperation with Russia will not only strengthen our bilateral and NATO-Russia relationships, but also could enhance NATO’s missile defense capabilities. Successful missile defense cooperation would provide concrete benefits to Russia, our NATO Allies, and the United States and will strengthen – not weaken – strategic stability over the long term.

This means it is important to get Russia inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the United States and NATO, while we are in the early stages of our efforts. Close cooperation between Russia and the United States and NATO is the best and most enduring way for Russia to gain the assurance that European missile defenses cannot and do not undermine its strategic deterrent.

Through this cooperation, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for the ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not threaten Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities. Cooperation will also allow Russia to see that the EPAA is designed to be flexible. Should the ballistic missile threat from nations like Iran change, our missile defense system can be adapted accordingly. Working together on missile defense would also send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working to counter their efforts.

That said, Russia has raised the issue of a legal guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria” that could, in effect, create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those presented by Iran and North Korea. We have also made it clear to Russia that we cannot and will not accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of purposes around the world, not just for missile defense.

The United States cannot accept any Russian proposal that limits the operational areas of U.S. or allied ships. Such limits are contrary to international law on navigational rights and freedom of the sea. We also will not accept limitations on the capabilities and numbers of our missile defense systems. Let me be clear, our missile defense capabilities are critical to our ability to counter a growing threat to our
deployed forces, allies, and partners; therefore, no nation or group of nations will have veto power over U.S. missile defense efforts.

And while we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that under the terms of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO alone will bear responsibility for defending the Alliance from the ballistic missile threat. This is why the United States and NATO cannot agree to Russia’s proposal for “sectoral” missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory.

We would, however, be willing to agree to a political framework including a statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. Any such statement would be politically binding and would publicly proclaim our intent to work together and chart the direction for cooperation, not limitations. Our bottom line is that missile defense cooperation with Russia will not come at the expense of our plans to defend against regional ballistic missile threats or our plans for the defense of the U.S. homeland.

Today’s ballistic missile threats continue to increase in number and sophistication. This increasing threat reinforces the importance of our collaborative missile defense efforts with partners around the world, which not only strengthen regional stability, but also provide protection for our forces serving abroad and augment the defense of the United States.

Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your questions. (End of prepared remarks).

MR. : Frank, you talked about EPAA, how about missile defense worldwide? For example, the U.S. is, of course, the term is, I guess, pivoting to the West. How about talking about that?

MR. ROSE: Yeah, let me say a couple of things. Let me first start by saying I talked a little bit about that early in my speech. One, we have the EPAA. But in the BMDR we were directed to look at other regions and develop individually tailored phased adaptive approaches.

Now the U.S. government is currently in the process of working on those phased adaptive approaches for East Asia as well as the Middle East. That said, we have a lot of work going on in East Asia and the Middle East. Let me talk – start with East Asia.

Japan. We have probably one of our best missile defense cooperation relationships with Japan. Japan has the SM-3 Block 1A. We are co-developing the SM-3 Block 2A. Additionally, Japan has Patriot PAC-3 and they’re looking at other capabilities. So we have a very strong relationship with Japan.
What we are starting to talk about, and it’s a little bit more difficult in East Asia, is how we work with the other nations in the region to have a more multilateral approach. And we’re in the early stages of that, but, for example, the United States and Japan and Australia have a trilateral dialogue on missile defense issues. So it’s in its infancies, but we are working very closely together with our Asian allies.

In the Middle East, you may have seen Secretary Clinton’s statement about three or four weeks ago about the work that we’re going to be doing with the GCC in the Gulf to deal with the threat from Iran with missile defense capabilities. So that is in its early stages. And most importantly in the Middle East, the long relationship that we have had with Israel.

Israel has – we’ve co-developed Arrow II. We’re in the process of co-developing Arrow III. David’s Sling is being deployed. And most importantly, Iron Dome has had some real effect.

So kind of going back to my earlier point, we believe that missile defense is a key element for our regional security architectures and we are implementing that around the world, not just in Europe. I have myself – I was the lead negotiator for the three basing agreements – I’ve spent a lot of my time in Europe, though I think we’re, as you said, we’re beginning to pivot and spend more attention in other parts of the world.

MR. : Just a quick follow-up on that. Do you envision a similar kind of phased approach of one, two, three, four, in these areas?

MR. ROSE: I think it has yet to be determined. I think to a certain extent we have a lot of work – for example, in East Asia and in the Middle East that’s been ongoing. I think it will be different. It could, in the end, when we are finished with the review, be a kind of a phase one, phase two, but it also could be different.

One of the things that the BMDR talks about is that each phased adaptive approach for each region will be different and will be tailored to the individual needs and requirements of that region. So it could be – to be determined.

MR. : You are, of course, aware of the activity that happened in the House Armed Services Committee this week. I wondered if you’d give your impressions of that? And specifically, members of the House, for example Congressman Turner, have pointed to a National Academy of Sciences report as the basis for this recommendation for this third missile site, which upon reading doesn’t really seem to support that conclusion. So would you talk about –

MR. ROSE: Well let me say a couple of points. Let me start by saying, and I think General Dempsey addressed this yesterday, we believe, given the current long-range threat from Iran, which is there is no long-range threat, we believe we have sufficient capabilities at this point to deal with any
threat. Now as I mentioned, we have 30 KBIs in Alaska and California. We have the radars in Thule and Fylingdales. So we believe right now a third site in the United States is not required.

That said, the administration and primarily the department of Defense, is looking at potential hedging strategies should our current intelligence change. So I have read the NAS. They say a couple of things. Their argument – and I think this is a correct argument – they say that they’re concerned that the SM-3 Block 2B will not get the velocity burnout necessary to do an intercept against a fast long-range missile coming from the Middle East.

So what they recommend is not putting additional GBIs in a third site in the United States. They are concerned that the GBI has serious reliability flaws. What they call for is developing a new interceptor that could be put in the East Coast of the United States.

But I think it’s also important to note that they say with regards to the EPAA, while they have concerns about phase four, which is the SM-3 Block 2B, they fully support phases one through three of the EPAA. And I’ve actually got a quote. I had a feeling that this issue would come up.

(Laughter).

So I actually have a quote from the report. They say, quote, “It should be noted that an effective theater missile defense is important to the homeland defense mission because it protects forward-deployed sensors essential to homeland defense and provides a fence against depressed trajectory attacks that would otherwise stress a U.S.-based homeland defense.”

So we’ll see. As I always said, we’re phased and adaptive. They make some other recommendations. One of the recommendations that the NAS study makes is that they believe that we need to have more powerful radars out there for discrimination.

Let’s be honest. This is off the record. I think everybody would argue who knows anything about missile defense, the more discrimination capabilities you have, especially when you are dealing with mid-course discrimination, the better. So I think there’s some good stuff. I don’t agree with everything in the NAS report, but I think they make some legitimate issues.

But on the East Coast site, I think the administration’s position, as articulated yesterday by General Dempsey is, given the current threat, we believe we are well positioned right now to deal with that threat. But again, we are working on a hedge strategy, primarily DOD, and if we have to adapt we will have to adapt. But again, we don’t believe now is the time to do that.
MR. : Going back to the co-development with the Japanese, can you touch on the issue of transferring that technology to our allies and partners, as well as any concerns regarding limitations in the ability of production, just from a capacity standpoint as well as a technical standpoint?

MR. ROSE: Well, you know, this is another -- since we’re off the record -- those who support the Aegis system I think owe a lot to Japan because I think had we not had a U.S.-Japan cooperative program I don’t know if we would have an SM-3 Block 2A missile. That said, I think we’re making a lot of progress on this export issue. As you well know, for a long time Japan had issues associated with its constitution that prevented them from exporting the SM-3 or other capabilities to third parties.

I think we’ve worked through many – and I’m not 100 percent we’ve worked through all the issues there – but I think we have made a great deal of progress. I don’t think to date we’ve had any interest in the SM-3 Block 2A for export, but that’s a very important thing for the United States. Because in many ways, Aegis has changed and the role that Aegis has played in the U.S. missile defense program has changed.

And I’ve said this publicly, and you can quote me on this – and Baker, I’ve said this before – Heritage was right about Aegis ballistic missile defense in 1990. And I’m very serious about that. I mean, Heritage was a voice in the wilderness in the late 1990s saying we should put the majority of our missile defense capabilities in the Aegis system because it’s the most proven system. And I think they were right.

And we’ve seen over the past 10 years a real reorientation of the missile defense program where we’re putting more capabilities into the Aegis system. I personally think it’s the right decision because I think that if you look at the Aegis track record, its effectiveness, suitability, survivability, it’s key. And as we work with other allies – and I talked a little bit about the naval capabilities the Spanish have, the Germans have, the Dutch have – as I see international missile defense I personally believe that sea-based missile defense will be key to international cooperation.

And hopefully in the future we will have a number of allies who will be interested in sea capabilities like the 2A and the 1B. We’ll have to see. We are very encouraging of our allies who want to get that capability. But the bottom line to your question is I think we’re making progress. We have not resolved all the issues but I think we’re moving in the right directions, and I think it’s critical for U.S. missile defense cooperation around the world.

MR. BAKER SPRING: First of all, thank you for that compliment. That’s where Heritage remains today on Aegis and the advantages of sea-based missile defense. I wanted to back up a little bit and focus specifically on the European region in terms of the broader deterrence posture for the United States and NATO, which is the nature, which is a little bit hard for me to discern from administration
policy today, whether it be about military issues, political issues within NATO or the European region, or with regard to arms control, is the relationship between short-range U.S. nuclear forces in Europe and missile defense. How would you categorize the relationship between those two elements of our broader deterrence posture in Europe, and what do you see in the future with regard to the military, political and arms control agendas regarding that relationship?

MR. ROSE: Well I think there are different views of most of the European allies on that issue. What I would say from the U.S.’ perspective is that we believe that missile defense is a complement to our nuclear capabilities and not a replacement for those capabilities. But as you know, there are differences among allies within the allies on kind of that appropriate mix.

There will be a DDPR (ph) that will be released, hopefully to the public sometime soon, that our heads of state and government will talk about in Chicago. And I think that will probably provide you a little bit more clearer view of kind of where we’re going. But for U.S. policy, we believe our missile defenses are a complement to our nuclear capability, not a replacement.

MR. HUESSY: You know, Robert Kaplan has written a book, “Monsoon.” And one of the things he writes about is from North Korea south through India, throughout the Middle East, the commonality of many countries is the deployment of ballistic missiles as leverage, but also it has the blackmail and terrorist aspect, and the seeking to put WMD on them. And I wanted you to address the issue of – Bruce Hoffman wrote in “Foreign Policy” on his blog that missile defense was – his comment was Iran is not going to launch a ballistic missile into the center of Europe.

So what’s the threat? Could you address – again, since you’re off the record – address the uses to which you feel our adversaries will use missiles? Apart from the actual launching of them, what do they serve politically which missile defense tries to check?

MR. ROSE: Fundamentally, from my point of view, I agree with your point that in many cases these countries are not going to actually use missiles. But the mere fact that they have those capabilities could influence nations, how they operate in a crisis.

For example, say there is a contingency with Iran in the Middle East. And Iran can say, we have thousands of missiles and if you allow U.S. forces on your territory we are going to use these missiles. And they don’t necessarily have to say what’s on it.

You know how the news media is. They have nuclear weapons. They have chemical weapons. But fundamentally, it can influence how nations respond to our request for access to bases, things like that. So you may not necessarily use the missiles, but it could play a major role in managing a crisis.

For example, and again we’re off the record, in 1991, the Gulf, Saddam Hussein shot quite a few missiles at Israel. Israel wanted to respond. Deploying U.S. Patriots – and we can debate on how effective those Patriots were – but I would argue that that helped manage the crisis, helped keep Israel out of the war. So you don’t necessarily have to use ballistic missiles for those to achieve their political objective.
My personal opinion is many of these countries who develop these weapons aren’t doing it for military capability – military reasons. They’re doing it to manage political crises. So that’s how I respond. I say one, they’re primarily political weapons. And two, I want to note the importance of using missile defense to help manage political crises, and I think we’ve seen that in the past.

MS. ALLISON FORTIER: Allison Fortier, Lockheed Martin. Thank you for your statements on the SM-3 2B as a defense of the continental United States. And there’s been a little bit of confusion about that on the Hill, some charts maybe that were misinterpreted. But as a defense of homeland, underlying GMD, I think that’s very important, so thank you for that.

I wanted to ask about the NATO commitment to the ALT/BMD. That billion dollar figure that you heard, I’d heard like 200 million Euros.

MR. ROSE: Well there are three parts of ALT/BMD. ALT/BMD is not just about territorial defense. It has three parts, and Dave Martin knows this very well.

The first part, called capability one, that is your lower tier system for defense of forces. And that’s about $400 million, about that.

Then you have capability two. Capability two is upper tier capabilities: Aegis, THAAD, for defense of forces, okay? So that’s about $800 million, okay?

Then, on top of that, in order to do territorial missile defense, you need to make some modifications to ALT/BMD. Now these are not major because most of the systems that you’re using for the EPAA: Aegis, ANT/PT2 radars, they are already part of capability two of the ALT/BMD forces. But what this additional defense of populations is, is this is your higher level strategic communications, your situational awareness. So when you take all the pieces of ALT/BMD, it’s probably a little bit over $1 billion, and that’s not an insignificant amount.

Now the United States, as a member of NATO, we bear about 22 percent of the cost in common funding for that upgrade. But our allies are paying 78 percent of the cost. So I think it’s really important to note that our allies one, are contributing. Now they have a lot fewer resources than we do, but they are, for the NATO system.

Number two, there are a number of allies, for example like the Dutch, like the Germans with Patriot, who have capabilities that will go into the NATO system. And number three, and I think people forget this and that’s why I made it a point in my speech today, you have the United Kingdom and Denmark who have hosted radars, allowed us to upgrade – and I actually played a big role in the upgrade of both Thule and Fylingdales in the Bush administration, that are primarily assets for the defense of the United States.

To be quite honest with you, I’m concerned that I hear some folks saying, why do we really care about the Europeans? Well one, I would argue, we’ve got a treaty commitment. But two, their defense is linked to our defense.
If we can’t protect the radars, you’re not going to have a homeland defense with the current capabilities we have. Now if we go in the future to some type of space tracking system where it obviates the need for land-based radars to do our missile defense mission, that may be different. I don’t see that happening anytime in the near future.

MR. HUESSY: The billion dollars is over what period of time, Frank? Is it a FYDP number?

MR. ROSE: It’s about 10 years. It’s over 10 years.

MR. : It’s more, Frank.

MR. ROSE: Yeah, well I use a billion as a nice round number. But when you start to look at the other – there’s a, for example, there’s a NATO system called bi-strategic command communications, which is your long-haul communications which is not in that number. So it’s even more.

MR. DAVE MARTIN (?): When we began starting this discussion with the infrastructure committees and so forth, it took a lot of work. But I think they’re supporting it now. I think that’s the important point – (off mic).

MR. ROSE: It’s basically over 10 years.

MR. HUESSY: Okay. Another issue, then, has to do with the use of ballistic missiles in actually but in a surreptitious manner. I emailed General Welch a number of months ago and asked him about what’s the worry about the use of missiles that would worry him that we’re not addressing? And he said, from the ocean, where you would not know who launched it. You might have suspicions. And the question is whether it would be off our maritime regions or a maritime region somewhere else; whether a freighter, which the Rumsfeld Commission looked at, or submarines, which are a little different in that -- the difficulty of people with submarines.

It’s off the record, but I’m curious. Can you lay out, Frank, the extent to which in the threat analysis that you work on, where is this in the pantheon of things that we need to start looking at?

MR. ROSE: Peter, I’ve got to be honest with you. At the State Department, though I’m involved in missile defense, most of my time is focused on working with the allies. So I really don’t have a good answer for you. I’m not dodging the question, I just don’t know.

MR. HUESSY: You never hear this from our allies given that all around Europe is, of course, water?

MR. ROSE: To be honest with you, not really. I mean fundamentally the issue that people are concerned about is Iran. I mean, that is really the concern in making sure that we have sufficient capabilities to deal with that threat. Now I’m not saying that that concern could not evolve over time. But that is really where the focus is.
MR. HUESSY: Part of my concern is that Iran would get a freighter and use a Scud to launch something into some American city so that it is a different aspect of the Iranian threat. It’s not a visible leverage, but it’s more of a terrorist threat.

MR. ROSE: Like I said, I’ve seen studies as well. That’s a very expensive threat to defend against.

MR. HUESSY: Yes, it is.

MR. ROSE: Very expensive. Any other questions?

MR. HUESSY: Yes, one.

MR. ROSE: Okay.

(Laughter).

MR. ROSE: A prerogative of the host.

MR. HUESSY: We were talking prior that the Institute for Defense Analysis, the National Academy of Science, General Accountability Office and DSB, four studies that have been – and I’m characterizing not what they said, because a lot of what they said was classified, but what the press said they said. And the comments have been, if you could summarize it, is that EPAA doesn’t really work. And that’s a broad statement. And that the key problems are the speed of the interceptor, mid-course discrimination and sensors. To what extent would it be very useful for the administration and Congress to assess, on an unclassified basis, what the reports actually said and the extent to which, as I’ve understood it from some of my friends, some of the report authors have walked back, both publicly and privately, from some of the things they said which were misunderstood in terms of what the capabilities and purposes of EPAA are?

MR. ROSE: That is an excellent question, Peter. I mean, I’ve read all the reports and I have actually been through most of the briefings. There’s been a lot on the DSB report, the Defense Science Board basically saying that – the argument is that the missile defenses won’t work. They can’t do discrimination.

Let me just – you know, page 34 of the report. Let me read what they have to say. And this is on the DOD web site. It said, “In summary, the pursuit of the current plans for regional ballistic missile defense, such as envisioned in the PAA, if pursued to completion, will provide an effective regional defense capability. Those plans are technically feasible, are making good progress and enjoy broad political support.”

And basically, NAS makes the same point about phases one through three of the EPAA. Their concern, in the NAS report, is more about whether you can get the speed out of the SM-3 2B to do that long-range intercept. We’re very early in the SM-3 2B program, so I think the jury is out. But I would not bet against Aegis.
Remember last year, the SM-3 Block 1A dealt with an intermediate range threat. And SM-3 1A is a very – I would say it’s the very early stages of the Aegis system. So, you know, I think there are some legitimate issues in some of those reports, specifically on discrimination. And I think if you talk to MDA, they agree that we need to improve our discrimination capabilities.

As I always say, three words, the phased adaptive approach. And as new capabilities and technologies come onboard we will insert those new capabilities. This is not in stone, it is adaptable, and it can be adapted to the threat.

So I think the bottom line is I think there’s been a lot in the press, but if you actually read these reports it’s a much different picture. They say missile defense is fundamentally feasible. But there are challenges, like there are challenges with everything. And I think those who understand missile defense, I don’t care if your view is on the right or the left, they say there are some legitimate concerns that have been raised in those reports.

MR. : You’re off the record, and it’s a leading question, but

MR. ROSE: Bob is my former boss.

MR. : So compare and contrast on the missile defense the long-range threat. Compare and contrast the SM-3 Block 2B, which doesn’t exist yet and is still very much on the drawing board, with the current GBI interceptor in terms of which would be the more appropriate one to deal with the long-range threat at this point, going forward, we’re looking at the 2020 and beyond period of time.

MR. ROSE: Well let me give you my personal opinion.

MR. HUESSY: This is off the record.

MR. ROSE: Here is my big concern about GMD. When GMD was designed MDA was exempted from all the requirements process. I’m going to come back to this. And therefore, things like suitability, survivability, reliability, were afterthoughts in the GMD system.

Aegis and THAAD, though they were exempted from the DOD requirements process, they used the original requirements documents as the basis for their development. So survivability, reliability and suitability were built into the system. And then when you look at the DOT&E reports on Aegis and THAAD – for example, two or three years ago the operations test authority for the Navy declared Aegis BMD, at least the current version, 3.6, to be operationally effective and suitable.

So I personally have, because of the way they have gone forward with the Aegis program, I have a lot of confidence that it can be an effective system. I’ve got concerns about GMD, again, my personal concerns, but I think a lot of people share those concerns. Let me quote from the NAS study.

They say – they were asked a question with regards to what was your opinion on the third site? And they said, quote, “The committee did not analyze the prior administration’s plan to deploy an additional interceptor site in Poland as such. However, since the interceptor proposed for that site
would have been a derivative of the existing GBI, it would have been subject to the same limitations that made the committee recommend replacing the existing GBI with a different interceptor.”

MR. HUESSY: Well, thank you, Frank, for a wonderful set of remarks. We really thank you for that, and come back next year.

MR. ROSE: Thanks.

(Applause).